Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA3027
2007-10-30 06:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO'S POLITICAL PROSPECTS

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2575
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #3027/01 3030647
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300647Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6849
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4431
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1447
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1418
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3508
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1025
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1941
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003027 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO'S POLITICAL PROSPECTS

REF: A. JAKARTA 2996

B. JAKARTA 2948

C. JAKARTA 2776

D. JAKARTA 2748

E. JAKARTA 2540

JAKARTA 00003027 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b,d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003027

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO'S POLITICAL PROSPECTS

REF: A. JAKARTA 2996

B. JAKARTA 2948

C. JAKARTA 2776

D. JAKARTA 2748

E. JAKARTA 2540

JAKARTA 00003027 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: As President Yudhoyono (SBY) moves into the
fourth year of his five-year term, his political prospects
are strong. His poll numbers remain robust and he can take
comfort in knowing that no compelling challengers have
emerged yet to contest the 2009 election. Nonetheless, there
are clouds on the horizon. An overall solid economic growth
rate hides the real problem of grinding poverty. Moreover,
critics accuse SBY of indecisiveness and lacking drive. His
political machine also remains weak. The smart money--at
this very early stage--is still on SBY to win a second term,
but re-election is far from certain. END SUMMARY.

GOOD POLL NUMBERS


2. (U) The latest numbers from Indonesia's most credible
polling outfit--the Indonesian Survey Institute
(LSI)--indicate that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono still
enjoys the support of over 50 percent of the Indonesian
electorate. According to an October 2007 poll, 58 percent of
the Indonesians surveyed expressed support for the
President's performance. While those numbers are down from
67 percent this time last year--and are far lower than the 80
percent approval rating SBY enjoyed in 2004--they
nevertheless stand as demonstrable evidence that his number
one political weapon remains intact--his personal popularity.

WHO WILL CHALLENGE SBY?


3. (C) Though most Indonesians will tell you that SBY's
political position is far from unassailable, Mission
contacts, pundits and political operators alike are all hard
pressed to name a prospective challenger currently in
position to unseat the President. Bearing in mind that there
is still plenty of time left until the 2009 presidential
primary, it is worth noting that all of the likely
challengers have major flaws and questionable prospects.
(Note: The dates for the 2009 presidential primary and runoff

have not been scheduled yet, but they will likely take place
in July and September of 2009, respectively.) SBY may be
popular, but right now he derives much of his political mojo
from the fact that no towering figures loom on the horizon as
competitors.


4. (S) The list of prospective opponents for 2009 is
relatively short and unimpressive, a recycled lineup of
has-beens and long-shot wannabees. It includes:

- Former President Megawati: Arguably the only political
figure with the potential to mount a legitimate threat, she
has stumbled in the opposition and failed to articulate a
competing vision for the country. She lost badly to SBY in
the 2004 election. She is the only challenger who
consistently registers double digits in the polls; she has
already thrown her hat in the ring (Ref E).

- Ex-Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso: The one fresh face in the
race is a former two-term governor of the capital region with
a reputation as a firm and assertive leader. His track
record managing the unwieldy metropolis of Jakarta, coupled
with his deep pockets, make him an intriguing dark horse. He
is a relative unknown outside of the capital, however, and
the scrutiny of the campaign could invite tough questions
about his business relationships (Ref C).

- Vice President Jusuf Kalla: He harbors presidential
ambitions, but would have a hard time challenging SBY for two
fundamental reasons: conventional wisdom holds that only
Javanese politicians can win the presidency (Kalla is from
South Sulawesi) and he is not nearly as popular as SBY (Ref
B).


JAKARTA 00003027 002.2 OF 003


- Former General Wiranto: Like former President Megawati,
Wiranto is handicapped by the fact that he already lost to
SBY. He is also out of power, attached to an unknown
political party and dogged by concerns about his human rights
track record. He reportedly, however, has a sizeable war
chest at his disposal (Ref D).

- Former President Abdurrahman Wahid (aka Gus Dur): The
enigmatic former president has discussed running again. His
own daughter, Yenny Wahid (a former presidential staffer),
told poloff she did not even know for certain if he will run.
If he does, his candidacy would likely be treated as little
more than a novelty act.

