AMBASSADOR REES MEETS BURMA CAUCUS CHAIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000517

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV KDEM KISL UNSC BM ID
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR REES MEETS BURMA CAUCUS CHAIR

REF: A. JAKARTA 293 (DPR FLEXES MUSCLES ON BURMA)


B. JAKARTA 98 (UNSC RESOLUTION ON BURMA)

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Classified By: Political Officer Eric W. Kneedler, reason: 1.4 (b) and
(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a February 20 meeting with Djoko Susilo, the
Chairman of Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) Caucus
on Burma, Special Representative for Social Issues Ambassador
Grover Joseph Rees commended the DPR's activism on Burma (Ref
A),and discussed additional measures the DPR might take to
pressure the GOI to revise its Burma policy. Amb. Rees
deplored the Burmese junta's record of gross human rights
violations, singling out in particular the use of rape as an
instrument of policy against ethnic minorities, and urged the
DPR to continue its efforts to compel the GOI to take a
leadership role on Burma within ASEAN. Djoko, also a member
of the DPR's Commission I, which handles foreign policy and
defense, said that Commission I members had approached the
DPR chairman about passing a statement on Burma before a full
plenary session. Djoko shared the text with us, included
below in its entirety, and said that it enjoyed strong
support across the party factions. A contact in DPR Chairman
Agung Laksono's office separately confirmed the meeting took
place, but asserted the statement would not be voted on in
plenary. Djoko sees Foreign Minister Wirajuda as the biggest
obstacle within the GOI to a more assertive stance on Burma,
and suggested that the Burma Caucus would focus its energies
on lobbying President Yudhoyono more forcefully. End
Summary.

MEETING WITH BURMA CAUCUS CHAIR
--------------


2. (C) On February 20, Special Representative for Social
Issues Ambassador Grover Rees and the Charge d'Affaires met
with Djoko Susilo, Chairman of the Burma Caucus and a member
of Amien Rais' National Mandate Party (PAN). Amb. Rees asked
Djoko about FM Wirajuda's Jan. 25 appearance before
Commission I (Ref A) and Djoko noted that Wirajuda was
heavily criticized by a range of parliamentarians from across
party lines for the GOI's UNSC abstention. Djoko disparaged
Wirajuda's performance before Commission I - a hearing that
lasted until one-thirty the following morning - and noted
that Wirajuda cited "dwifungsi" ("two functions," the
Soeharto-era arrangement under which the Indonesian military
had social-political as well as military functions) as a
possible transitional tool in Burma, a particularly unhelpful
suggestion given Indonesia's own history with an
authoritarian military regime. Djoko had personally met with
FM Wirajuda on the Burma issue both before and after the
GOI's abstention, and he believed that FM Wirajuda was almost
single handedly responsible for the decision to abstain.
According to Djoko, Director for International Security
Affairs Desra Percaya was a strong advocate for a "yes" vote,
but ultimately could not overcome FM Wirajuda's objections
(Comment: Percaya said the same (septel) in a separate
meeting but we believe his suggestions of having an
independent position are suspect). Djoko said that President
Yudhoyono played virtually no role in the vote decision
making process and he asserted that he and other members of
the Burma Caucus would have to focus their lobbying efforts
on the President personally if they were to overcome FM
Wirajuda's obstructionist tendencies on the issue.


3. (C) Djoko said that some of his Foreign Ministry contacts
had suggested to him that Indonesia might have supported the
resolution had they been given an opportunity to provide more
input into its wording. The Charge disputed this assertion
and pointed out that the GOI had in fact been given every
possible opportunity to help shape the resolution, both in
Jakarta and New York.


4. (C) Djoko said that he was aggressively working to build
popular support for a new GOI approach to Burma by
highlighting the plight of Muslims in Burma suffering under
the junta's rule. Djoko pointed to a recent article that he
had written in the Jakarta Post newspaper as one example of
his efforts in this regard. Djoko asked rhetorically why
Indonesia should be so outspoken in its support of a UNSC

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resolution on Israeli actions in Gaza, a problem thousands of
miles away and with little direct impact on Indonesia's
security, and yet fail to endorse a resolution on Burma, a
nettlesome issue in its own backyard; Burmese refugees had in
fact already landed on Indonesian shores in Aceh.


