POLITICAL ISLAM -- GAUGING HARD-LINE INFLUENCE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM ID
SUBJECT: POLITICAL ISLAM -- GAUGING HARD-LINE INFLUENCE IN
KEY MUSLIM GROUPS

Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Indonesia's two largest mass Muslim
organizations--Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)--are
reportedly having success in mitigating the influence of
hard-line radicals in their ranks. Muhammadiyah is probably
the more susceptible of the two organizations to radical
infiltration due to its urban links and general philosophy;
NU is less a target. Over all--given the influence of the
two groups--it is natural that radicals want to gain a
foothold, but, so far, their influence remains minimal. Some
commentators have observed a "conservative drift," however,
in the two groups toward Sunni orthodoxy and personal piety.
END SUMMARY.

ON GUARD AGAINST RADICALISM


2. (C) NU, with about 40 million members, and Muhammadiyah,
with about 35 million, are the largest mass Muslim
organizations in Indonesia and, by some counts, the world.
Both groups have long been on guard against radical
influences. In recent conversations with poloff, for
example, youth and student leaders from the two organizations
cited the growing influence of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI),
a small radical group. HTI's influence remained very
limited, but NU and Muhammadiyah wanted to make sure that the
group--which wants to create an international
"Caliphate"--does not pick up influence.


3. (SBU) This concern with radical "infiltration" remains
high, despite polling data released earlier this month by the
Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI)--a reputable local
firm--which shows that the appeal of radical groups in
Indonesia has declined gradually over the past three years.
The survey indicates both an increase in awareness of and a
decrease in support for hard-line organizations such as HTI
and the Islamic Defender's Front (FPI). It also reveals a
steep drop in support for viewpoints espoused by extremists
and some conservatives. For instance, the percentage of
respondents who believe a woman should not be president of
Indonesia declined from 41 percent in 2005 to 22 percent in

2007.

MUHAMMADIYAH'S STEPS


4. (C) Muhammadiyah leaders admit that they have needed to
work assiduously to curb radical elements. According to
commentators, Muhammadiyah is probably the more susceptible
of the two organizations to radical infiltration due to its
urban links and generally "modernist" philosophy. Markus
Sudibyo, an important Muhammadiyah leader, told Pol/C
recently that radicalism was "always" a problem, but "one
which we are having success controlling and combating." For
example, Muhammadiyah earlier this year completed an internal
review that revealed the extent to which its Youth members
also affiliate with radical groups. Youth Secretary General,
Gunawan Hidayat told poloff that dual affiliation was a
serious issue and noted that some members whose loyalties
were "doubted" had been "purged" from the group. While some
radicals clearly remained in the organization, they had
little influence on policy and their numbers did not seem to
be increasing, Hidayat concluded.

NU -- LESS CONCERNS


5. (C) NU seems less worried about radicalism. The Secretary
General of NU,s Student Movement (PMII),Hery Haryanto
Azumi, told poloff he was not overly concerned with the
possible infiltration of his organization by groups like HTI.
While Muhammadiyah shared and competed for the same urban
base as HTI and the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),
NU was predominantly rural. He also noted that the radical
threat to NU was mitigated by the strength of its pesantren
(Islamic school) network, which served as a bulwark against
non-mainstream influences by providing students with a firm
grounding in Islamic ideas.


6. (C) Nevertheless, PMII is working to develop the public
relation skills of its cadre to spread the "mainstream
message." According to Azumi, hard-line groups have worked

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to exploit their media and public affairs advantage over the
traditionally less agile mass Muslim organizations. PMII
aims to incorporate these skills into NU,s pesantren
education so that graduates can better champion the cause of
moderate Islam at the university level--where groups like HTI
and KAMMI, PKS,s student wing--have expanded rapidly.
Unlike Muhammadiyah, NU does not intend to block its members
from holding "dual" or alternate political affiliations.
Instead it is working to create a political commission that
will advise the hundreds of politicians linked to NU from
different political parties on NU views, and the ways it
perceives political and social matters.

CONSERVATIVE DRIFT?


7. (C) Although radicalism might be declining, both NU and
Muhammadiyah contacts have admitted that the core of their
membership appears to have become more conservative in a
Sunni orthodox manner. NU Chairman Hasyim Muzadi has
described the shift as "a natural one" for the organization,
given the general direction of Islam at this time
internationally. Azumi further explained that increasing
attention to global political developments was at the heart
of the shift within NU and the growing clout of conservatives
(but not radicals) within the organization. In particular,
he argued that the war in Iraq had contributed to fears that
Islam was somehow under attack and had prompted many Muslims
in Indonesia "to strengthen their personal defenses" with
more conservative teachings. Contacts in Muhammadiyah report
the same sense of conservative drift, with an accent on
personal piety but not political extremism.

HUME