Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD4728
2007-11-05 13:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004728
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PK ASEC CASC KFLO PINR
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS
REF: ISLAMABAD 4702
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 004728
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PK ASEC CASC KFLO PINR
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS
REF: ISLAMABAD 4702
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary: President Pervaiz Musharraf spoke November 5
to the full diplomatic corps. The hour-long monologue was
rambling and personalized, focused more on his reasons for
the March 12 sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry than
for his November 3 suspension of Pakistan's Constitution.
The Ambassador raised USG concerns about the government's
heavy-handed measures against civil society and the media;
Musharraf railed against the head of the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (now under house arrest) and avoided
discussing the recent curb on the press. Responding to the
British High Commissioner's request for a date for
parliamentary elections and for doffing his uniform,
Musharraf would provide no schedule, only committing to
"implement the third phase of (democratic) transition." End
summary.
"All because of March 12"
--------------
2. (C) Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf convoked the
diplomatic corps in Islamabad on November 5. Joined by
several ministers/advisors, including Foreign Minister
Kasuri, the head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General
Nadeem Taj, and the head of Military Intelligence (MI)
General Nadeem Ejaz Ahmed, Musharraf launched an hour-long,
rambling monologue before taking some questions from the
assembled ambassadors. Though Musharraf said he would
reiterate the points from his late night November 3 speech to
the nation, he instead presented a highly personalized case
against Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
3. (C) Musharraf said he did not take lightly his November 3
decision to suspend Pakistan's Constitution, but the Chief
Justice "placed me between a rock and a hard surface." He
said the court threatened Pakistan's progress and development
of the last seven years with its interference in legislative
and executive decisions, using suo moto judgments. He
claimed there were now thousands of petitioners before the
Court trying to receive special treatment. Musharraf
pleaded, instead, for unity among the three branches of
government.
4. (C) Starting from before his March 12 suspension of the
Chief Justice, Musharraf counted eight reasons for his
decision: (1) he had no sense of justice, playing politics
with the choice of Supreme Court panels and with vacancies on
the Sharia Court and provincial high courts; (2) he violated
judicial norms, suspiciously changing decisions and hampering
privatization initiatives; (3) he inappropriately called on
the chiefs of national intelligence agencies; (4) he pressed
the President and Prime Minister to appoint his son to a
civil service position; (5) he harassed civil servants
working at his judicial chambers; (6) he entertained
thousands of suo moto petitions; (7) he made fake
reimbursement claims; and (8) he was driven by his ego.
Musharraf concluded that his actions against Chaudhry were,
therefore, justifiable and constitutional; in contrast, the
Supreme Court's dismissal of the reference was not.
Too Soft
--------------
5. (C) Musharraf then claimed to have been too lenient with
the lawyers' movement and the press. "Things have
snowballed" to the point that the Supreme Court now felt it
could review his eligibility to remain president. He argued
that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) had the
constitutional authority to rule on this matter, and yet the
Court entertained the opposition's petitions. He said the
Court had dangerously put the country in "suspended
animation" and had "semi-paralyzed" law enforcement by
threatening contempt of court charges. Musharraf claimed he
had sent numerous conciliatory messages to the Chief Justice,
some of which were very public.
6. (C) Once assured of a negative judgment, however,
ISLAMABAD 00004728 002 OF 003
Musharraf realized that his only constitutional option would
be to resign, which "others convinced me against." Musharraf
revealed that, before making this decision, he met with all
of the corps commanders -- "my constituency." He also
reported that he met with senior politicians, provincial
governors and chief ministers, and his cabinet. "This option
was not for myself," but for Pakistan, he repeated several
times. Musharraf said that his demand that judges swear an
oath under the new provisional constitutional order (PCO) was
extra-constitutional; the suspension of fundamental rights
under a state of emergency was not.
"Bear with Us."
--------------
7. (C) Directly addressing ambassadors from the "developed
world," Musharraf argued that every country is different in
its level of civil rights. "If this were an ideal world, an
ideal solution would be possible," Musharraf explained
concerning the arrests of political party and civil society
leaders and the curb on media freedoms. "Are we supposed to
let everyone do what they want?," he asked.
8. (C) The Ambassador strongly reiterated with Musharraf the
USG's concern over heavy-handed measures against civil
society and the press. She further raised the detention in
Lahore of 50 members of the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan, adding that it was "hard to imagine a group less of
a threat to Pakistan's security." The Ambassador warned
Musharraf that his internationally-recognized accomplishment
of supporting a free and vigorous press was being undermined
by the near complete suspension of the media.
9. (C) In reply, Musharraf ridiculed the leader of the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asma Jahangir, as "mentally
unbalanced." The Foreign Minister confirmed with the
Ambassador on the margins that Jahangir was not at a local
police station, though some male workers might still be, but
was under house arrest. Punjab Chief Minister Pervaiz Elahi
told CG Lahore that he had offered Jahangir his chef and
suggested she enjoy the time at home with her family.
