COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND FRIEDNSHIP SESSION II

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 001227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINS KAWC TT ID
SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND FRIEDNSHIP SESSION II
HEARINGS

REF: JAKARTA 908

Classified By: PolCouns Marc L. Desjardisn, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The last two days of Session II (March
26-30) of the Commission of Truth and Friendship
Indonesia-Timore Leste was a continued study in contrasts.
Prominent Indonesian Generals, active and retired, postulated
a description of events that at times almost seemed to mock
the intent of the Commission. They systematically denied any
wrongdoing and portrayed themselves as victims of the UN.
Indonesian Commissioners tended to ask questions seeking to
buttress their position. East Timorese commissioners sought
explanations on how incidents could have occurred given the
claims of good behavior by security forces. Lesser
Indonesian officials also testified and did not say anything
surprising, denying any ties to the actions by various
militias. Four victims spoke of the personal tragedies that
they faced or witnessed, but could not speak directly to the
larger issue of responsibility for events. An official of
the commission told us privately that the public
presentations by the generals differed to a great extent to
the answers they gave commissioners in private. Session III
will take place again in Jakarta from May 2-5. End Summary

Major General Suhartono Suratman
--------------


2. (SBU) In a presentation that bordered at times on the
comical, Suhartono emphasized three major themes: a history
of various meetings and agreements that occurred in 1999 and
his duty to adjust to new realities and provide security;
killings by East Timorese rebels of innocent civilians such
as doctors and engineers; and lastly how great a commander he
was, as measured by the number of dignitaries and local
leaders he received or visited while in East Timor, which he
displayed in a lengthy slide presentation. Suhartono had
aides distribute copies of a book he wrote to the audience
and had a cheering section present.


3. (SBU) Suhartono stated that his actions as military
commander in East Timor where in accordance with accepting
the new realities that were transpiring in East Timor in

1999. He stated that the security forces attempted to
encourage dialogue and provide security for the
implementation of several peace agreements that were signed
in the course of that year. He cited the presence of one
East Timorese commissioner at some of those talks. He said
that agreements to lay down arms were not respected and
criticized the UNAMET commander for not being neutral.


4. (SBU) After showing pictures of a number of incidents
involving civilians that he said were killed by rebels,
Suhartono then showed a lengthy series of pictures of
meetings with foreign personalities, involvement in good
works or on visit to various local institutions. The display
was an attempt to illustrate his benevolent attitude and he
discussed his wife's charitable activities at length.
Suhartono claimed that they always had the East Timorese
people's welfare first in their mind as did his forces. He
criticized then rebel leader Xanana Gusmao for escalating
violence in April 1999 through a call for an uprising. He
stated that while integrationist forces had turned in their
weapons in accordance with agreements, independence forces
had not and that the military was hamstrung because it was
confined to barracks in the period leading to the referendum.


5. (SBU) Questions by the Indonesian commissioners brought
forward statements that Suhartono left East Timor two weeks
before the referendum, that the Indonesian military had no
security role from May 1999 because it had adopted a
"neutral" position between pro-independence and
pro-integration forces, that the police was responsible for
security and that TNI forces were decreased from 10 to 3
battalions in the course of the summer. East Timorese
commissioners' attempts to seek information on the source of
weapons for the pro-integration militias and statements that
the militias were composed of military personnel resulted in
a flat denial by Suhartono of any military involvement.
Other questions about specific incidents led to denials of
TNI wrongdoing and a flat assertion by Suhartono that all his
personnel were trained in human rights and carried human
rights booklets with them. He added that any violations were
punished in accordance with law but asserted that there were
not many. He said that from May 1999, his soldiers were not

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permitted to carry weapons outside their barracks. The
authorities thought the police and UNAMET would be able to
provide adequate security. He criticized UNAMET for not
understanding the situation well enough.

Major General (retired) Adam Damiri
--------------


6. (SBU) Damiri, whose command included multiple islands
besides Timor, made a more coherent and focused presentation
than Suhartono. Emphasizing the history of events as he saw
them from 1975 onward, he repeated many themes enunciated by
other GOI officials. He talked of continued violence from
1975 onwards, that one group punishing another with violence
was part of the local culture, pointing to current
instability in East Timor. He specifically called charges of
forced displacement an allegation. He asserted that
pro-independence forces caused the unrest because they were
attacking the nation's integrity and that Indonesian forces
were most concerned with protecting civilians from Fretilin.
He stated that in 1999 Fretilin activities had the effect of
causing a mass exodus and destroyed much GOI-provided health
and education infrastructure. He said that many
organizations organized by the government said to be militias
were not so, but similar to neighborhood watch groups that
exist to this day in all parts of Indonesia.


