FORMER PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON THE POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002996

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT HABIBIE ON THE POLITICAL
SITUATION, SUHARTO, DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

REF: 06 JAKARTA 13328

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Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met former president B.J.
Habibie on October 24. Habibie characterized the current
political situation in Indonesia as "confused," expressed a
desire to collaborate with the Mission on democracy promotion
projects, and shared the details of his last conversation
with former president Suharto (in 1998). Habibie praised
President Yudhoyono and suggested that the GOI's inability to
meet the average Indonesian's basic needs represented the
most significant threat to the country's long-term stability,
not radical Islam. He plans to visit New York in early 2008.
END SUMMARY.

THE HABIBIE INSTITUTE


2. (C) At Habibie's invitation, the Ambassador joined the
former president on October 24 for lunch at his residence.
Habibie was characteristically energetic and talkative, and
eagerly briefed the Ambassador on the Habibie Institute's
latest projects. Noting that he founded the think-tank at
former President Carter's urging, Habibie fondly recalled the
2001 collaboration between Mission and the Habibie Institute
(and the German government) on the Indonesian Constitution
project. The former President inquired about the USG's
polling work in Indonesia. Habibie then offered that one
possible avenue for future collaboration between the USG and
the Institute would be to develop the equivalent of a
"happiness index" -- a poll that would gauge the average
Indonesian's level of satisfaction with democracy, government
responsiveness, etc. The Ambassador agreed to consider
additional ways to collaborate in the future.

HABIBIE ON DEMOCRACY


3. (C) On the subject of the overall health of democracy in
Indonesia, Habibie told the Ambassador that the political
situation in Indonesia was "confused." While information was
readily available, Habibie argued that it was also
institutionalized and Indonesians had a hard time making
informed judgments. Habibie noted that he did not like to
comment on people as a general rule, but nevertheless felt
comfortable telling the Ambassador that he believed current
President Yudhoyono was committed to advancing democracy and
was "a patriot."


4. (C) In Habibie's estimation, the greatest threat to the
future of democracy was not radical Islam -- a force that he
labeled "imported" -- but rather the destabilizing potential
for a popular movement among the millions of Indonesians who
cannot meet their basic needs. The government's inability to
reduce poverty and raise the standard of living of
impoverished Indonesians could eventually lead to public
resentment and a strong popular reaction against the
government. Islam, on the other hand, was not at all
ideological in Indonesia -- as opposed to in Egypt and other
Middle Eastern countries -- and most Indonesians separated
their faith from their political beliefs. The risk of
radical forces ever gaining traction in Indonesia was small
in his opinion.

LAST WORDS WITH SUHARTO


5. (C) In response to a question about Habibie's relationship
with former president Suharto, Habibie -- noting that the two
had not talked since 1998 -- recounted the story of his last
conversation with the deposed ex-president. According to
Habibie, in the tumultuous first days after Habibie replaced
Suharto in May 1998, Habibie made several attempts to reach
out to Suharto to repair their relationship and solicit his
guidance. Suharto repeatedly rebuffed Habibie's entreaties
until June 8 arrived and Habibie could not stand the thought
of not talking to Suharto on his birthday -- a tradition
since they first met. Habibie ultimately called Suharto's
then Chief of Staff -- General Wiranto -- and insisted on
wishing Suharto a happy birthday directly. Making no

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promises, Wiranto vowed to try.


6. (C) When Suharto finally came to the phone, Habibie wished
him a happy birthday and asked to come see him in person,
noting that he was wholly unequipped for the task of running
the country and needed Suharto's counsel. Suharto quickly
and firmly told Habibie "no" and said for the good of the
country the two should never meet again. Suharto then
advised Habibie to focus his energies on his job; everything
would work out in due time Suharto told him. Suharto closed
the conversation by observing that the two were both
extremely devout and that he would "remember Habibie in his
prayers." With that, Suharto ended the call and they never
talked again. Suharto, according to Habibie, was a patriot
at heart but had suffered from limited vision. At the end of
the day, however, Suharto could have made life very difficult
for Habibie and Indonesia. To Suharto's everlasting credit,
he had chosen not to do so.

NEW YORK VISIT


7. (C) The lunch closed with Habibie noting that he and his
wife will stay in New York on February 2 en route to a cruise
on the Queen Mary; Habibie would also stay over in New York
at the end of the Caribbean cruise. Habibie told the
Ambassador that while he would like his visit to be
relatively low profile, he would also be interested in
"meeting people" and would welcome any suggestions on how to
best make use of his time there. Habibie also said he would
be accompanied by two escorts and requested Mission's
assistance in facilitating his group's entry into the United
States.
HUME