HOPES DIM FOR RATIFICATION OF INDONESIA-SINGAPORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 002660

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP, T, PM, L
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AP (IPSEN)
JOINT STAFF FOR CLEMMONS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV ID SN
SUBJECT: HOPES DIM FOR RATIFICATION OF INDONESIA-SINGAPORE
DEFENSE AGREEMENT

REF: A. JAKARTA 1566


B. SINGAPORE 1377

C. SINGAPORE 1045

JAKARTA 00002660 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (U) This message was coordinated with Embassy Singapore.


2. (C) Summary: Indonesian officials see chances for
ratification of the Indonesia-Singapore Defense Agreement as
dimming, five months after its signature. Leading the
charge, a key Indonesian legislator has urged the GOI to
cancel the agreement unilaterally, asserting that it is
advantageous to Singapore. A key bone of contention involves
the so-called "Area Bravo," a proposal to use Indonesian
waters as a key training site. Aside from provoking
nationalist-type outbursts, the agreement has also fallen
victim to endemic executive-legislative branch infighting.
End Summary.

From the DPR with love
--------------

3. (SBU) The Indonesian legislature (DPR) has taken another
swipe at the proposed Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA)
with Singapore. Theo Sambuaga, Chairman of Commission I of
the DPR, which oversees foreign and security affairs, called
for the GOI's outright cancellation of the agreement after
meeting with Defense Minister Sudarsono on September 17.
Sambuaga asserted, erroneously, that Singapore had ratified
the DCA despite known Indonesian differences, and
characterized that step as jus]ifying Indonesian
cancellation, given the outstanding differences that remained
between the two sides. Minister Sudarsono
noted--considerably more circumspectly--that the DCA was not
a self-executing agreement and that it could not be ratified
without a more detailed document specifying technical,
administrative and operational issues. If the report were
true, therefore, Indonesia would have to reject the pact.
The treaty, which was negotiated and signed in tandem with a
parallel Extradition Treaty in April (refs a, c),came under
heavy fire early on from the DPR and, after a recent brief
respite, has returned to the front page with Sambuaga's
statement.


4. (C) Sambuaga and fellow legislators appear to be out ahead
of the facts on their report of Singaporean ratification.
Embassy Singapore has confirmed with the Singapore Parliament
that the DCA has not yet been submitted for approval. The
DCA was last discussed in Singapore's parliament in July (ref
b) when it came up during question time. It is quite
possible that Singaporean officials may have told Indonesian
counterparts such a step was imminent, which could explain
Sudarsono's consultations with Sambuaga. Even if the
allegation is not based in fact (not always a serious
impediment in the DPR),it underscores how far the Indonesian
legislature is from ratifying the agreement.

"Area Bravo" Plans not Popular
--------------

5. (C) Commenting on these developments, Director General for
Defense Strategy BG Dadi Susanto at the Indonesian Defense
Department (DEPHAN) expressed serious concern to us about
prospects for Indonesian ratification of the proposed DCA
with Singapore. Five months on, Susanto said he was "frankly
worried" about the fate of the treaty. The barrage of DPR
attacks was more than mere political posturing and reflected
genuine sensitivities on the part of many Indonesians.
Moreover, provincial legislators in areas near projected
training sites had written to the Defense Minister protesting
what they characterized as future "war exercises" in their
vicinity.


6. (C) The central obstacle at this point, Susanto explained,
was the status of the Implementing Arrangement (IA) for "Area
Bravo." This site, the largest and most controversial of the
training areas allotted to Singapore under the draft
agreement, encompasses a substantial stretch of the Natuna

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Sea east of Singapore and would be used for air and naval
exercises, including live fire, firing of missiles and
participation of third countries, under the agreement.
Susanto said such arrangements had been finalized for all
other training areas except Bravo, where Singapore was unable
to agree with the provisions proposed by Indonesia. Much of
the public outcry on the Indonesian side has in fact focused
on the broad latitude that the DCA would allegedly give
Singapore in Area Bravo without an IA. Additional points of
contentioNDm*kommander in Chief of
Defense Forces (Panglima) to proceed with negotiations, but
Singapore had yet to designate a counterpart. If Singapore
proceeded to ratify the DCA without the Bravo IA, enraged
Indonesian legislators would likely scuttle the agreement,
Susanto asserted.

You can't always get what you want
-------------- 3QQ+krPJQ*@ were surprised when the agreement was signed in
April. The administration is not throwing in the towel just
yet. It knows the score, however, and seems prepared for
non-action by the DPR on this foreign policy priority.
Beyond the merits of the case, there is also the fact of
executive-legislative branch sparring, with the DPR trying to
exert itself as a big-time player on international relations
as well as domestic policy. In this game, DPR members are
more than willing to play to the crowd for points against the
Palace and do not seem at all disturbed by the potential
fallout in cross-strait relations.
HUME