DEFENSE COOPERATION -- ENGAGING INDONESIA ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 002990

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, T, PM, PM/RSAT, PM/DTC, PM/CPA, PM
ISO, PM/PPA
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA J.TOOLAN, USDP/ISA/AP P.IPSEN
JOINT STAFF FOR P.CLEMMONS
NSC FOR E.PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV ID
SUBJECT: DEFENSE COOPERATION -- ENGAGING INDONESIA ON
FUTURE OF MIL-MIL RELATIONSHIP

REF: A. JAKARTA 2725

B. JAKARTA 2934

C. JAKARTA 2893

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Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military
relationship has reached an important phase. Both sides need
to discuss how they see this relationship developing. The
October 29-November 3 CHODS conference in Hawaii provides
Admiral Keating with an ideal opportunity to engage Panglima
Gen. Djoko Suyanto--the central player on the Indonesian
military side--to shape Indonesian perceptions, mobilize
support in key areas and, in general, move the relationship
forward. Key issues are the scheduled re-engagement with the
Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS),the deployment of coastal
radars for the Sulawesi Sea provided with assistance under
Section 1206, and the status of Indonesia's inquiry regarding
F-16 sales. Interaction with the Panglima at the conference
will help set up Admiral Keating's November visit to
Indonesia. END SUMMARY.

KEY FACTORS AND CHALLENGES


2. (C) After more than a decade of strained relations, we
have an opportunity to repair U.S.-Indonesian
military-to-military relations. There has been an uptick in
Indonesian purchases of U.S. defense equipment, but some
mega-deals in the works would return that relationship to the
scale of our pre-sanctions cooperation. These deals, notably
prospective F-16 purchases and upgrades (ref a),are
signaling that, for at least part of the TNI leadership,
including the current Panglima, the TNI wants U.S. equipment
and closer ties. Licensing requests for these deals appear
to be within current guidelines, and we would hope that
Admiral Keating could assure the Panglima of his support of
them. Rhetoric from other elements of the TNI and the GOI,
notably from Navy Chief Soebijanto and Defense Minister
Sudarsono, as well as the national legislature (DPR),reflect
persistent skepticism about U.S. reliability and resentment
over past sanctions, however. It will take time to overcome
that skepticism, but now we are at a moment to push forward.


3. (C) There are other signs of Indonesia's seriousness. In
just the two years since U.S. sanctions were lifted,
Indonesia has taken a central position in hosting major
U.S.-supported multilateral regional-security events. From a
starting point of zero events in 2005, Indonesia hosted a
Pacific Area Senior Officers Logistics Seminar (PASOLS) and a
Western Pacific Naval Symposium Disaster Relief Exercise in
2007 and will host or co-host the CHODS conference, a Unified
Engagement Air Force Exercise, a Tendon Valiant Medical
Readiness Exercise, an annual Maritime Tri-border Security
Conference and a Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) in

2008. These events give Indonesia the opportunity to deepen
its security cooperation with the United States and
Indonesia's neighbors. They demonstrate that Indonesia is
readily shouldering its share of the regional security agenda
and wants to do more.

SHAPING THE FUTURE


4. (C) Jakarta professes, as does Washington, to want a
"strategic partnership," but that goal remains largely
unrealized in practice. Indonesia's expectations for
bilateral defense cooperation with the United States have not
gelled either. Indonesian policy remains in flux, a
reflection of the nascent nature of the bilateral
relationship, uncertainty about Washington's long-term
intentions and weak policy coordination within the Indonesian
government. The Indonesian defense policy-making process
remains fractured, given Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono's
limited control over the TNI and TNI HQ's limited control

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over the respective defense services. Further Indonesian
legislation, together with the results of the U.S.-sponsored
Defense Resources Management Study (DRMS),will help correct
this situation over time.


5. (C) In the meantime, we must operate by actively engaging
Indonesian political and military leaders to mobilize a
consensus supporting U.S. interests and objectives.
President Yudhoyono, MinDef Sudarsono and the Panglima are
the three most important players. Admiral Keating's
discussions, first at the October 29-November 3 CHODS
conference in Hawaii and later during his November 18-21
visit to Indonesia, together with our discussions here in
preparation for that visit, will stimulate thinking on the
relationship and begin to develop a consensus within the
Indonesian government in order to move forward.

STEPS WE ARE TAKING


6. (C) Rebuilding a reliable partnership requires engagement
with the TNI across the board. We have expanded our dialogue
and activities to encompass an ever-larger circle of TNI
elements and defense topics. The now-annual Strategic
Dialogue (IUSSD) and Bilateral Defense Discussions (BDD)
provide constructive exchanges on a wide range of topics, and
the annual Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP)
facilitates a comprehensive menu of substantive training
opportunities and other joint events. IMET programs offer
exposure to U.S. educational and policy establishments and
provide valuable contacts which will underpin professional
contacts for decades to come. We need maximal IMET funding
here to make up for the lost generation of TNI officers who
were cut off from U.S. training during the embargo. These
successful initiatives demonstrate the sincerity of our
intentions to help the Indonesian military become the
professional force that it should.


