Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA515
2007-02-26 06:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

USG PUSHES INDONESIA TO HELP STOP STATE SPONSORED

Tags:  PHUM PGOV PREL ASEAN BM ID 
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VZCZCXRO7297
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0515/01 0570618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260618Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3442
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 7521
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0577
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000515 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL ASEAN BM ID
SUBJECT: USG PUSHES INDONESIA TO HELP STOP STATE SPONSORED
RAPE IN BURMA

REF: A. A) STATE 20000

B. B)JAKARTA 429

Classified By: POLOFF SANJAY RAMESH FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000515

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2016
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL ASEAN BM ID
SUBJECT: USG PUSHES INDONESIA TO HELP STOP STATE SPONSORED
RAPE IN BURMA

REF: A. A) STATE 20000

B. B)JAKARTA 429

Classified By: POLOFF SANJAY RAMESH FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: During his February 19-20 visit to Jakarta,
Special Representative for Social Issues, Ambassador Grover
Joseph Rees, conveyed the USG's concern over the Burmese
government's use of rape as an instrument of violence in
three separate meetings with Indonesian Department of Foreign
Affairs (Deplu) officials. He urged Indonesia to use its
leadership role in ASEAN, as well as its bilateral
relationship, to press the Burmese junta to immediately stop
this intolerable practice.


2. (C) While Deplu officials deplored government-sponsored
rape in principle, they asked for reports backing the USG's
allegations and steered clear of firm commitments to tackle
the issue. Indonesia's approach to Burma was one of
engagement not confrontation. Director for International
Security Affairs Desra Percaya spoke at length on how pushing
a Security Council resolution had backfired and claimed
Indonesia might have supported the resolution if language on
ASEAN had been inserted. Officials also claimed that other
countries had declined to support Indonesian suggestions for
a resolution about Burma in the Human Rights Council.
Percaya described the attempt in Cebu to have three ASEAN
nations to work with Burma as unlikely to be successful. End
Summary.

Delivering the Message
--------------


2. (C) On February 19 and 20, Special Representative for
Social Issues, Ambassador Rees, told Deplu officials that
Burma and Sudan were the only two countries whose
governments systematically use rape as an official instrument
of violence exclusively against vulnerable minorities. The
Burmese junta used rape to oppress, demoralize and control
restive minorities. Pointing out that a "gradual roadmap
approach" and incremental measures such as strengthening the
justice system or law enforcement were totally insufficient
to stopping rape in Burma, Amb. Rees urged the international

community to take immediate action to make the Burmese junta
stop this gross violation of human rights. He noted that
though the recent UN Security Council resolution censoring
Burma had failed to pass, it received nine of fifteen votes
on the UNSC, and that all the Council members acknowledged
the problems that existed within Burma.


3. (C) Amb. Rees told Deplu officials that Indonesia is in an
excellent position to assist in efforts to persuade the
Burmese regime to stop systematically raping minorities.
Indonesia's influence derived from its status as an emerging
democracy and world's largest Muslim country, a member of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) and Human Rights Council (HRC),
and a natural leader of ASEAN with strong bilateral ties to
Burma. Ambassador Rees urged the GOI to use various
bilateral, regional, and international fora to compel Burma
to stop state-sanctioned rape. He suggested that Indonesia
work with like-minded countries to introduce a Human Rights
Council resolution censoring the Burmese government's use of
rape. Ambassador Rees said that by taking a strong and
principled stand on this issue, Indonesia had the chance to
assume a global leadership role in promoting human rights.
He said the USG would provide Indonesia with several credible
reports documenting widespread rape targeted at minorities
such as the Karen, Shan, and Chin.

Indonesia Trying to Engage Burma
--------------


4. (C) Deplu Director for East Asian Affairs Yuri Thamrin,
told Amb. Rees that Indonesia shared USG concerns over lack
of human rights in Burma and characterized government
sponsored rape as "intolerable." However, he noted,
Indonesia differed with the U.S. over the means to influence
Burma. He explained that Indonesia had abstained from voting
"yes" on the UNSC Burma resolution because it was the wrong
forum in which to address the Burma issue. Thamrin said
Indonesia had explored holding a HRC special session on
Burma. However, this idea was dropped due to the Non-Aligned
Movement's and Indonesia's long-standing opposition to
country-specific UN resolutions.


5. (C) Thamrin said Indonesia was committed to pushing Burma
towards democracy, but warned against "simplistic approaches"
that could alienate the Burmese junta. Democracy, rule of
law, and human rights were still "emerging norms within
ASEAN," and that Burma needed to be "encouraged" on the right

JAKARTA 00000515 002 OF 003


path. During the previous week's Indonesia-Burma Joint
Commission meetings, Indonesia had explored several
mechanisms to influence Burma, including training Burmese
military in the Indonesian staff-college, cultural exchanges,
and trade fairs (note: on February 14-15, the foreign
ministers of Indonesia and Burma kicked off the first meeting
of their bilateral "Joint Commission" and discussed
cooperation in the economic sphere, energy, defense, trade,
education, etc. See septel readout). In these meetings,
Indonesia tried unsuccessfully to get information about Aung
San Suu Kyi's continuing imprisonment and the possibility of
future release. Thamrin regretted that Burma's powerful
neighbors, India and China, were actively engaging the regime
and vying for influence without regard to Burma's lack of
democracy, providing the regime with less incentive to reform
itself. Thamrin asked Ambassador Rees to send him
documentation on rape in Burma and promised to "discuss the
issue" with Foreign Minister Wirajuda and "await further
instructions from the Minister."

