Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA1185
2007-04-27 08:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

PSI: JOINT DEMARCHE WITH AUSTRALIA

Tags:  PARM PREL KNNP XC 
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VZCZCXRO9258
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #1185 1170837
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270837Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4506
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0699
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1476
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001185 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/CPI M.STUMPF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP XC
SUBJECT: PSI: JOINT DEMARCHE WITH AUSTRALIA

REF: SECSTATE 17716

Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001185

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO ISN/CPI M.STUMPF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP XC
SUBJECT: PSI: JOINT DEMARCHE WITH AUSTRALIA

REF: SECSTATE 17716

Classified By: CDA John A. Heffern, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Officials from the U.S., New Zealand, Canadian,
British and Japanese embassies in Jakarta joined Australian
DCM and PolCouns for a joint demarche on the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to Desra Percaya, Director for
International Security and Disarmament at the Department of
Foreign Affairs on April 26. Australian and U.S.
representatives emphasized the need for PSI, its utility in
support of UN Security Council resolutions and its place in
the range of nonproliferation agreements, arrangements and
initiatives. Percaya reiterated Indonesia's known concerns
regarding PSI's compatability with the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and maintained that existing
agreements and mechanisms were sufficient to control
proliferation. Percaya proposed the creation of a working
group which would meet to exchange perspectives on PSI with a
view to finding a common way forward but stressed Indonesia
was not prepared to attend PSI meetings. Embassy
representatives accepted the proposal and the Australian
Embassy will arrange an initial meeting, prospectively in
June. Further details of the discussion follow.


2. (C) Percaya said Indonesia understood the need to ensure
international security but believed PSI infringed the freedom
of navigation on the high seas and in territorial waters of
littoral states. The international community should focus on
the causes of proliferation. Indonesia was in the process of
implementing a number of other nonproliferation commitments,
notably the drafting of national legislation on chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons proliferation. Indonesia
fully supported existing arrangements and could be relied
upon to fulfil its obligations under them. However,
Indonesia did not see a need for a new initiative and did not
see why Indonesia's participation was so important.
Indonesia was uncomfortable with the principle of
interdiction because of its potential for misapplication and,
psychologically, because of Indonesia's colonial experience.
Indonesia might be more comfortable with a version of PSI
within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN).


3. (C) In responding, embassies argued that existing
arrangements, while important, were insufficient because
violators were not signatories to existing arrangements,
often were non-state actors and often were beyond the reach
of national governments. The wide support PSI had received
from other capitals indicated that there was a perceived need
for such an initiative, beyond existing arrangements.
Indonesia's participation was critical because Indonesia
straddled some of the world's primary waterways, had numerous
ports and, therefore, was a critical nexus of international
shipping. National capitals were providing assistance to
strengthen detection and enforcement capabilities of police,
customs and other elements in Indonesia's ports.


4. (C) Embassies asked whether Indonesia had discussed its
concerns with other recent signatories of PSI, particularly
those from Southeast Asia. Percaya responded that
Indonesia's position was geographically different, even from
a country like Brunei, for instance, because of Indonesia's
archipelagic character and that the implications of PSI might
therefore be different.


5. (C) Comment: Post believes Indonesia's position is fairly
well entrenched and is rooted in Indonesia's continued
identification with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),its weak
maritime capabilities and its concern that it would not be
able to control PSI's application within Indonesia's
territorial and archipelagic waters. Knowledgeable
Indonesian officials also make unspecified references to the
legal liability of interdicting their own or other states'
ships under PSI, an apparent reference to a mistaken seizure
of cargo at some point in the past for which the Indonesian
government was sued. Embassies agreed to the formation of a
working group in the knowledge that PSI has already been the
subject of extensive policy and technical discussions but in
the hope that continued dialogue on respective positions,
including interpretations of the UNCLOS, might eventually
offer a way forward.
HEFFERN