Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA2421
2007-09-04 09:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY

Tags:  PREL MARR PHUM CACS ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7282
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #2421/01 2470928
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040928Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6048
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0087
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4263
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1095
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1328
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 3415
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4159
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0725
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1705
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0664
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002421 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA/I, PM, T, DRL/PHD,
ISN/RA, IO/UNP, OBO, H, CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM CACS ID
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY
ADVISOR DJALAL

JAKARTA 00002421 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 002421

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, NEA/I, PM, T, DRL/PHD,
ISN/RA, IO/UNP, OBO, H, CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM CACS ID
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL'S MEETINGS WITH DEPLU DG HADI AND SBY
ADVISOR DJALAL

JAKARTA 00002421 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate August 28 meetings, EAP Deputy
Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel discussed a range of
bilateral issues with Andri Hadi, Director General for
Information and Public Diplomacy at the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DEPLU),and with Dino Djalal, advisor to President
Yudhoyono. Agreeing that the U.S.-Indonesia relationship was
in good shape, they discussed the normalization of military
ties; progress on human rights and accountability; possible
UNSCR action on Iran's nuclear program; the situation in
Papua; the USG travel warning on Indonesia and the status of
the Embassy's land purchase. END SUMMARY

MILITARY TIES AND CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS
--------------


2. (C) Noting that there were no longer legislative
restrictions on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, DG
Hadi asked why the USG recently denied export licenses for
Indonesian military (TNI) firearm purchases. DAS Marciel
explained that Secretary Rice had told Congress that the
Administration would move steadily to reestablish normal
military ties with Indonesia. We would not rush ahead too
fast but neither would we move backwards on our military
relationship. Congress was closely examining TNI's progress
on human rights and accountability. Moving forward too
quickly might provoke backtracking on the progress we had
already made. As an example of this incremental movement,
the USG had approved the sale of approximately 30 competition
pistols for the TNI but decided that it was too soon for a
larger sale of nearly 400 pistols.


3. (C) Hadi, who until four months ago was DCM at the
Indonesian Embassy in Washington, stressed that the GOI was
committed to addressing USG and Congressional concerns and
wanted to show Congress how far Indonesia had come. He noted
that some key Congress members and staffers had never visited
Indonesia and suggested their understanding was based on

obsolete information. He reiterated that Indonesia welcomed
Congressional visitors.

ACCOUNTABILITY
--------------


4. (C) DAS Marciel also stressed the importance of
accountability for past human rights violations by TNI and
other elements of the Indonesian security services. He noted
that recent developments in the Munir trial were a positive
sign but cautioned that Indonesia needed to make further
progress on this front. The Indonesian Special Forces'
(KOPASSUS) feting of Tommy Suharto at a recent shooting
competition raised questions about Indonesia's commitment to
accountability. DAS Marciel also pointed to the recent
appointment of Col. Burhanuddin Siagian, who had been accused
of serious human rights violations in East Timor, to a
sub-regional military command in Papua. Incidents like these
cast doubt on TNI's commitment to accountability. Indonesia
should pursue accountability not because the U.S. requested
it do so but because it was important for Indonesia's
democratic development. DG Hadi agreed both incidents cast
Indonesia in a bad light and admitted DEPLU had been caught
off guard by the KOPASSUS event with Tommy Suharto. He added
that accountability was a sensitive issue within the GOI but
that Indonesia was committed to it.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
--------------


5. (C) DAS Marciel asked for the GOI's views on Iran's
nuclear program, noting that the UNSC would likely return to
the issue in the near future. DG Hadi replied that he could
not say how the GOI might vote without seeing the text of a

JAKARTA 00002421 002.2 OF 003


proposed resolution. Indonesia remained committed to
supporting international nonproliferation norms but faced a
complex domestic political environment. Hadi noted 65% of
the Indonesian public supported the government's yes vote on
UNSCR 1747, according to a survey in the Indonesian media.


6. (C) DG Hadi explained that Indonesian support for another
resolution would depend on successful lobbying of the
Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR),a key
responsibility of his current position. A small number
hard-line Islamists in the DPR, such as Abdila Toaha, were
implacably opposed to any resolution on ideological grounds.
(Note: Other DEPLU contacts have mentioned Toaha as the DPR's
most committed supporter of Iran. End Note.) The majority of
DPR members had no strong connection with Iran and, unlike
the Islamists, might be persuaded to support the GOI's yes
vote on the next resolution. He added that many DPR members
were eyeing the 2009 general election and would act based on
domestic political calculations, not on the substance of any
UNSCR. DAS Marciel added that the USG understood Indonesia's
domestic concerns and stressed that we would consult closely
with Indonesia on any future UNSCR action.


7. (C) Presidential advisor Djalal cautioned that it would be
difficult for Indonesia to support another UNSCR on Iran as
long as Iran appeared to be cooperating with the IAEA. The
GOI opposed harsh or punitive language in the resolution and
wanted the UNSC process to be "part of the solution." Djalal
denied that domestic opposition to Indonesia's support of
UNSCR 1747 had given SBY cold feet about supporting another
resolution.

IRAQ
--------------


8. (C) Djalal said that, although a segment of the Indonesian
population criticized U.S. policy in the Middle East,
President Yudhoyono wanted to play a helpful role on Iraq.
Noting SBY would meet Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki on the
margins of the UNGA in New York, Djalal asked whether
Washington had any specific message SBY should deliver.

PAPUA
--------------


9. (SBU) DAS Marciel thanked DG Hadi for his help with the
successful July visit of Representative Eni Faleomavaega and
said he might visit Indonesia again in December. DG Hadi
agreed the visit had been a success and Rep. Faleomavaega had
left with a deeper understanding of the situation in
Indonesia. The key was to build confidence between Rep.
Faleomavaega and the GOI. Rep. Faleomavaega had to be
confident that the GOI was working hard to improve the lives
of the Papuan people, while he GOI needed to be confident
that Rep. Faleomavaega did not have a hidden agenda of
promoting Papuan independence. While it was not possible for
Rep. Faleomavaega to visit Papua during his July trip, DG
Hadi said, he would be welcome there in December.

TRAVEL WARNING
--------------


10. (SBU) Noting that Indonesia had been free from a
terrorist attack for over two years and had a number of
recent counterterrorism successes, DG Hadi asked whether the
USG would consider revising its travel warning. DAS Marciel
responded that we had already revised the travel warning this
year and were continually reviewing the security situation in
Indonesia. He stressed that revision of travel warnings was
not a political decision and was based solely on an
evaluation of security conditions.

EMBASSY LAND

JAKARTA 00002421 003.2 OF 003


--------------


11. (SBU) DAS Marciel asked about the GOI's decision on
selling the last of four plots of land which comprise the
Embassy compound. (Note: The Embassy compound consists of
four parcels of land. The USG owns two outright and the GOI
has already decided to sell the third to us. We are awaiting
their decision on the final parcel, the purchase of which is
required to begin construction of a new Embassy. End Note.)
DG Hadi replied that the Finance Ministry was still
soliciting the views of GOI entities that had equities in the
issue. He did not know when the GOI would make a decision
but assured DAS Marciel that DEPLU was pursuing the matter
through the GOI's interagency process.


12. (U) DAS Marciel approved this message.
HUME