INDONESIA'S UNSC PRESIDENCY: PROCESS ABOVE ALL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003020

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR P, EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, IO, IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC ID BM IR
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S UNSC PRESIDENCY: PROCESS ABOVE ALL

REF: JAKARTA 2968

JAKARTA 00003020 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Indonesia is looking forward to assuming the
UNSC presidency--a largely procedural position--in November.
The GOI agenda is likely to be shaped by Jakarta's preference
for consensus-driven multilateral approaches to foreign
policy issues. On some key issues--including Iran and
Burma--the Indonesians will likely be inclined to avoid
controversial stands and to support approaches that emphasize
diplomatic process over concrete results. Indonesia also
wants to promote multilateral peacemaking in the Middle East,
but is short on specifics. Overall, the GOI will be
satisfied if it looks like a fair broker, and if its November
tenure goes by without tension and recriminations. END
SUMMARY.

INDONESIA'S NOVEMBER


2. (SBU) Indonesia is realistic about the largely procedural
nature of the UNSC presidency. In an October 25 interview in
the Jakarta Post, PermRep Marty Natalegawa stressed the need
to manage expectations regarding what Indonesia could achieve
as UNSC president. He said Indonesia would seek to build
consensus among all UNSC members and was aware that as
president it "had to speak on behalf of all." In managing
tensions among the P-5, Natalegawa said, Indonesia would rely
on its historical role as "a builder of bridges" between
countries.


3. (SBU) Natalegawa, one of the Indonesian diplomatic corps'
fast-rising stars--he became Ambassador to the UK at age
42--will play a key role shaping Indonesia's actions as UNSC
president. He headed the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DEPLU) office for UN policy-making from 2000-2001 and has
served two previous assignments at the Indonesian mission in
New York.

STRESSING MULTILATERAL APPROACHES


4. (C) Contacts have told us that Indonesia sees the
presidency as an opportunity to raise its foreign policy
profile, chiefly by promoting multilateral approaches to
international problems. Indonesia's thematic debate,
scheduled for November 6, will focus on the role of regional
and sub-regional organizations. The Indonesians see this as
an opportunity to highlight ASEAN's efforts to achieve peace
and stability in Southeast Asia. They also hope to promote a
similar multilateral, consensus-based approach to other
conflict areas, notably the Middle East.

KEY ISSUES


5. (C) Middle East -- Despite Natalegawa's sense of realism,
the Indonesian approach on some issues may tend, for domestic
policy reasons, to be longer on rhetoric than on specifics.
Chief among these issues is the Middle East. President
Yudhoyono has taken a personal interest in the region and
tends to approach it with a touch of grandeur. During
Palestinian President Abbas' October 21-23 visit to Jakarta
(ref a),presidential advisor Dino Djalal ambitiously
suggested that Indonesia would use its UNSC Presidency to
help facilitate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and
reconcile Fatah and Hamas. Indonesia has made such pledges
before, but has yet to deliver any tangible successes.


6. (C) While President Yudhoyono envisions a role for
Indonesia in arranging Middle East peace and sincerely wants
Indonesia to play such a role, DEPLU has generally taken a
more realistic, if not skeptical, tack on the Middle East.
DEPLU's Directorate of Middle Eastern Affairs is relatively
weak within the Department's hierarchy and is frequently left
out of the decision-making process on major issues. FM
Wirajuda relies instead on a small number of key
officials--some several levels below him--for action on the
Middle East. Chief among those is Desra Percaya, Director
for International Security and Disarmament. Percaya's office
handles all Security Council issues, most Middle East issues

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and nonproliferation as well. Percaya's predecessor, Hasan
Kleib, is now Natalegawa's deputy at the UN, which should
facilitate policy coordination between the capital and the
mission. But Percaya's overstuffed portfolio means he will
be stretched particularly thin during the Indonesian
presidency, which could hamper DEPLU's ability to implement
the President's vision.


7. (C) Iran -- The Yudhoyono administration weathered a storm
of domestic criticism for its March 2007 support of UNSCR
1747 demanding a halt to Iran's nuclear reprocessing
activities. The Indonesian legislature (DPR) castigated the
government for abandoning Indonesia's "independent and active
foreign policy"--a euphemism for non-aligned--and "taking
orders from America." Local Muslim groups joined the chorus
of condemnation for abandoning "a fellow Muslim country" to
side with the West. Politicians jockeying for advantage in
advance of the 2009 general elections also exploited the
issue for political gain. The government has already
intimated its strong reluctance to support another round of
sanctions.


