UNSC/KOSOVO: GETTING INDONESIA TO YES

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 001076

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR U/S BURNS FROM JOHN HEFFERN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK KFLU TBIO YI ID
SUBJECT: UNSC/KOSOVO: GETTING INDONESIA TO YES

REF: A. STATE 49723

B. JAKARTA 994

C. JAKARTA 930

D. JAKARTA 673

Classified By: John A. Heffern, Charge d'affaires. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary. In response to Under Secretary Burns'
request (ref A),I recommend that the Secretary, and even the
President if necessary, contact their Indonesian counterparts
to urge support for the Kosovo resolution. I have pressed
the case with a former Foreign Minister, the Speaker of the
Parliament, the President's foreign policy advisor, and a key
think tanker. On April 18, I will meet with key Foreign
Ministry official Desra Percaya, but these steps are
insufficient. UNSC votes have become unhelpfully politicized
in Indonesia's domestic context, and President Yudhoyono will
want to avoid the appearance of caving to U.S. pressure. The
factors most likely to sway the GOI in favor of Kosovo
independence would be a P-5 consensus on the resolution,
vocal support from other Muslim countries, and a strong and
effective case for the plan by Matti Ahtisaari, who will meet
with President Yudhoyono on April 23. End summary.


2. (C) We have seen no evolution in recent days on
Indonesia's position on Kosovo (refs B - D). President
Yudhoyono (SBY) is still contending with political fallout
from Indonesia's vote in favor of UNSCR 1747; a parliamentary
petition to interpellate SBY on this matter has reportedly
gathered 300 signatures. While the Indonesian House of
Representatives has little real authority in foreign affairs,
its reactions to the Burma and Iran resolutions show that
SBY's decisions carry a domestic political cost.
Accordingly, SBY will be extremely reluctant to commit to
supporting Kosovo independence. Even before the uproar over
the Iran vote (ref C),Foreign Ministry officials indicated
clearly and consistently that longstanding doctrinal concerns
about territorial integrity and separatism predispose the GOI
to oppose Kosovar independence over Belgrade's objections
(ref D).


3. (C) On April 16, I raised Kosovo with Speaker Laksono and
other parliamentarians, and received blank stares and shrugs
in response. They had no knowledge of the issue. An
influential Indonesian who made informal soundings on our
behalf confirmed that the legislature and others who had
strong views on Iran and Burma are not cognizant of Kosovo.
He therefore recommended that the less the issue is
publicized locally, the better our chances of persuading the
GOI to join us. Nonetheless, the issue will be tough since
the GOI will not want to open itself to criticism by
nationalists for violating sacrosanct principles against
separatism, which are ingrained in Indonesian foreign policy
thinking.

Ahtisaari Visit
--------------


4. (C) I have just learned that Special Representative
Ahtisaari will meet President Yudhoyono on April 23. This is
crucial. Ahtisaari is respected in Indonesia for his efforts
in brokering the Aceh accord. SBY foreign policy advisor Dino
Djalal told me today that SBY had no firm position on the
issue. He said that the only consideration that might trump
Indonesia's commitment to "territorial integrity" is war and
peace. If Ahtisaari can convince the President that his plan
has a better chance of bringing long-term peace to the
Balkans than any alternative, then SBY might be convinced to
support it.


5. (C) Another decisive factor in getting the Indonesians to
vote "yes" would be a clear signal from Russia and China that
they will support the resolution. In the absence of a P-5
consensus, we are certain that the best we can hope for is
Indonesia's abstention. Calls from the Secretary and the
President call to their Indonesian counterparts will be
crucial to make the case for the Kosovo resolution.

Call from Secretary Rice
--------------


6. (C) In her call to Foreign Minister Wirajuda, Secretary
Rice should allay concerns that the Kosovo resolution creates
a precedent for increased U.N. meddling in the internal
affairs of its member states. Indonesia bitterly recalls the
U.N.'s role in securing East Timor's independence, and is
aware of calls from by NGOs and some foreign legislators for
the U.N. to mediate between Jakarta and indigenous
separatists in Papua province. The Secretary should stress
the specificity of the Kosovo case, and explain that the
unique history of the Balkans, including many years of
Security Council involvement, means that the case of Kosovo
does not constitute a precedent for U.N. involvement in Papua
or any other part of Indonesia, and that the Ahtisaari plan
is the best hope for peace.


7. (C) The Secretary should also be prepared to counter
arguments that the U.S. is creating an artificial sense of
urgency about this issue. We have heard some complaints that
while the U.S. is seized of the Kosovo question, there has
been little progress in moving the Mideast Peace Process. It
would also be helpful if the Secretary could report any
progress in securing support for Kosovo independence from
Russia, China, or other Muslim states, especially fellow UNSC
member Qatar.

Call From POTUS
--------------


8. (C) The President should also telephone President
Yudhoyono to raise Kosovo and other issues. In planning the
call, we should be aware that SBY has faced criticism that he
is overly deferential to the U.S. This means that the
discussion should not consist solely of a full-court press on
Kosovo, and that we should not expect SBY to clearly voice
his position in the course of the conversation. We believe
that the President should make the case for Kosovo
independence in general terms, which should be sufficient to
impress upon Yudhoyono the importance of the issue to us.


9. (C) Another topic the President could usefully raise
during the call would be the sharing of samples of the avian
influenza (AI) virus. Indonesia leads the world in reported
human AI cases, but stopped sharing AI samples with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in December
2006 out of pique over the apparent development of commercial
AI vaccines from Indonesian samples. After a series of
negotiations with the World Health Organization (WHO),
Indonesia won much praise when Minister of Health Fadillah
Supari announced at a March 28 meeting in Jakarta that it
would immediately resume sample sharing. However, almost
three weeks have passed since that pledge, and no samples
have left Indonesia, despite continuing human AI cases. It
is unclear whether Indonesia intends to drag the issue into
next month's World Health Assembly, or whether bureaucratic
ineptitude is holding up sample sharing. A mention to SBY of
the significant potential damage to Indonesia's public health
interests, and reputation, from continuing to boycott the
world influenza surveillance system could be extremely
helpful.
HEFFERN