(Note: People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) Chair Hidayat
Nur Wahid, former MPR Chair Amien Rais and former Golkar
Party Chair and DPR Chair Akbar Tandjung are also all
potential candidates. They are considered long-shots at
best.)

IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID


5. (S) In an October 24 meeting with the Ambassador, former
President Habibie put his finger on what most people would
argue is the President's core political vulnerability--the
GOI's inability to meet the average Indonesian's basic needs
(Ref A). Despite the fact that Indonesia has experienced
three straight years of six percent growth or higher--an
impressive track record by almost any measure--the SBY
administration has not lowered unemployment or
underemployment or lifted the many millions of indigent
Indonesians out of poverty. Presidential advisor T.B.
Silalahi told poloff on October 22 that "it was only a matter
of time" before this economic reality caught up with the
President at the polls.

THE INDECISIVENESS FACTOR


6. (S) The President continues to be dogged by a reputation
for excessive caution. Not surprisingly, SBY's opponents
cite his deliberate streak as a sign of weakness and trumpet
the issue both in private and in the media. Despite the
intense scrutiny of this facet of his character by the
political classes, the issue does not appear to have
resonated publicly, or triggered any sort of meaningful
behavioral changes on the part of the President, for that
matter. In fact, among many in Java, a deliberate, calm,
non-forceful style is considered a plus and a matter of
cultural preference.


7. (S) Regardless of whether or not the issue has gained any
traction politically, SBY's friends and foes seem to agree
with the fundamental point of the criticism--SBY takes too
long to make decisions and when he does make them, he fails
to push actively. SBY's strongest supporters are among his
most vocal critics on this score. Advisor T.B. Silalahi has
repeatedly complained about this facet of SBY's character in
conversations with poloff. The concerns are mirrored by
sympathetic journalists, members of the political elite, and
longtime Indonesia watchers, all of whom are united by a
desire to see the President succeed in his effort to
modernize and unify a secular, tolerant Indonesia, and
mortified by the possibility SBY may jeopardize this vision
through inaction.

HIS PARTY REMAINS WEAK


8. (C) In 2004, the Democratic Party catapulted from
obscurity to prominence with a surprisingly robust showing in
the legislative elections, a result that could almost
entirely be attributed to the party's affiliation with SBY.
He subsequently won the presidential election as a Democratic
Party candidate, and party officials eagerly anticipated five
years of influence as the ruling party. Now, over three
years later, the party has stalled. Poorly-managed,
under-funded, and all but neglected by SBY, many observers
believe the party could struggle mightily in 2009.


9. (C) A weak Democratic Party showing in the 2009

JAKARTA 00003027 003.2 OF 003


legislative elections (likely to take place in April 2009)
could leave the President vulnerable. According to the
current election law, the only eligible presidential
candidates are those nominated by parties, or coalitions,
which win either 15 percent of the parliamentary seats, or 20
percent of the overall legislative votes during the 2009
parliamentary election. Though this law will likely be
revised to include a more manageable electoral threshold, the
President could well find that his party is not strong enough
to nominate him in 2009. In such a scenario, SBY would
likely be able to enlist the support of other parties eager
to back a winner, but would have to make uncomfortable
compromises along the way.

KEEP THE CORK IN


10. (C) More than three years into his term, SBY remains
popular, with a deep reservoir of political influence. He
has successfully steered his country through a tragic run of
natural disasters, presided over a historic peace accord in
Aceh, and created the conditions for relative peace and
security in the country. He has also demonstrated a strong
commitment to a reform agenda, as evidenced by his solid
track record on appointments. He is far from invincible
however, and a continued failure to demonstrate real progress
on poverty reduction could make him vulnerable. At this late
stage, he has shown no real effort to tackle this problem.
Furthermore, in the event his numbers do begin to go south,
his admirable desire to steer clear of money politics leaves
him without a political safety net. That said, he is blessed
with relatively weak opponents lacking any discernible plan
of action for the country.
HUME