Human Rights Office Unaware of Rape Charges
--------------


6. (C)Deplu Director for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs Wiwiek Firman said that while she was aware of human
rights violations in Burma such as forced labor, this was the
first time she had heard of instances of
government-sanctioned rape. However, she said Indonesia was
extremely sensitive to rape, in part due to its own history
in Aceh and East Timor where human rights groups alleged
widespread rape by the security forces. In addition, Firman
said Indonesian NGOs were deeply concerned about women's
rights and rape and that these NGOs actively worked with
Deplu to influence foreign policy. Consequently, Firman told
us she was alarmed at reports of state-sponsored rape in
Burma and asked that we send her the relevant information.


7. (C) Ambassador Rees asked for Indonesia's support on four
upcoming UN resolutions:

-- An HRC resolution on religious intolerance. Ambassador
Rees asked Indonesia to help the U.S. ensure that this
resolution did not solely focus on intolerance against
Muslims, leaving out intolerance (including violence) against
Jews, Christians, Buddhists and others;

-- An HRC resolution on technical assistance on democracy,
particularly to countries with poor human rights records;

-- A Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) resolution
sponsored by the U.S. on forced and early marriage; and

-- A Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) resolution
sponsored by the U.S. on female infanticide and prenatal
screening for gender.

Firman expressed great interest in the texts of the CSW
resolutions and suggested that Indonesia would be inclined to
support resolutions on those topics.

UNSC Burma resolution "a mistake"
--------------


8. (C) On February 20, Director for International Security
Affairs Desra Percaya described the USG's attempt to pass a
UNSC resolution on Burma as "not wise" and a "mistake."
Percaya said Indonesia had advocated a "gradual escalation"
in the UNSC, starting with a presidential statement and then
slowly moving to a resolution and possible sanctions. By
"rushing the process," the USG had ended up with a vetoed
resolution which in effect gave the Burmese junta "the upper
hand." Percaya also claimed that the resolution was "too
broad" and that it left out the critical role of ASEAN in its
operative paragraphs.


9. (C) In a surprising assertion, Percaya claimed Indonesia
had unsuccessfully tried to insert language on ASEAN.
Peracaya hinted that Indonesia would have supported the UNSC
resolution had it included language on ASEAN. PolCouns
challenged this assertion saying that no indication had been
given by GOI officials in Jakarta that there was a desire for
ASEAN-specific language. Percaya suggested that he had
supported voting for the resolution but that his minister did
not agree. He made a point of telling his staff not to
include his statements on this point in their record of the
conversation. Percaya said that while the U.S. and Indonesia
agreed on the ultimate goal of bringing about democracy in
Burma, they differed in their approach.


10. (C) Percaya said that Indonesia had explored different

JAKARTA 00000515 003 OF 003


strategies to influence Burma such as:

--Raising Burma in the HRC, although the idea was
unsuccessful, he claimed, due to lack of support from other
countries, including the EU. Percaya also noted that the
"old" Indonesian position has been to oppose all
country-specific human rights resolutions, but he hinted that
this position might be subject to change.

--Proposing a trilateral commission composed of Indonesia,
Singapore, and the Philippines to work with Burma during the
ASEAN Cebu summit earlier this year (previously referred to
as a "troika" in reftels). Percaya indicated that this idea
was unlikely to be go very far, blaming the timing of the
Security Council vote.

Percaya said the failed UNSC resolution as well as the
stalled attempts to raise Burma in the HRC and form a
trilateral commission had "left us stuck." He concluded that
it was important to keep Burma firmly within ASEAN, and
warned against taking actions that could push Burma closer to
China.


11. (C) During the course of the conversation, Polcouns
delivered the reftel A demarche urging Indonesian support for
action in Burma in all available international fora.


12. (C) Comment: In response to Ambassador Rees's message on
government-sponsored rape in Burma, Deplu officials sounded a
sympathetic note and deplored rape in principle. They asked
for the USG to provide Indonesia substantiating reports, but
steered clear of firm commitments. The comments alleging
that Indonesia explored pursuing a resolution in the HRC were
surprising given Indonesia's consistent opposition to
resolutions targeted to specific countries (except Israel).
We do not believe that the GOI will suddenly change its
position in this regard, but recommend that Missions Geneva
and/or New York challenge the Indonesian delegations on this
point. Desra Percaya's description of events surrounding the
UNSC resolution lacked credibility, notably on the ASEAN
language. It is unusual for someone who until recently was
the Minister's Chief of Staff to be openly suggesting a
different point of view, including to Parliamentarians
(septel). When received from the Department, we will forward
the requested information on rape to the above Deplu offices.
End Comment.


13. (U) Ambassador Rees has cleared this message.
HEFFERN