UNSC: DISCUSSION WITH INDONESIA ON MINURSO, KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MTS, EUR/SCE, IO/PSC (THOMAS),NEA/MAG (EWING)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK RU YI MO WI ID
SUBJECT: UNSC: DISCUSSION WITH INDONESIA ON MINURSO, KOSOVO

REF: STATE 56431 (UNSC MINURSO MANDATE RENEWAL)

Classified By: Marc L. Desjardins. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. On April 27, an Indonesian Department
Foreign Affairs official indicated that the GOI was undecided
about whether to support the Friends of the Western Sahara
draft resolution on the MINURSO mandate (reftel),but said
that as a matter of principle it was unlikely to do so in the
absence of indications that the draft was acceptable to all
parties in the dispute. The official added that he had just
received a demarche from the Russians on Kosovo independence.
The Russians' position on Kosovo, he said, was still
"diametrically opposed" to that of the U.S. and the EU. End
summary.

Western Sahara: Indonesia Ambivalent
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2. (C) On April 27, we met with Hery Saripudin of the
Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs' Directorate of
International Security to urge that the GOI accept without
changes the Friends of the Western Sahara's draft UNSCR on
renewing MINURSO's mandate (reftel). Saripudin said that the
GOI fundamentally regarded the issue as a decolonization
problem, since it considered the Western Sahara to be an
"occupied territory." Reciting the history of the issue, he
deplored the fact that arrangements for a plebiscite under
the two Baker Plans had broken down over questions of
modalities. Saripudin said that he had met with the Moroccan
Ambassador the day before, who had conveyed the impression
that any plebiscite leading to independence was now off the
table.


3. (C) Saripudin said that the GOI would support the draft
UNSCR only if it were persuaded that it was acceptable to the
Polisario as well as to Morocco. Otherwise, the GOI would
not agree to imposing the UNSCR out of a sense of undue
urgency. He said that the GOI was proceeding very carefully,
since it had realized that its UNSC votes had domestic
political ramifications. He added, however, that
developments were breaking very rapidly in New York and that
he might not be informed of the latest. He thanked us for
our presentation and said he would convey our position
together with the draft Friends UNSCR (which he said he had
not yet seen) to the Indonesian Mission to the UN.

Kosovo: Russians Intransigent
--------------


4. (C) On Kosovo, Saripudin said he had just received a
demarche from the Russian DCM, Kyrill Barsky. Barsky, he
said, had provided a readout of Foreign Minister Lavrov's
April 19 visit to Belgrade. The Russians reaffirmed their
strong opposition to Kosovo independence and had pressed the
GOI to join them, according to Saripudin. The Russians
regard UNSCR 1244 (1999) as the basis for the status of
Kosovo and oppose any effort to change this. Saripudin
observed dryly that Russia's position was "diametrically
opposed" to that of the United States and European Union on
this question.

Comment
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5. (C) Post believes that the GOI will not commit to
supporting managed independence for Kosovo unless it gets
clear signals that Russia and China do not oppose it. As
with the Iranian resolution, generation of a P-5 consensus
remains key to pushing the GOI to "yes." End comment.
HEFFERN