COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA RACKS UP MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003375

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, S/CT, INL FOR BOULDIN
DOJ FOR CRIM AAG SWARTZ, DOJ/OPDAT FOR
LEHMANN/ALEXANDRE/BERMAN
DOJ/CTS FOR MULLANEY, ST HILAIRE
FBI FOR ETTUI/SSA ROTH
NCTC WASHDC
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV KJUS PTER ID
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM -- INDONESIA RACKS UP MORE
CONVICTIONS

REF: A. JAKARTA 3350


B. JAKARTA 3312

C. JAKARTA 3214

D. JAKARTA 2101

E. JAKARTA 826

F. JAKARTA 194

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b+d).


1. (U) This message was coordinated with Consulate General
Surabaya.


2. (C) SUMMARY: A Jakarta court has handed down guilty
verdicts to four more terrorists involved in a series of
attacks in Central Sulawesi in 2004-06. The sentences were
consistent with those handed out the previous week in six
other cases involving the same crimes. Collectively, the 10
convictions represent a milestone in the GOI's largely
successful effort to defuse tensions in the formerly restive
province. There is no sign that the government plans to let
up in its winning effort. END SUMMARY.

FOUR MORE!!


3. (SBU) The GOI has racked up more convictions in its war
against terrorism. On December 11, prosecutors from the
Attorney General's Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational
Crime won convictions against four more terrorists who
participated in a series of deadly attacks in Poso and Palu,
Central Sulawesi. The men were members of the "Tanah Runtuh"
group, a Poso-based terror cell led by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
operative Hasanuddin (one name only),currently serving a
20-year sentence (ref E). Six other members of the cell were
similarly convicted on terrorism charges the week of December
3 (ref B). Those convicted have yet to indicate whether they
will appeal the convictions.


4. (U) The newly convicted include (the trial and penalty
phases are merged in Indonesia):

-- Muhammad Basri, who received the stiffest penalty (19
years) for his role in multiple attacks targeted at Poso
Christians, including the 2005 beheadings of several
schoolgirls, the murder of a pastor and the shooting of two
students;
-- Ardin Djantau, who received a 14-year sentence for his
role in the 2005 Tentena market bombing that killed 22
people; and,
--Tugiran and Ridwan (both one name only),who also received
14 years for a bombing attack in September 2006 that killed
one.

The sentences were consistent with those handed out to other
members of the Tanah Runtuh group, as well as those received
by 17 Poso Christians convicted this past August of murdering
two Muslims (ref D).

THAT WINNING FEELING


5. (C) The 10 convictions mark a milestone in the GOI's
largely successful effort to bring an end to the simmering
conflict in Central Sulawesi (ref C). The spate of attacks
in 2005 and early 2006 threatened to revive the communal
violence of 1999-2001. Instead, in 2006, the GOI made a
concerted effort to arrest those who were provoking attacks,
some of whom were JI provocateurs from outside the province.


6. (C) The arrest of Hasanuddin and two others by Indonesian
National Police (INP) in May 2006 was followed by a lengthy
INP campaign to locate the other members of the Tanah Runtuh
group. These efforts culminated in a series of raids on the
group's Poso stronghold in January which yielded 18 arrests
(ref F). Nine of those arrested were among the 10 newly
convicted terrorists.

JAKARTA 00003375 002 OF 002




7. (C) While focusing primarily on catching Muslim
extremists, the GOI also took action against Christians who
engaged in violence. In September 2006, the GOI carried out
death sentences against three Christians involved in attacks.
Moreover, the INP acted quickly in apprehending 17
Christians who murdered two Muslims in reaction to the
executions. GOI law enforcement made a point of treating the
Christians the same as Muslim arrestees: they were sent to
Jakarta for trial, charged with terrorism, and received
sentences in the 12-14 year range. This seemingly evenhanded
approach has largely quieted earlier claims by radical Muslim
leaders that the INP was unfairly targeting Muslims.

ATONEMENT?


8. (C) The GOI was clearly embarrassed that it failed to
prevent the brutal violence that afflicted the Poso region,
which had been festering for several years prior to 2005.
Its patient but effective response since then has clearly
born fruit and--in the process--earned a strong measure of
respect from domestic and international observers. Moreover,
there is no sign--as it continues to atone for past
mistakes--that the government plans to let up in its effort
now.

HUME