YARGITAY'S RULING ON ECUMENICITY: WHAT DOES IT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000638

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017
TAGS: PHUM PGOV TU
SUBJECT: YARGITAY'S RULING ON ECUMENICITY: WHAT DOES IT
MEAN FOR THE PATRIARCHATE?

REF: A. ISTANBUL 0550

B. ISTANBUL 0607

C. 06 ISTANBUL 0524

Classified By: Acting Principal Officer Sandra Oudkirk for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Ecumenical Patriarchate attorney Kezban
Hatemi and Ecumenical Patriarch senior advisor Metropolitan
Meliton, separately, gave us very different assessments of
the implications of the Turkish Higher Court of Appeals'
(Yargitay) recent rejection of the ecumenicity of the Greek
Orthodox patriarchate. Hatemi expected the decree would not
affect future legal or political decisions related to the
patriarchate, while Meliton contended the ruling would be
used to justify the government's intransigence. Though
analysts continue to study the court's decision, its ultimate
impact on the patriarchate will largely depend on the
intentions of the post-July 22 government. End summary.

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ONE ATTORNEY'S PERSPECTIVE: DECISION IS IRRELEVANT
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2. (C) Ecumenical Patriarchate attorney Kezban Hatemi
expressed to us on July 12 her opinion that the Yargitay's
June 26 rejection of the ecumenicity of the Greek Orthodox
patriarch was just another in a string of "strange" rulings
by that court which only serve to polarize the judiciary.
Hatemi recounted the judicial proceedings associated with the
case (ref A) and dismissed the ecumenicity rejection as the
court's irrelevant attempt to placate those upset that the
Yargitay upheld a lower court ruling to acquit the
patriarchate defendants on charges of obstructing the
religious freedom of a Bulgarian Orthodox priest.
Ironically, she agreed in part with the Yargitay's rejection,
noting that there is no legal basis for the ecumenicity of
the Patriarch -- only a spiritual one. "In a truly secular
society," Hatemi asserted, "the law would not be involved."
The patriarchate has long argued that it is not seeking the
government's recognition of its ecumenicity. At the same
time, it is not the government's place to say that the
patriarchate is not ecumenical, she said.


3. (C) Despite ultra-nationalist attorney Kemal Kerencsiz's
unsuccessful attempt to block the July 7-10 Holy Synod
meeting because it included non-Turkish members (ref B),
Hatemi doubted the government would interpret the Yargitay's
ecumenicity rejection as a precedent to be used against the
patriarchate (e.g., in such matters as the re-opening of
Halki Seminary or the inclusion of non-Turkish voters and/or
candidates in the election of the Patriarch). Nevertheless,
she was considering filing a complaint in the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) against the Yargitay for "putting
pressure on the religious freedom of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate."


4. (C) Hatemi praised the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister
and Istanbul Governor for being tolerant and helpful,
pointing out that Kerencsiz's application to the Governor to
stop the Synod meeting had had the opposite of the effect
intended. The Governor facilitated the meeting by providing
six body guards for each member, she said. Hatemi recalled
that PM Erdogan and the Ministry of Education made positive
statements two years ago regarding the possibility of
re-opening Halki Seminary. She noted that Justice and
Development Party (AKP) member and incumbent Istanbul MP
Egemen Bagis asked Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew for the
Greek Orthodox community's support during the upcoming
elections. Bartholomew agreed, remarked Hatemi, but stressed
that if Bagis doesn't do anything to assist the patriarchate,
the community will ask why.

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METROPOLITAN MELITON: AN OMINOUS RULING
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5. (C) In a separate July 12 meeting, Ecumenical Patriarch
senior advisor Metropolitan Meliton expressed his
appreciation for the Consul General's July 5 visit to the
Istanbul Governor in which she reiterated the USG's and
American people's interest in the concerns of the
patriarchate. He bemoaned the Yargitay's unexpected
pronouncement, noting that it represented the first time in
the Republic's 84-year history that a court had ruled on the
legal status of the ecumenicity of the patriarchate. He
expressed particular concern that the Yargitay had
interpreted an Istanbul Governorship document dated December

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6, 1923, stating that "the people who will participate in the
religious and clerical elections in the patriarchate and who
will be elected should be Turkish citizens and to (sic) be in
charge in Turkey at the time of the election" as legally
binding. (Note: An excerpt of the Yargitay's decision
applying to the ecumenicity of the patriarchate will be
reported septel. End note.)


6. (C) Meliton dismissed Hatemi's assessment as overly
optimistic and stated lawyers in Ankara warned him that all
courts will use the Yargitay's decision as a precedent and,
more importantly, politicians will use the ruling as a way to
say "no" to future patriarchate requests. He posited that
the case was a calculated attempt by the "deep state" to
retaliate against a June 12 ECHR decision to agree to hear
the critical Buyukada Orphanage case (ref C). Meliton
considered the timing of the Yargitay's ruling, which was
officially made the day after the ECHR decision (but not
announced until June 26),suspicious. Furthermore, he
believed the ecumenicity rejection was strategically
incorporated into a decision in favor of the patriarchate so
that the latter would have no recourse to appeal the decision
to the ECHR.

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WHAT THE GOVERNOR DID AND DIDN'T DO...
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7. (C) Meanwhile, patriarchate representative Paul Gikas
confirmed the patriarchate had previously mis-reported that
the Istanbul Governor rejected, in a televised appearance, a
patriarchate request to approve work permits for foreign
staff (ref B). According to Gikas, the report was due to an
internal miscommunication; the Governor has actually not yet
responded to the letter the patriarchate sent two months ago,
making the request. Gikas also affirmed Hatemi's account of
the Governor providing extra security for Holy Synod members
during their July 7-10 meeting.


8. (SBU) Separately, press widely reported this week on the
cancellation of a patriachate-sponsored concert by Greek
artist George Dalaras on July 14. According to an embargoed
copy of a press statement the patriarchate had yet to release
as of July 17, the Istanbul Governor's Security Directorate
cancelled the concert at the last minute, claiming it had not
been informed about the concert within the necessary
timeframe. The patriarchate asserted it had obtained
approval to hold the concert as part of the 2nd Orthodox
Youth Conference from the Istanbul Governor's City Culture
and Tourism Directorate on May 28. Some press reports
surmised the decision to cancel the concert may have been
linked to a statement Dalaras made six months ago during a
Greek television interview, "if Cyprus cannot be Greek, then
I'm not setting foot in Turkey."

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Comment. Though Meliton takes a consistently
pessimistic view on all developments affecting the
patriarchate, Hatemi's dismissal of the possible negative
implications of the Yargitay's ruling seems overly
optimistic. While analysts continue to assess the court's
decision, Kerencsiz's attempt to block the Holy Synod meeting
is an example of the types of challenges the patriarchate can
expect to face in the future: a report in today's edition of
Hurriyet claimed that one of the litigants in the case
associated with the Yargitay's ruling has filed a complaint
with the Beyoglu Chief Public Prosecutor against Bartholomew
for continuing to use the ecumenical title. How these
challenges play out largely depends on the "tolerance" of the
post-July 22 government. We will follow up with the Istanbul
Deputy Governor for minority affairs to gain insight into the
government's initial interpretation of the ruling. End
comment.
OUDKIRK