POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RED MOSQUE OPERATION

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003027

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PTER PK
SUBJECT: POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE RED MOSQUE OPERATION

REF: A. ISLAMABAD 2468

B. ISLAMABAD 2270

C. ISLAMABAD 1647

D. ISLAMABAD 897

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. President Musharraf's decision to take
military action against the Red Mosque removes a
long-festering cell of extremism in Pakistan's capital.
Although criticized for being "soft" on extremists, the
government's delayed response reflected concern about keeping
civilian casualties to a minimum and limiting negative
consequences, especially in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP). Media reports of secret burials to hide the real
casualty figures could erode what was widespread public
support for action. Religious parties and extremists have
responded with so far limited demonstrations and attacks tied
to the Mosque action. Al Qaeda's Zawahari has called for
jihad against the government, which should stiffen government
resolve for further action against extremists.


2. (C) Summary continued. The crisis exposed popular
discontent with the government's ability to deliver basic
services and law and order, even in the capital. The Red
Mosque offered what the government often did not provide -- a
safe haven for earthquake and rape victims, action to shut
down brothels, and dispute resolution that conformed with the
conservative (but not extremist) views of many Pakistanis.
The militant's ability to hijack the Mosque's populist agenda
also demonstrates how talibanization is spreading from the
FATA to the NWFP. Musharraf is due to address the nation on
the crisis; the question now is how quickly he will move to
take further action against creeping talibanization. End
Summary.

Entrenched Extremism and a Populist Agenda
--------------


3. (C) The Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) and its associated
madrassas have been increasingly extremist since the 1980's
when President Zia ul-Haq patronized the mosque and its
previous leader Maulana Abdullah to encourage young
Pakistanis to join the jihad against the Soviets. Maulana
Abdullah's sons, Abdur Rashid Ghazi and Abdul Aziz, continued
his firebrand tradition, and throughout the 1990's the mosque
openly claimed ties to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. After 9/11,
the Red Mosque became increasingly isolated by mainstream
religious leaders, religious political parties, and other
madrassas. It also became the natural haven for militants
from a host of banned extremist groups, such as Sipah-e-Sabah
and Jaish-e-Muhammad. Videos and paraphernalia supporting
Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist organizations were
openly available inside the mosque.


4. (C) Concurrently, the Red Mosque was developing a populist
agenda by playing to the concerns of working- and lower-class
communities who seldom receive adequate government services
or effective justice. Neighbors, who had repeatedly
petitioned the police to close a known brothel, asked the Red
Mosque to intervene. The mosque provided a safe haven for
the destitute, including earthquake and rape victims, often
ignored by the government. It offered the services of its
"Sharia court" as a form of informal alternative dispute
resolution to those frustrated by an ineffective justice
system. The mosque's literature is highly populist in
nature, calling for the rights of the underprivileged, relief
for the homeless, rights for prisoners, and universal health
care.


5. (C) Since January 2007, the self-styled Red Mosque
"brigade" periodically kidnapped brothel owners, policemen,
and foreign masseuses. Militants in the guise of students
were often seen chanting jihadist slogans outside the mosque,
intimidating local CD shop owners, and occupying government
property. These provocative and illegal actions occurred
every few weeks and were resolved through negotiations with
the government. Though it was widely known that the Red
Mosque had a cache of heavy weaponry, the brigade had not
used lethal force prior to July 3.


6. (C) Pakistani security officials have exercised restraint

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since January due to the presence of women and children in
the mosque. This controlled response -- a combination of
negotiations and a display of force -- was enough to keep the
Red Mosque quiet for a few weeks each time. However, the
repeated transgressions of the Red Mosque brigade frustrated
both the public and government officials. The June 23
kidnapping of five Chinese massage parlor workers, which
occurred on the eve of the Interior Minister's trip to
Beijing, appears to have focused plans for action. Violence
began when militants inside the mosque fired on policemen who
were erecting barbed wire barriers around the mosque to
contain further Red Mosque brigade actions.


7. (S/NF) For the operation against the Red Mosque, the
government deployed its best-trained special operations
forces, including troops with hostage rescue training, in
order to minimize casualties. The 30-hour length of the
final operation surprised most observers who had not expected
the tenacity of the militants and the extent of their
weaponry.


8. (C) The government took unprecedented steps (daily
briefings, hotlines) to keep the media and public informed
during the crisis. However, media reports of secret burials
to hide the final casualty figures could quickly undermine
government credibility and erode what had been widespread
public support for military action. How the government
handles Ghazi's funeral will also affect public opinion in
the NWFP.


Who was inside the mosque?
--------------


9. (C) Militants: The last holdouts within the mosque
included approximately 100 well-trained, well-armed
terrorists. The militants were reported to come from various
banned terrorist organizations in Kashmir and in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),including
Sipah-e-Sabah, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Jangvi. They
were also responsible for bringing weapons inside the Red
Mosque.