Musharraf did not address the Ambassador's point about media
restrictions beyond repeating, "Please understand our
society," implying that recent measures were acceptable to
the general public.
... And then there are the terrorists.
--------------
10. (C) Saying some of his advisors described the Chief
Justice's suo moto rulings as "judicial terrorism," Musharraf
argued that, at the very least, Chaudhry had stymied the
government's counterterrorism efforts. For example, the
government has been in contempt of court, Musharraf said,
since October 30 because the government had not complied with
the Chief Justice's order to re-establish the red mosque or
release terrorist suspects arrested without charge.
11. (C) In answering a question from Canadian High
Commissioner David Collins on the government's plans in FATA
and Swat, Musharraf promised, "We will come down more
strongly there." Musharraf claimed to have opened another
front against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and said the
government had the support of the majority in these areas,
who he described as moderate and scared.
Parliamentary Elections; Uniform
--------------
12. (C) In response to a question from British High
Commissioner Robert Brinkley on parliamentary elections and
whether Musharraf would resign as Chief of Army Staff (COAS),
Musharraf committed to implementing "the third stage of
(democratic) transition," but noted that "legal issues"
related to the PCO may cause "minor changes" to the previous
mid-January target for elections.
13. (C) Comment: Since his reinstatement, the Chief Justice
increasingly opted to challenge Musharraf's rule and
executive-judicial relations by intervening on a wide range
ISLAMABAD 00004728 003 OF 003
of issues, from vegetable prices and zoning regulations to
the voters list. The Supreme Court's rulings on political
issues, including the Nawaz deportation, Musharraf's
eligibility to be a candidate and the National Reconciliation
Ordinance appeared designed to keep the proverbial sword of
Damocles hanging over Musharraf's head. Today's harangue
indicates just how much Musharraf has been preoccupied about
the Chief Justice. Musharraf's dismissal of USG and other
international concerns about civil liberties, and his refusal
to confirm dates for parliamentary elections and his
resignation as COAS are troubling. We have made the case
privately and emphatically to GOP officials that the choice
of individuals arrested seems designed to elicit stringent
international condemnation. We will continue to deliver the
message that failure to follow through on these issues
threatens to damage US-Pakistan bilateral relations. End
comment.
PATTERSON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PK ASEC CASC KFLO PINR
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF CONVOKES DIP CORPS
REF: ISLAMABAD 4702
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) Summary: President Pervaiz Musharraf spoke November 5
to the full diplomatic corps. The hour-long monologue was
rambling and personalized, focused more on his reasons for
the March 12 sacking of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry than
for his November 3 suspension of Pakistan's Constitution.
The Ambassador raised USG concerns about the government's
heavy-handed measures against civil society and the media;
Musharraf railed against the head of the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (now under house arrest) and avoided
discussing the recent curb on the press. Responding to the
British High Commissioner's request for a date for
parliamentary elections and for doffing his uniform,
Musharraf would provide no schedule, only committing to
"implement the third phase of (democratic) transition." End
summary.
"All because of March 12"
--------------
2. (C) Pakistani President Pervaiz Musharraf convoked the
diplomatic corps in Islamabad on November 5. Joined by
several ministers/advisors, including Foreign Minister
Kasuri, the head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General
Nadeem Taj, and the head of Military Intelligence (MI)
General Nadeem Ejaz Ahmed, Musharraf launched an hour-long,
rambling monologue before taking some questions from the
assembled ambassadors. Though Musharraf said he would
reiterate the points from his late night November 3 speech to
the nation, he instead presented a highly personalized case
against Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.
3. (C) Musharraf said he did not take lightly his November 3
decision to suspend Pakistan's Constitution, but the Chief
Justice "placed me between a rock and a hard surface." He
said the court threatened Pakistan's progress and development
of the last seven years with its interference in legislative
and executive decisions, using suo moto judgments. He
claimed there were now thousands of petitioners before the
Court trying to receive special treatment. Musharraf
pleaded, instead, for unity among the three branches of
government.
4. (C) Starting from before his March 12 suspension of the
Chief Justice, Musharraf counted eight reasons for his
decision: (1) he had no sense of justice, playing politics
with the choice of Supreme Court panels and with vacancies on
the Sharia Court and provincial high courts; (2) he violated
judicial norms, suspiciously changing decisions and hampering
privatization initiatives; (3) he inappropriately called on
the chiefs of national intelligence agencies; (4) he pressed
the President and Prime Minister to appoint his son to a
civil service position; (5) he harassed civil servants
working at his judicial chambers; (6) he entertained
thousands of suo moto petitions; (7) he made fake
reimbursement claims; and (8) he was driven by his ego.