7. (C) The next step that we are now taking in this direction
is engagement with Indonesia's Army Special Forces
(KOPASSUS). After years of restrictions in our bilateral
relationship, these elite forces must be folded into our
bilateral cooperation if Indonesia is to play an effective
security role in the region as we desire. Engagement with
KOPASSUS is required for this Mission's ability to advance
and protect U.S. interests and personnel in Indonesia. We
have laid out a clear rationale for this course of action and
a targeted, calibrated series of events designed to assess
and ultimately help shape KOPASSUS skills and capabilities,
beginning with human rights and developing counter-terrorism
and counter-insurgency capabilities (ref b).


8. (C) We are also advancing an approach to licensing for
sales to Indonesia, from pistols to larger pieces of
equipment, that supports our interests here and is consistent
with the Secretary's waiver decision. So far this year
Washington has approved none of Indonesia's eight FMS pistol
license applications (two license applications for commercial
sale of competition pistols were approved),but it has
approved 32 of 51 for the Philippines (despite documented
"summary executions of 20 individuals by government forces"
as reported by the 2006 Country Report on Human Rights
Practices) and 69 of 89 for Thailand (despite a coup d'etat
in 2006). Given the political progress in Indonesia, the
approval rate for Indonesia should be at least on par with
these other countries. We can assure the Panglima that we
are actively trying to shape a new policy consensus in
Washington which is transparent, understandable and
commensurate with our growing cooperation.

STEPS INDONESIA CAN TAKE


9. (C) From our side, we need to maintain momentum for
engagement. The lifting of sanctions in November 2005 gave a

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powerful psychological boost to the relationship and laid the
policy foundation for broad cooperation. That decision
remains the basis for our engagement with the TNI. The burst
of defense-sector reforms in 2002 and 2004, however, has
slowed and internalized. We need to push additional reforms
here to demonstrate Indonesia's continued determination to
break with the past and mold the TNI into a modern,
professional military.


10. (C) Indonesia has not prosecuted past human rights
violations in any consistent manner. While we need to keep
Indonesia mindful of the consequences of inaction on TNI
accountability, Indonesia is unlikely to abandon its
approach. We need therefore to encourage the Indonesian
government to take alternative steps to demonstrate
accountability. Although there is no alleged connection to
the TNI, prosecution of human rights activist Munir's
murderers (reportedly linked to intelligence services) is one
such step, and the recent efforts by the president's new
attorney general should be supported. A more sincere
dialogue with East Timor in the framework of the Truth and
Friendship Commission (TFC) would be another. The Yudhoyono
administration can take these steps without dividing the
country or sacrificing political support, and they would go a
long way to create a more favorable atmosphere in Washington
for further military engagement.


11. (C) On KOPASSUS, the GOI and the TNI should ensure that
KOPASSUS builds a positive public image and actively works to
leave behind former habits and allegiances that are
incompatible with a professional military in a democracy. It
is in the interest of Indonesia's political and military
leaders to manage this issue. The Panglima is in a better
position than anyone else to make this happen.


12. (C) Other positive steps are somewhat easier. Indonesia
plays a constructive role in UN-sponsored international
peacekeeping activities, one which we welcome and actively
support. The deployment of Indonesia's 850-troop Garuda
XXIII battalion with UNIFIL in Lebanon, the most visible
example, includes the president's son, and a replacement
force of equal size will rotate into Lebanon later this year.
Indonesia will of its own accord continue this long and
proud tradition, and we should welcome these efforts and
support them with assistance where necessary.

COASTAL RADARS


13. (C) The coastal radars on the Sulawesi Sea that we
offered to Indonesia under Section 1206 of the NDAA for
FY2007 and FY2008 have encountered roadblocks due to
Indonesian backtracking (ref c). We need the Panglima's
personal engagement on this issue now in order to keep this
important project on track. Failure of these assistance
programs would forfeit a great opportunity for security
cooperation in a critical area and would send the wrong
signal about TNI willingness to support U.S. regional
security objectives.


14. (C) Admiral Soebijanto's preference to place the radars
on the Makassar Strait is understandable, but the real
obstacle to our radar plan may be Soebijanto's personal
suspicion or an institutionalized version of it. In contrast
to the Indonesian Air Force, which is eager to engage with
the United States, and the Indonesian Army, which is less
uniform but still favorably disposed overall, the Indonesian
Navy seems stuck in a past of sanctions and ill will.
Navy-Navy cooperation is vital in maintaining free passage
through Indonesia's international waterways and interdicting
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction on the high seas.
Resolving the 1206 impasse, therefore, is in our interest
over the longer term.


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15. (C) More broadly, our message to the Panglima and other
Indonesian leaders, including the President, should be to
chart the benefits of future bilateral cooperation with the
TNI as a whole. The gains we have achieved with the
Indonesian Army or the Air Force, including pending
engagement with KOPASSUS and F-16 sales, could be undercut by
a recalcitrant Indonesian Navy.

FINDING A STRATEGIC CENTER


16. We need to work with the Indonesians to find a shared
strategic center for the relationship. A strategic center
would provide balance and gravity to keep the relationship on
course against the headwinds that inevitably buffet any
relationship. We need to set a course toward shared, defined
objectives. The headline would be the strategic partnership
that President Bush and President Yudhoyono envisioned when
they met in Indonesia in November 2006. Beneath it would be
other, more specific objectives. We now have several
concrete issues on the table which we can use to get this
discussion moving. We hope over the coming weeks and months
to develop with the Indonesians a shared sense of where we
intend to take our mil-mil relationship in the future.

HUME