Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA3239
2007-11-23 11:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

ASEAN SUMMIT/INDONESIA -- A MIXED REACTION

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON ASEAN XC BM ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003239 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/PD, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ASEAN XC BM ID
SUBJECT: ASEAN SUMMIT/INDONESIA -- A MIXED REACTION

REF: A. SINGAPORE 2085

B. SINGAPORE 2092

C. SINGAPORE 2093

D. JAKARTA 3201

JAKARTA 00003239 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b-d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003239

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/PD, EAP/RSP
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ASEAN XC BM ID
SUBJECT: ASEAN SUMMIT/INDONESIA -- A MIXED REACTION

REF: A. SINGAPORE 2085

B. SINGAPORE 2092

C. SINGAPORE 2093

D. JAKARTA 3201

JAKARTA 00003239 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b-d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Indonesian reaction to the recent ASEAN
Summit meetings in Singapore was generally positive,
particularly in regard to the Charter and the Economic
Blueprint. Reaction--particularly from legislators and the
press--regarding the GOI's handling of Burma has been largely
critical, however. President Yudhoyono has called for
Indonesia's ratification of the Charter within a year. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) POSITIVE ON CHARTER: Indonesian government reaction
to the recent ASEAN Summit meetings was positive. Gudadi
Sasongko in the Department of Foreign Affair's Directorate
for East Asia and Pacific Affairs told DepPol/C that
Indonesia considered the long-term interests represented by
the Charter to be more important than the short-term
situation in Burma (the GOI received domestic flak re its
Burma positioning -- see below). The Charter was "a landmark
agreement" that would provide a legal basis for ASEAN
policies and actions, thereby moving ASEAN beyond mere
consensus. It provided a number of important tools for the
21st century, including a Code of Honor that would serve as a
standard for measuring Burma's progress on human rights and
democracy, for example.


3. (C) ECONOMIC BLUEPRINT: GOI reaction on the economic side
also was basically positive. Mahendra Siregar, Deputy
Minister for Economic and Regional Cooperation at the
Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs, told DepEcon/C
that the GOI was generally pleased with the agreed on
Economic Blueprint. It provided the structure for measuring
current progress and a plan of action. It would improve the
ASEAN dispute resolution mechanism, while the Charter would
facilitate better decision-making on economic issues. The

challenge for Indonesia would be national implementation of
the Blueprint's agenda. As the nation with the largest ASEAN
population and geographic expanse, Indonesia needed to be a
leader and make the Blueprint work for the benefit of its
people.


4. (C) NEXT STEP -- RATIFY CHARTER: President Yudhoyono
urged Indonesia to ratify the ASEAN Charter within a year.
Noting that the Charter provided inter alia for
interparliamentary cooperation, Yudhoyono said the DPR (the
national legislature) "understood" the importance of the
Charter and his administration would carefully review the
Charter with the DPR in the next several weeks and months.
Presidential spokesman Dino Djalal said the Charter would
make ASEAN "a better, more adaptive, dynamic organization
with a faster pace." Theo Sambuaga, Chair of the DPR's
Commission on Foreign and Security Affairs, told Pol/C that
he thought the legislature would "ultimately support" the
Charter, a document which he felt was positive "for regional
integration."


5. (C) BURMA PROBLEMATIC: The government received criticism
for its positioning re Burma. Sambuaga told Pol/C that
Indonesia had not been "strong enough" on the issue of Burma.
Sambuaga characterized a media photograph of President
Yudhoyono shaking hands with Burmese Prime Minister Thein
Sein and smiling as "inappropriate," adding that Indonesia's
failure to take a harder line made Indonesia look weak.
Other legislators lashed out at the Indonesian government,
including members of the Myanmar Caucus, which announced that
"the government has failed the people of Myanmar by not
pushing hard enough for democratic rights there."


6. (U) MEDIA MIXED: Press commentary generally welcomed the
Charter as for the first time giving ASEAN a legal basis that
makes regional integration possible. The English-language
daily "Jakarta Post" said Indonesia had no choice but to
ratify the Charter, despite what it characterized as its
"watered-down" provisions. The paper questioned the

JAKARTA 00003239 002.2 OF 002


Charter's "rigid" adherence to the principle of
non-interference and noted that, even with the Charter,
consensus still will remain the key ASEAN mode for
decision-making. The national daily "Kompas" suggested in a
positive comment that now ASEAN would by 2008 race to remove
trans-border economic barriers.


7. (U) There was also criticism re Burma. "Kompas" said
ASEAN's failure to take a firm stance on Burma had made the
Charter's ratification and implementation more complicated
and would be a brake on ASEAN's aspirations to emulate the
European Union. The national daily "Media Indonesia" said
the Charter's lofty ideals were contradicted by the
willingness of ASEAN leaders to countenance Burma's behavior.
The Jakarta Post published several articles blasting what
they saw as ASEAN's and the Indonesian government's
"weakness" in confronting the Burmese regime in a direct
manner.

HEFFERN