Musharraf concluded that his actions against Chaudhry were,
therefore, justifiable and constitutional; in contrast, the
Supreme Court's dismissal of the reference was not.
Too Soft
--------------
5. (C) Musharraf then claimed to have been too lenient with
the lawyers' movement and the press. "Things have
snowballed" to the point that the Supreme Court now felt it
could review his eligibility to remain president. He argued
that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) had the
constitutional authority to rule on this matter, and yet the
Court entertained the opposition's petitions. He said the
Court had dangerously put the country in "suspended
animation" and had "semi-paralyzed" law enforcement by
threatening contempt of court charges. Musharraf claimed he
had sent numerous conciliatory messages to the Chief Justice,
some of which were very public.
6. (C) Once assured of a negative judgment, however,
ISLAMABAD 00004728 002 OF 003
Musharraf realized that his only constitutional option would
be to resign, which "others convinced me against." Musharraf
revealed that, before making this decision, he met with all
of the corps commanders -- "my constituency." He also
reported that he met with senior politicians, provincial
governors and chief ministers, and his cabinet. "This option
was not for myself," but for Pakistan, he repeated several
times. Musharraf said that his demand that judges swear an
oath under the new provisional constitutional order (PCO) was
extra-constitutional; the suspension of fundamental rights
under a state of emergency was not.
"Bear with Us."
--------------
7. (C) Directly addressing ambassadors from the "developed
world," Musharraf argued that every country is different in
its level of civil rights. "If this were an ideal world, an
ideal solution would be possible," Musharraf explained
concerning the arrests of political party and civil society
leaders and the curb on media freedoms. "Are we supposed to
let everyone do what they want?," he asked.
8. (C) The Ambassador strongly reiterated with Musharraf the
USG's concern over heavy-handed measures against civil
society and the press. She further raised the detention in
Lahore of 50 members of the Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan, adding that it was "hard to imagine a group less of
a threat to Pakistan's security." The Ambassador warned
Musharraf that his internationally-recognized accomplishment
of supporting a free and vigorous press was being undermined
by the near complete suspension of the media.
9. (C) In reply, Musharraf ridiculed the leader of the Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan, Asma Jahangir, as "mentally
unbalanced." The Foreign Minister confirmed with the
Ambassador on the margins that Jahangir was not at a local
police station, though some male workers might still be, but
was under house arrest. Punjab Chief Minister Pervaiz Elahi
told CG Lahore that he had offered Jahangir his chef and
suggested she enjoy the time at home with her family.
Musharraf did not address the Ambassador's point about media
restrictions beyond repeating, "Please understand our
society," implying that recent measures were acceptable to
the general public.
... And then there are the terrorists.
--------------
10. (C) Saying some of his advisors described the Chief
Justice's suo moto rulings as "judicial terrorism," Musharraf
argued that, at the very least, Chaudhry had stymied the
government's counterterrorism efforts. For example, the
government has been in contempt of court, Musharraf said,
since October 30 because the government had not complied with
the Chief Justice's order to re-establish the red mosque or
release terrorist suspects arrested without charge.
11. (C) In answering a question from Canadian High
Commissioner David Collins on the government's plans in FATA
and Swat, Musharraf promised, "We will come down more
strongly there." Musharraf claimed to have opened another
front against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and said the
government had the support of the majority in these areas,
who he described as moderate and scared.
Parliamentary Elections; Uniform
--------------
12. (C) In response to a question from British High
Commissioner Robert Brinkley on parliamentary elections and
whether Musharraf would resign as Chief of Army Staff (COAS),
Musharraf committed to implementing "the third stage of
(democratic) transition," but noted that "legal issues"
related to the PCO may cause "minor changes" to the previous
mid-January target for elections.
13. (C) Comment: Since his reinstatement, the Chief Justice
increasingly opted to challenge Musharraf's rule and
executive-judicial relations by intervening on a wide range
ISLAMABAD 00004728 003 OF 003
of issues, from vegetable prices and zoning regulations to
the voters list. The Supreme Court's rulings on political
issues, including the Nawaz deportation, Musharraf's
eligibility to be a candidate and the National Reconciliation
Ordinance appeared designed to keep the proverbial sword of
Damocles hanging over Musharraf's head. Today's harangue
indicates just how much Musharraf has been preoccupied about
the Chief Justice. Musharraf's dismissal of USG and other
international concerns about civil liberties, and his refusal
to confirm dates for parliamentary elections and his
resignation as COAS are troubling. We have made the case
privately and emphatically to GOP officials that the choice
of individuals arrested seems designed to elicit stringent
international condemnation. We will continue to deliver the
message that failure to follow through on these issues
threatens to damage US-Pakistan bilateral relations. End
comment.
PATTERSON