AHTISAARI MEETINGS IN INDONESIA ON KOSOVO

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001150

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK SR ZL ID
SUBJECT: AHTISAARI MEETINGS IN INDONESIA ON KOSOVO

REF: JAKARTA 1098 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: A/DCM Michael Anderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
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1. (C) UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari told
A/DCM April 24 that President Yudhoyono (SBY) said that
Indonesia would try to decide on the future of Kosovo
rationally. Citing domestic concerns and the need to consult
the legislature, SBY did not state a position. The
Indonesians seemed to be looking for reasons to support
Ahtisaari's plan. Ahtisaari met with Vice-President Kalla
and several ministers over dinner. Kalla reportedly phoned
Yudhoyono in support of the plan. Ahtisaari gave a personal
tone to all of his discussions to emphasize to the
Indonesians that they owed him one, given his previous role
in the Aceh peace negotiations. Ahtisaari was more
optimistic about his Indonesia stop than the ones in Ghana
and South Africa. End Summary


2. (C) The morning of April 24, UN Special Envoy for Kosovo
Marti Ahtisaari briefed A/DCM on his talks with President
Yudhoyono and other senior leaders about the future status of
Kosovo. Ahtisaari had dinner at Vice-President Kalla's home
the evening of April 22, met with President Yudhoyono April
23 and was scheduled to meet Foreign Minister Wirajuda the
afternoon of April 24. He was scheduled to meet EU
representatives before departing that evening for Vienna.
Three of Ahtisaari's aides attended our meeting as did
PolCouns.

SBY Wants to Make a "Rational" Decision
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3. (C) Ahtisaari spoke positively about the April 23 meeting
with SBY, whose comments were reassuring. SBY told Ahtisaari
that the Indonesians were trying to be rational in their
decision-making. SBY acknowledged the differences between
Kosovo and other territories. SBY said he would have to
consult within the government and with the legislature, but
left Ahtisaari with the impression that he could control the
process. SBY said that Islamists would be supportive but
that others would be critical. Although SBY was unwilling to
say what exactly he would do about a UN Security Council
resolution, Ahtisaari told us that he would be very
disappointed if the Indonesians did not support. Ahtisaari
felt much more positive about his Indonesia visit than he had
after his recent Ghana and South Africa visits: in those
countries he did not know what to make of their positions, he
said.


4. (C) During the conversation, SBY discussed possible EU
incentives to Serbia and Kosovo at length. Ahtisaari said
that the Indonesians clearly did not understand the mechanics
of EU membership nor had they internalized that Kosovo would
have to be independent in order to join the EU. The
hand-over of wanted war criminals by Serbia had to be
resolved as well. Hopefully, he added, the Indonesians
understood better EU membership procedures. Ahtisaari said
that SBY had promised to call after the visit of a Serb
envoy, who was scheduled to arrive in Jakarta April 24, to
provide a readout of that conversation. SBY was accompanied
in the meeting by Cabinet Secretary Sudi Silalahi and foreign
affairs adviser Dino Djalal.

Dinner with VP Kalla and Cabinet Members
--------------


5. (C) Ahtisaari was received the previous evening by VP
Kalla for dinner. In attendance were several Cabinet members
including Coordinating Minister for Security, Political, and
Legal Affairs Widodo, Foreign Minister Wirajuda, and Minister
of Justice and Human Rights Awaluddin. Also in attendance
was the former rector of Jakarta's Islamic Univerity,
Azaruddin Azra, who is a well-known religious moderate.
Ahtisaari said he made his "sales pitch" and that there were
extensive questions and answers. Uncharacteristically,
Vice-President Kalla was silent during most of the discussion
while the Foreign Minister probed with many questions. Azra
asked questions about the kind of state that would emerge in
Kosovo. Ahtisaari expected his formal call on Minister
Wirajuda would not cover any new ground. Minister Awaluddin
told Ahtisaari at an April 24 dinner that Kalla had
telephoned SBY with a recommendation to support the Kosovo
plan.

No Press
--------------


6. (C) Before the Presidential meeting, Ahtisaari agreed not
to make a statement to the press at the request of Dino
Djalal. Apparently, the Indonesians wanted to avoid any
appearance that SBY was being lobbied, as opposed to
receiving an explanation of the recommendations. Ahtisaari
said that he was comfortable with that approach and suggested
that any further interactions by the Kosovo plan's supporters
with the Indonesians be low-key. He did not plan to hold any
press event before his departure. With respect to his own
tactics, Ahtisaari said that he made sure that all his
interlocutors understood that he would be personally
disappointed if they did not support his plan, leaving unsaid
that the Indonesians owed him for his assistance with the
Aceh peace talks. He noted that the Indonesians seemed most
interested in the position of Qatar, presumably due to the
religious factor surrounding Kosovo's future.


7. (C) Comment: We are happy that Ahtisaari had a good
round of meetings in Jakarta, and have no doubt that his
visit will be an important contribution to Indonesian
thinking. The references by SBY to his domestic audience
probably reflect a real concern, given the parliamentary
outcry over the Iran vote. We believe that he will want to
make sure his bases are covered before the GOI makes a final
decision on the Kosovo resolution. Based on Ahtisaari's
relative optimism, that decision could bode well for his
plan. End Comment



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