7. (SBU) Damiri stated that when a ceasefire was negotiated
between the various forces in mid-1999, only pro-integration
forces handed over weapons, 435 guns, while pro-independence
handed over none. He criticized the UNAMET chief for having
failed to collect any. TNI's neutrality restricted its right
to patrol yet it had to supply UNAMET with numerous
resources, he stated. As had other military witnesses, he
alleged that foreign planes were doing night operations at
the time. Damiri criticized UNAMET for not using the
resources of the local election commission to better organize
the vote and for recruiting only pro-independence staff. He
said that UNAMET was biased towards independence and did
nothing about cheating during the vote and did not follow-up
Indonesian complaints. Despite this, Damiri asserted that
Indonesia had met its responsibility by assuring a peaceful
voting day.


8. (SBU) Damiri stated that the subsequent violence was
sporadic and everywhere. He claimed that integrationists
were disappointed by UNAMET cheating and that in their
euphoria, the winners behaved in an "exaggerated" way. He
cited the early announcement of the results as an important
factor as well. Damiri said that he never instructed
Indonesian forces to support autonomy (i.e. integration)
during the course of 1999. He specifically denied the
issuance of weapons by the TNI to militia forces, noting that
most weapons available in armories had been shipped to Java.
In answer to questions, Damiri provided long lists of actions
he said his forces took to protect people during the violence
that followed the referendum. Prompted by an Indonesian
Commissioner's question, he agreed with the possibility that
Indonesia had been the victim of a conspiracy, naming
Australia in particular. Damiri claimed that the referendum
should have shown 60 percent support for integration, based
on voter participation in the Indonesian parliamentary
elections earlier in the year.


9. (SBU) The questioning of Damiri exhibited moments of
tension and others of close familiarity. Indonesian
Commissioner Achmad Ali at one point was so forward leaning
in agreeing with Damiri's comments that the East Timorese
co-chair soon after made a statement to remind commissioners
that they were not supposed to come to any conclusions at
that time. At another point, Damiri noted that East Timorese
Commissioner Felicidade de Sousa Guteeres had told him that
she had been once in a position to kill him when she was a
fighter in the bush. She smiled and nodded in
acknowledgement. He then noted that another commissioner,
Isabel Ferreira, wife of the current head of the East
Timorese military, knew Damiri and his wife well. In fact,
after the testimony Ferreira came down into the audience to
chat with Damiri's wife.

Victim Witnesses
--------------


10. (SBU) During the last two days of testimony, there were
several victim witnesses. One woman was a victim of multiple

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rapes by militia members who was then kidnapped and taken to
the border with West Timor. After much more abuse, the
victim managed to run away. The witness was a person of
simple background who had trouble telling her story in the
imposing milieu of a hotel ballroom.


11. (SBU) Another victim was a male who had left the military
and had been attacked by militia for being an independence
supporter. Seriously wounded by a knife attack, the TNI
prevented him from being killed. A separate victim described
an attack by militia members on the Maliana Police station in
which three local parliamentarians died. Questioning
established that the witness could not specifically establish
the identities of the attackers and that the attack occurred
because the police did not take action to impeded such
attacks and protect victims.


12. (SBU) A witness who was an aide to a priest testified to
the killings during the Suai Church attack, saying that he
himself had counted fifty bodies. Refugees had gathered in
the church due to threats they had received before they were
killed by militia.

Former Mayor of Dili
--------------


13. (SBU) Also testifying was Mateus Maia, former Mayor of
Dili from 1996-99. He spent much of his time explaining the
difference between the militia groups and government
established civilian security brigades. He claimed that the
population often confused the two groups. He said that the
government group was composed of East Timorese both for and
against independence whereas the militia groups were private
pro-independence forces. He described the incident in which
local notable Manuel Carrascalao was killed as resulting from
pro-integrationists who were disappointed that Carrascalao
had switched sides.


14. (C) Comment: There was a slight uptick in the tension
in the sessions during the last two days, notably when
Suhartono and Damiri testified. Truth has thus far does not
always seem to be the winner in the sessions. In fact, an
official closely familiar with the Commission's work said
that Suhartono and Damiri were much more frank in private
preparatory discussions. The next session runs from May 2-5
and includes such prominent witnesses as General Wiranto and
then Colonel (now Major General) Noer Muis. End Comment
HEFFERN