10. (C) Students: The Red Mosque has two associated madrassas
Jamia Hafsa for females and Jamia Faridia (attached to the
nearby Faisal Mosque) for males. Most of the approximately
7,000 enrolled students came from conservative families in
the NWFP. From media interviews, it was clear that male and
female students had been indoctrinated to enlist their
participation in the violence. Many of the students -- both
male and female -- participated in the violence. The
majority of the 3,000 to 5,000 people in the mosque who
surrendered were students; most were remanded to their
parents' or NGO custody.


11. (C) The Destitute: The Red Mosque had also become a safe
haven for many widows and orphans from areas affected by
Pakistan's October 2005 earthquake. The mosque also
supported several rape victims and other women who had been
shunned by their families. Many of these victims were
released to the custody of NGOs. Initial public sympathy for
the Red Mosque resulted partly from its aid to the destitute,
but the use of such victims as bargaining chips in the final
operation angered the public.

Talibanization
--------------


12. (C) Internationally, the media has focused on the Red
Mosque as the prime example of the Pakistan's talibanization;
however, the mosque has had mixed success on the ground. It
certainly did not convert relatively liberal Islamabad to its
extremist perspective. Even the staunchest Islamist parties,
including the Jamaat-e-Islaami and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam,
denounced the mosque's actions and distanced themselves from
its leaders. The Deobandi madrassa accreditation board,
Wafaqul Madaris, pulled the accreditation of the Red Mosque's
associated seminaries in March 2007. Hard-line madrassas
participated with the government in negotiations with Mosque
leaders during the crisis.


13. (C) Most Pakistanis are religiously conservative but

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moderate. While they may sympathize with the Red Mosque
leaders' accusations that the government is corrupt and
un-Islamic, they oppose violent action. According to
Pakistan national television's cell-phone poll (released July
6),80 percent of the 5,300 respondents supported the
government's handling of the situation. Bilqees Edhi, the
co-founder of the Edhi Foundation (Pakistan's largest and
most-respected NGO) condemned the Red Mosque leaders. She
called the behavior of Ghazi and Abdul Aziz "the greatest
dishonor of Islam and the country and its history." The main
criticism that urban and elite Pakistanis share is that the
government waited too long to act.


14. (C) In some remote areas of the country and within other
radical madrassas, particularly in NWFP and Balochistan,
there is sympathy for the militants' willingness to stand up
to what they see as corrupt, ineffective local and central
government. Since the initiation of military operations on
July 3, there have been a number of demonstrations and
attacks on NGOs in support of the Red Mosque, primarily by
madrassa students in towns across the NWFP and Balochistan.
After the operation, religious parties criticized the
government's actions, probably to gain political points among
conservative Red Mosque sympathizers. The death toll from
the military operation will likely be used by extremist
groups, such as Tehreek-i Nafaz-i Shariat-i Mohammadi (TNSM),
to justify further terrorist attacks in the NWFP. Al Qaeda's
Zawahari July 12 issued a video condemning the attack and
calling for jihad against Pakistan. The Wafaqul Madaris,
which represents 17,000 madrassas, announced nationwide
protests.


15. (C) Pakistan witnessed vigilante tactics like those in
remote areas well before the Red Mosque brigade became active
in January 2007. Pakistan's security forces have not yet been
able to enforce law and order in these areas. The presence
of jihadi-trained extremists within the Red Mosque also
highlights the ease with which such elements can travel from
the FATA and Kashmir to Islamabad and other cities.


16. (C) Concerned about negative reactions to the Mosque
operation, including the death of Maulana Abdur Rashid Ghazi,
the government July 11 announced a nation-wide security alert
that includes increased police presence in sensitive areas
and more security checkpoints. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
announced in a special cabinet session that madrassas
country-wide would be investigated to conform with Pakistani
laws, especially those banning weapons.


Short and Long Term Effects
--------------


17. (C) Comment: Most Pakistanis supported President
Musharraf's handling of the crisis, although reports of a
cover-up over casualties could quickly erode that support.
Musharraf's reluctance to act quickly against the Mosque
leaders ultimately allowed the militants time to alienate the
general public and build support for a military response. At
a time when the military was facing increasing criticism, it
was able to demonstrate a continued capacity for decisive
action. In comparison, the political opposition was
ineffective in either criticizing the government or offering
solutions, which may marginally help the ruling Pakistan
Muslim League party in upcoming parliamentary elections.


18. (C) In the longer term, the government faces the specter
of creeping talibanization by militants who capitalize on
public discontent with the government's inability to deliver
basic services and law and order. Musharraf now plans to
take action against the spread of talibanization in the NWFP
and extremism elsewhere in the country; implementing his plan
will require substantial military and economic development
resources. End Comment.

PATTERSON