AHMET CALIK ON ASHGABAT LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISTANBUL 000106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: EPET PGOV TX
SUBJECT: AHMET CALIK ON ASHGABAT LEADERSHIP


Classified By: Classified by Consul General Deborah K. Jones for reason
s 1.5 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Ahmet Calik, Turkish oligarch and longtime Ashgabat
insider, shared his views on Turkmen developments February 11
in Istanbul with visiting SCA PDAS Mann. We convey them as
an additional window on Turkmen issues.


2. (C) Calik has known interim President Berdimuhammedov
since 1997 when the latter, as health minister, was making
his first trip abroad to Israel via Turkey. Calik
accompanied him in Istanbul and Berdimuhammedov spoke no
single word that was not on his printed talking points.
Calik considered this either very smart or very stupid, and
he now inclines to the former view. In the succeeding years,
they both resided in the same Ashgabat apartment building
(one that Calik's construction firm built) and developed a
closer acquaintance. He considers Berdimuhammedov very
intelligent and a master of detail. He is rough on
subordinates, though he may be compelled to change as
president. Asked who are his allies within the current
leadership, Calik replied that there are no permanent ties,
only shifting allegiances.


3. (C) The current leadership configuration, Calik believes,
consists of Berdimuhammedov the defense minister, and the
intelligence chief. The defense minister, he asserted, is
close to Russia, the intelligence chief less so, though this
is not true of the his subordinates in the intelligence
service, who are more influenced by Russia .
Berdimuhammedov remains more distanced from Russian influence
than the other two. Rejepov, head of Presidential security,
has put out the word that he plans to retire. This
information comes from Rejepov's son, who is employed by
Calik. Calik, though, is not ready to take this at face
value; he believes Rejepov may be distancing himself from the
current leadership maneuverings and looking toward a future
role. Power, he believes, rests with the army and the
intelligence service. Another key player to watch: the
Turkmen ambassador in Moscow, who Calik says is the main
channel for conveying the Kremlin's views to the new
leadership. He considers this ambassador as a potential
future president.


4. (C) Calik stated that Berdimuhammedov's priorities are
first, to stay in office, and then to address key
deficiencies, notably education and health. Turkmen
agriculture is a major problem and Berdimuhammedov will want
to tackle the problems of the money losing Soviet-style
system. Calik believes the Turkmen people had high
expectations with independence, expectations which were then
dashed by Niyazov's misgovernance. If the national decline
continues, it could lead to unrest, and Calik therefore
recommends that the US push hard on reform at the onset of a
new government but push in a way that does not isolate
Berdimuhammedov The useful way to do this, he believes,
would be to reach out through frequent senior visitors to
Ashgabat and make clear to him the alternatives and the
advantages that the United States can offer. He advised
outreach to the intelligence chief, who he believes is
persuadable, and even to the defense minister.


5. (C) On Turkmen energy, Calik believes that the sector is
troubled, through underinvestment and the meager capabilities
of the Chinese. By way of example, he disclosed an incident
that has thus far been kept close-hold within the Turkmen
government, a fire that developed in late 2006 in the Yolotan
gas field. When local personnel were unable to control the
fire, Niyazov requested Calik's assistance in bringing it
under control. Calik then consulted American specialists and
prepared a work proposal; the minister of energy, however,
sidelined the proposal in favor of Chinese efforts. He
stated that the Chinese have thus far proved unsuccessful and
the fire continues. Calik was particularly scornful of the
minister of energy as corrupt and inept. He warned that the
Chinese have paid off both the minister and subordinate staff.


6. (C) Calik agreed with the USG view that Turkmenistan has
large unrealized gas export potential and he suggested that
both a trans-Caspian pipeline and a trans-Afghan pipeline
were feasible, though not simultaneously. He expressed
concern about Caspian delimitation impeding a TCP. Mann
outlined the USG view that delimitation was not a
prerequisite for a pipeline and he described the talks on
energy issues held by Assistant Secretary Sullivan and his
delegation in Baku. He advised Calik that the Turkish
government must successfully address the transit tariff
issue, in the first instance, with Azerbaijan, in order to
achieve TCP development.


7. (C) Calik will travel to Ashgabat for the inauguration as
part of the Erdogan delegation. Mann urged the Turkish
delegation to reassure Berdimuhammedov that we do not expect
him to change existing gas sales arrangements but that
Turkmenistan should not undertake new commitments for
development or export until it has had a chance to assess the
issues fully and accurately and to discuss these with Turkey
and the United States. Calik endorsed the message and
stressed that it would be unwise to press Berdimuhammedov for
specific commitments at this early stage. His advice: build
a relationship, visit frequently, and continue to provide the
new president with data and options. Berdimuhammedov may
still be unsure in dealing with foreigners, and Calik thought
it would not be unexpected for the president to divert
meetings to his ministers until he gained greater sureness.


8. (C) Comment: Calik has been a player in Turkmenistan
since independence and at one point in Niyazov's reign was
termed the second most powerful man in the country. He
clearly is concerned about his fortunes with the new regime,
in energy, construction, and textiles, and has a strong
interest in confronting Russian influence and in being able
to show the new leadership that he is influential with the
Turkish and the American governments. Calik was famously
close-mouthed throughout the Niyazov years, so to speak at
length and in detail on Ashgabat developments is a sign in
itself of his concern.
JONES