8. (C) Despite senior Indonesian officials' caution over the
domestic politics of the issue, they remain committed to
international nonproliferation goals, albeit with a heavy
does of disarmament. Indonesia will look for ways to attain
UN nonproliferation goals in Iran without appearing to
penalize or ostracize that country. To that end, Indonesia
will emphasize Iran's agreement to work with the IAEA to
resolve all outstanding nuclear issues. So long as Iran
appears--in any manner--to be cooperating with the IAEA,
Indonesia will be extremely reluctant to consider another
sanctions resolution, even in the absence of an Iranian
cessation of reprocessing activities. That said, if the P-5
agrees on a new Iran resolution, Indonesia would be hard
pressed not to join the consensus.


9. (C) Iraq -- Domestic opposition to U.S. involvement in
Iraq has kept the Indonesian government from supporting too
overtly the Iraqi government and U.S. policy there.
Recently, however, Indonesia has begun to move ahead on Iraq.
Most notably, the GOI has announced that it will try to
reopen its embassy in Baghdad although it has not set a
specific timeframe for doing so. Indonesia will almost
certainly join a P-5 consensus to renew the mandate of the
Multinational Forces in Iraq (MNF-I).


10. (C) Burma -- The Indonesians are frustrated at the lack
of progress in Burma, but are wary of taking more aggressive
measures. They fear that sanctions and other forms of
pressure on the regime could lead to a catastrophic collapse
of the Burmese government and the descent of the country into
civil war as ethnic minority regions go their own way. The
GOI, however, is aware that the current situation is bad news
for ASEAN and it wants to find a way that moves the regime
toward democratic reform. As UNSC president, Indonesia will
view itself as reflecting the ASEAN position on Burma and is
unlikely to go beyond what other ASEAN members have agreed to
support (which is actually a pretty high threshold given what
was said in the September 27 ASEAN Foreign Ministers'
statement).


11. (C) That said, Indonesia supported the October 12 UNSC
Presidential Statement on Burma and has voiced strong support
for Special Envoy Gambari's mission. Gambari met with
President Yudhoyono and other senior officials in Jakarta on
October 21-23. Over the coming month, Indonesia is likely to
remain engaged on Gambari's efforts and will look for ways to
pressure the regime into cooperating with the envoy. So long
as Gambari remains visible and active on Burma, even absent
any tangible progress, Indonesia is unlikely to support
additional UNSC pressure on the regime. In a press briefing
on October 26, DEPLU official Desra Percaya said Indonesia
has no plans to raise Burma in the UNSC.


12. (C) Timor Leste -- A UNSC mission to Timor-Leste November
25-December1 will also visit Indonesia. The mission will be
charged with reaffirming the UNSC's commitment to
Timor-Leste's sovereignty, territorial integrity and

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long-term stability. The mission will also assess the
progress of the United Nations Integrated Mission in
Timor-Leste (UNMIT). Indonesia does not appear to view the
UNSC mission as a threat, despite the UNHRC's decision not to
attend the hearings of the Indonesia-Timor Leste Commission
on Truth and Friendship (CTF) and will use the UNSC visit to
highlight its good relations with the former breakaway
province.


13. (C) Kosovo -- The Kosovo issue exposes a key tension in
Indonesian foreign policy. On many issues, such as Iran's
nuclear program, Indonesia's position reflects a perceived
solidarity with fellow Muslim countries. Yet this dynamic
does not automatically push the Indonesians to support the
Muslim Kosovars. Re Kosovo, Indonesia's own ethnic divisions
and fears of separatism cause it to give issues of
territorial sovereignty equal weight. Accordingly, Indonesia
has made its support of any solution conditional upon
Serbia's acceptance. The result, in terms of UNSC debate,
has been an ambivalence which, so far, the government has not
chosen to resolve. The fact that Kosovo thus far has not
attracted a great deal of domestic attention from Muslim
constituencies may allow Indonesia to go along with any P-5
consensus that gives sufficient cover on the principle of
territorial sovereignty. As with Iran, a P-5 consensus on a
Kosovo resolution will be a necessary prerequisite for the
GOI to take a stand.

PROCESS OVER PROGRESS


14. (C) Over all, the GOI will be satisfied if it looks like
a fair broker during its presidency. Culturally, Indonesians
dislike conflict and want to be seen as accommodating and
friendly, even at the expense of making progress on
substantive matters. The last thing that the GOI wants is
for its November tenure to involve tension and
recriminations, and they will work hard to make sure that
does not happen. Our guess is that the Indonesians will try
to go with the flow, while nudging the process a bit in areas
which they find of import such as the Middle East and Burma.
HUME