Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISTANBUL187
2007-03-08 08:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Istanbul
Cable title:  

S/P KRASNER DISCUSSES IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST,

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU IZ IR 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHIT #0187/01 0670840
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080840Z MAR 07
FM AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6715
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000187 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/P DR. KRASNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: S/P KRASNER DISCUSSES IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST,
U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS IN ISTANBUL


Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000187

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/P DR. KRASNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU IZ IR
SUBJECT: S/P KRASNER DISCUSSES IRAQ, MIDDLE EAST,
U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS IN ISTANBUL


Classified By: Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary. Following policy/planning consultations
with the Turkish Foreign Ministry in Ankara, S/P Director
Stephen Krasner met with the secular, nationalist-leaning
Marmara group as well as academics in Istanbul on February
23-24. Lecturer and writer Soli Ozel questioned how a
revolutionary foreign policy could result in Middle East
stability. The answer now, he said, was to sit down and
"hash it all out" with all sides. End summary.

A REVOLUTIONARY FOREIGN POLICY
--------------


2. (C) S/P Director Stephen Krasner spoke with Turkish
foreign policy lecturer, author and writer Soli Ozel on
February 24. Ozel observed that America's Iraq intervention
upset the social basis of power for the entire Middle East
established in the 1920s. The move destroyed the Iraqi state
and led to the end of Sunni dominance throughout the region.
This revolutionary foreign policy was not welcomed by other
states. Since Iraq was not a client state, the revolution
there could not be controlled from the center. "How," he
asked, "can you manage the situation and bring about order?"
In revolutions, repercussions are not felt immediately; in
the first decades, the radicals dominate. Krasner responded
that it was not an accident; the U.S. wanted to upset the
existing order. Saddam had led a repressive, threatening
regime. A moderate center could yet emerge, he argued.
Turkey, a medium-sized, yet important regional power, could
not solve big regional issues on its own, but could join the
U.S. by continuing its cooperation on Iraq and by pressuring
Iran.


3. (C) Ozel said that short term, all sides within Iraq
supported extremist factions to achieve the best possible
deal at the end of the game. The U.S. had "created a mess"
in Iraq. He hoped the U.S. wouldn't continue to rearrange
the region without discussing its moves in advance with other
regional states. He said it was at least important to give
the impression that the U.S. listened and heard. He urged

engagement with the Syrians. The Turkish government was
anxious to help in approaching the Syrians, he claimed.
President Sezer visited President al-Asad in April 2005, and
Turkey had been instrumental in starting a second track
dialogue between Syria and Israel last year, acknowledged by
Israel. Turkey would not double cross the U.S.-- its efforts
were transparent. The best regional answer, Ozel said, would
be for all sides -- the U.S., Iraq, Syria, Iran -- to sit
down at the table as equals and "hash it all out."


4. (C) Krasner asked why Iran would cut a deal with the U.S.
Didn't they want to bloody the U.S. and force a departure?
Ozel said Iran did not know the real U.S. interest; the
current atmosphere in Washington made it difficult to judge.
Krasner noted the Secretary had offered talks the previous
summer if the regime suspended its nuclear programs; the
offer was still on the table. Ozel outlined what he thought
were Iranian requisites for talks. The U.S. would need to
recognize Iranian interests and give assurances the regime
would not be overthrown. Krasner said anti-western elements
in Iran might try to undercut any long-term deal. Ozel
responded that it was not until December that Ahmadinejad had
been successfully quieted. He sympathized that it was
difficult for the U.S. to know which policy to follow until
it was certain which group would come out on top -- but the
U.S. had shown hubris in Iraq; Israel the same in Lebanon;
maybe Iran was demonstrating theirs. It was ironic that Iran
was in so many ways close to the U.S.

U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS STUCK ON KURDS
--------------


5. (C) Ozel lamented the state of U.S.-Turkish relations,
noting the generally shared outlook and similar values. He
partially blamed Turkey's trouble with the PKK on domestic
politics that over-inflated the importance of the problem.
The U.S. had delivered Ocalan to Turkey in 1999 but since
then, Turkey had done nothing to make progress. The PKK had
become an alibi for the Turkish government which reduced all
policy down to this one issue. Because of the focus, the GOT
had no ability, Ozel said, to move forward on other issues
with the U.S. There was a vicious cycle. Ocalan did not
want to lose influence, the Iraqi Kurds were challenging
Turkey with respect to Kirkuk and other agenda items, and
Turks were furious.


6. (C) With regard to Kirkuk, the constitutional process in
Iraq was being destroyed every day by Kurds, according to

ISTANBUL 00000187 002 OF 002


Ozel, who were packing their own people into the city. This
was unfortunate; Iraq had been multi-ethnic,
multi-confessional. Now, only Kirkuk maintained this
character. Had the U.S. considered a special status for the
city something like Brussels, for instance, enjoyed within
the EU? The U.S. argument on the Iraqi constitution and the
Kirkuk referendum increased the U.S.' credibility problem
given the population shift the Kurds were openly effecting.


7. (C) Ozel said people had a hard time understanding
American foreign policy. David Ignatius had lectured
recently in Russia, quoting Henry Kissinger as saying, "Iran
must decide if it is a cause or a nation." Someone in the
audience responded that the U.S. must decide as well if it is
a nation or a cause. Critics of President Bush said he
displayed self-righteousness, that the U.S. stood for good
but so long as the speaker cannot see what the critics are
saying, the critics cannot see the U.S. for what it is -- no
matter how well-intentioned the actions. Krasner pointed out
that the American approach had worked out extremely well over
time. It was the point of Robert Kagan's recent book,
"Dangerous Nation". Perhaps the U.S. had been a bit more
confident than warranted after the fall of the USSR, but
stepping back, one could see that over the long term U.S.
fireign policy had been very successful.


8. (U) This cable was cleared by Dr. Krasner.
JONES