Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA2948
2007-10-22 05:30:00
SECRET
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

VICE PRESIDENT KALLA'S UNCERTAIN POLITICAL FUTURE

Tags:  PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID 
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OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #2948/01 2950530
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220530Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6744
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4416
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1405
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1399
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3488
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0989
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1906
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002948 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT KALLA'S UNCERTAIN POLITICAL FUTURE

REF: A. SURABAYA 57

B. JAKARTA 2924

C. JAKARTA 2474

D. 06 JAKARTA 13173

JAKARTA 00002948 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b,d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002948

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INR/EAP
NSC FOR EPHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL PINR ID
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT KALLA'S UNCERTAIN POLITICAL FUTURE

REF: A. SURABAYA 57

B. JAKARTA 2924

C. JAKARTA 2474

D. 06 JAKARTA 13173

JAKARTA 00002948 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: With the 2009 presidential race heating up,
the most intriguing political wild card at this stage is VP
Kalla. He enjoys a reputation for dynamism, chairs
Indonesia's largest political party, and--given his sometimes
tricky relationship with SBY--would seemingly have motivation
to make a run for the top job. In recent weeks, he has
showed signs of prepping for a run. That said, Kalla may
ultimately decide to mount a bid for the presidency only if
compelled to--a highly plausible scenario if the President
opts for a more pliable running mate or Kalla's party forces
his hand. END SUMMARY.

THE WALK AND THE TALK


2. (S) In recent weeks, VP Jusuf Kalla has increasingly shown
all the signs of preparing for a possible presidential
campaign. The Vice President recently paid courtesy calls on
all the former presidents--a traditional rite of passage of
sorts for prospective candidates--and has been shaking hands
and kissing babies like a man on a mission. Pol/C, who is a
neighbor of the VP's, has recently noticed lines of cars
parked outside the official VP residence for various
receptions and other functions. The media coverage of the
Vice President has ratcheted up accordingly. For his part,
Kalla has done little to extinguish the flames of
speculation, commenting last week that "any candidacy will be
announced three months before the election." (Note: The
primary election is slated to take place in mid-2009.)


3. (S) According to Golkar Deputy Treasurer Poempida
Hidayatulloh, Kalla's handlers truly believe the VP should
run and are preparing accordingly. While Poempida underlined
that it was still far too early to speculate on whether Kalla
might contest the presidency, he agreed that the Vice
President was clearly laying the groundwork for a possible
run. Legislator Yuddy Chrisnandi, on the other hand, had no

such inhibitions, telling poloff that he felt certain Kalla
would run. On the other hand, Gembong Priyono, a key
assistant to VP Kalla, told Pol/C recently that Kalla was
"genuinely undecided, would not take precipitous steps and
would probably wait for 2009 before any formal
announcements."

WHY HE MIGHT RUN


4. (S) It is no secret that the brash, action-oriented Vice
President from South Sulawesi and the more cerebral,
deliberative President from Java have had a turbulent working
relationship at times (Ref D). Dadan Irawan, a Golkar
operative with ties to Kalla's camp, told poloff that the two
were "at loggerheads" on a host of issues. A number of other
Mission contacts have also reported that Kalla generally
feels frustrated with the President and that he undoubtedly
believes he could do a better job.


5. (S) At first blush, Kalla would seemingly be well-equipped
to mount an effective electoral challenge in 2009. Widely
respected for his no-nonsense, hard-charging style, many
pundits and political operatives view him as the archetypal
type "A' leader, especially when he is contrasted with the
more deliberative--some critics would say
indecisive--President Yudhoyono. Kalla is also extremely
wealthy and has demonstrated a talent for navigating the
murky world of Indonesian money politics. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, Kalla chairs the Golkar Party,
Indonesia's largest and most well organized political
operation.

WHY HE MIGHT NOT RUN


6. (S) Every politician has a political ceiling, and the Vice
President has publicly suggested that he has already reached

JAKARTA 00002948 002.2 OF 002


his. In comments to the press last year, Kalla memorably
declared that it would be foolhardy to challenge Yudhoyono
because the President was tall, handsome and Javanese, while
Kalla was short, ugly, and from Sulawesi. (Note:
Conventional wisdom holds that Javanese--by far the largest
ethnic grouping--would never support a non-Javanese candidate
for president.) Kalla has also no doubt seen the polls, all
of which show SBY holding a commanding lead over Kalla in a
potential race. In fact, just last week one such poll
measuring support for 10 possible presidential contenders
showed SBY with 35 percent support, while Kalla came in a
distant seventh with only three percent.


7. (S) Not only would a presidential run appear to be a
difficult mission, but many contacts have suggested the Vice
President would actually prefer to stay in his current job.
Kalla's business interests have flourished during the last
few years and any cost benefit analysis on a possible
presidential bid would surely factor in these interests.
Besides, at least one contact vigorously maintains that all
is well between the President and Vice President. According
to Gembong Priyono, Kalla and SBY enjoy a good rapport and
work well together because "they both have the country's best
interests at heart."

THE FATES WILL DECIDE


8. (S) Regardless of what the Vice President decides to do,
his fate may ultimately be out of his hands. Several
contacts report that President Yudhoyono is actively
considering other VP candidates. No Mission contacts claim
to have an authoritative read on who may be in the running.
To be sure, influential First Lady Kristiani Herawati will
undoubtedly wish to leave her mark on the VP decision
whichever way it goes (Ref B).


9. (C) Another key factor in determining Kalla's political
future will be his party's performance in the 2009
parliamentary elections. If Golkar retains a majority of the
seats in the legislative elections, several Golkar contacts
have said the party likely will feel compelled to nominate
its own presidential candidate, regardless of the prospects
for victory. In such a scenario, Kalla could be faced with a
stark decision: serve as Golkar's presidential "sacrificial
lamb," or surrender the reins to the party and try to
continue his association with the President, despite his
reduced political value.


10. (C) Kalla clearly faces an uncertain future. He is an
ambitious, dynamic personality, and ideally would like to
move up the ladder. Unfortunately for him, the final step is
the most difficult one and though he is talented politically,
Indonesian national politics are simply not built to favor
"outer islanders." While Kalla would probably settle for
another chance to play second fiddle to the President, he may
not have much of a say in the matter.

HUME