5. (C) Djoko decried the fact that ASEAN had taken very
limited action to date to pressure the Burmese junta. He
noted that the GOI had repeatedly pointed to ASEAN as the
appropriate forum to help resolve the impasse with Burma, and
yet he lamented that virtually nothing had been accomplished.
If ASEAN were to play a truly useful role, he argued,
Indonesia would need to use its muscle as the largest member
to begin to develop a consensus and bring to heel reluctant
members such as Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei. While the ASEAN
inter-parliament group had already taken steps to lead the
regional charge, it was simply not enough.


6. (C) The previous week Djoko met with DPR Chairman Laksono
to discuss the possibility of bringing a formal criticism of
Burma to a vote in a DPR plenary session. Djoko claimed that
Laksono had signaled his interest in such a vote and Djoko
suggested that the DPR would soon endorse a Commission I
statement on Burma before a full plenary session. Our
contacts in Chairman Laksono's office separately confirmed
that a meeting on Burma was held on February 14, but disputed
Djojko's account that Laksono had provided any such
assurances. Arief Budiman, a member of Chairman Laksono's
staff, said Laksono told Djoko and other Commission I members
that he would consider bringing the statement to a vote,
before ultimately concluding it would serve no political
purpose. According to Arief, Laksono felt the issue did not
resonate because of a lack of popular support. He said the
statement would not make it to a plenary vote.


7. (SBU) Below is the translated text of Commission I's
statement on Burma:

The House of Representatives of
The Republic of Indonesia

Statement of the Commission I of the House of Representatives
of
the Republic of Indonesia On Myanmar

Background:

(1.) As we have all known for more than a decade, Myanmar has
become the subject of concern in the world community because
democracy is experiencing a decline there. The setback is
most obvious with respect to the Human Rights situation,
which has been getting worse since the military junta, called
the State Peace Development Council (SDPC),took power in
Myanmar. The junta negated the results of the 1990 general
election, won by the National League of Democracy (NDL) and
detained its Secretary General, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, who has
gone ten years without a court proceeding.

(2.) When it became a member of ASEAN, the government of the
military junta, the State Peace Development Council (SPDC),
promised to fulfill the Road Map to Democracy. The junta
developed this itself and highlighted its importance in
promoting national reconciliation as a way of overcoming the
many conflicts occurring among different groups in society
and among political parties in Myanmar, including upholding
the result of the 1990 general election. However, until
today, there have been no significant developments towards
the promised reconciliation process.

(3.) Indonesia's DPR Commission I believes that the
reconciliation process will take place only if Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi and the other political detainees are freed. Only if
this requirement is fulfilled can a just and satisfying
political reconciliation in Myanmar occur. We share this
belief with fellow ASEAN countries, as well as local civil
society groups in Myanmar seeking to increase transparency on
what is taking place with respect to the reduction in
democracy and human rights in Myanmar.

(4.) The decline of democracy and human rights in Myanmar is
no longer a domestic affair of Myanmar. It has become a
regional and international issue, and, therefore, needs other
ASEAN members to participate on that issue in light of the

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social, political and economic implications for the region.
For that reason, Indonesia, as the third biggest democratic
country in the world, should play a more significant and
active role in encouraging democracy in the Southeast Asia
region, particularly in the ASEAN community.

Based on the above mentioned facts, we, members of Commission
I DPR-RI recommend the following:

(1.) Urge the Burmese government and the State Peace
Development Council (SPDC) to immediately release Aung San
Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners as a pre-condition
for a just and equal national dialogue on national
reconciliation in Burma.

(2.) Urge the State Peace Development Council (SPDC) to
fulfill the plans written in the Road Map to Democracy and
especially to immediately resolve their conflict with the
National League of Democracy (NLD).

(3.) Urge the State Peace Development Council (SPDC) to
immediately open a dialogue with groups of society and
political parties in conflicts and to take positive steps
towards a program for solving the problems that have caused
the conflict so that national reconciliation and democracy
can be realized in Burma.

(4.) Urge the Indonesian government to ask ASEAN countries to
support a UNSC resolution on Burma affairs after the previous
resolution was rejected in the Security Council meeting.

Jakarta, January 16, 2007
Commission I Chairman
(signature)
Theo L. Sambuaga

End of draft of Commission I statement


8. (U) Amb. Rees has cleared this cable.
HEFFERN