Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD1994
2007-05-03 13:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:
MUSHARRAF AND KARZAI IN ANKARA: AN INTERIM
how-toVZCZCXRO4501 PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #1994 1231333 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 031333Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8901 INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3839 RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 2333 RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0130 RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 4169 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 1287 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2055 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7076 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0864 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 3066 RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 5864 RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 2193 RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0510 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2253 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 001994
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: PK PREL AF PGOV
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF AND KARZAI IN ANKARA: AN INTERIM
REACTION FROM PAKISTAN
REF: A. KABUL 01506
B. ANKARA 01029
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Bodde, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 001994
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: PK PREL AF PGOV
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF AND KARZAI IN ANKARA: AN INTERIM
REACTION FROM PAKISTAN
REF: A. KABUL 01506
B. ANKARA 01029
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Bodde, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)
1. (C) Summary: Working-level contacts at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs told us May 3 that the April 30 meeting
between Presidents Musharraf, Karzai, and Sezer reinforced
Pakistan and Afghanistan's common commitment to fighting the
Taliban. The meeting also presented opportunities to further
institutionalize bilateral dialogue between the two
countries. Post has numerous meeting requests pending with
senior Government of Pakistan officials as well as the
Turkish Ambassador. Post will provide a more complete
readout after these meetings. End Summary.
2. (C) On May 3, Amir Shaukat, Director for Afghanistan at
the Foreign Ministry, noted that the two sides had arrived in
Ankara without having negotiated a joint statement (the
Ankara Declaration) in advance. In a day and a half, Shaukat
stressed, the Pakistani and Afghan teams drafted a joint
statement that included important references to intelligence
sharing and repatriation of Afghan refugees. Shaukat also
noted Turkey's involvement in engaging Pakistan and
Afghanistan was especially welcome for two reasons: Pakistan
and Afghanistan both enjoyed good relations with Turkey; and
Turkey's participation offered leaders of both nations a new
forum in which to forge common understandings on sensitive
issues. Turkey, Shaukat said, was a moderate Muslim country
more acceptable to the public as a broker on Afghan/Pakistani
issues than some western nations.
3. (C) Press reaction indicates that, whatever Musharraf's
demeanor in private, he said positive things in public,
fueling a generally supportive reaction to the Ankara meeting
in Pakistan. On the flight back to Islamabad, Musharraf told
journalists his meeting with Karzai was productive; that he
hoped the Ankara Declaration would help bring an end to the
public blame-game between the two leaders. Post spoke with
leading members of the Pakistani press, who noted Musharraf's
positive public posture but also questioned whether Karzai
would ever "admit part of the responsibility" for the
insurgency in Afghanistan.
BODDE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2017
TAGS: PK PREL AF PGOV
SUBJECT: MUSHARRAF AND KARZAI IN ANKARA: AN INTERIM
REACTION FROM PAKISTAN
REF: A. KABUL 01506
B. ANKARA 01029
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter Bodde, For Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)
1. (C) Summary: Working-level contacts at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs told us May 3 that the April 30 meeting
between Presidents Musharraf, Karzai, and Sezer reinforced
Pakistan and Afghanistan's common commitment to fighting the
Taliban. The meeting also presented opportunities to further
institutionalize bilateral dialogue between the two
countries. Post has numerous meeting requests pending with
senior Government of Pakistan officials as well as the
Turkish Ambassador. Post will provide a more complete
readout after these meetings. End Summary.
2. (C) On May 3, Amir Shaukat, Director for Afghanistan at
the Foreign Ministry, noted that the two sides had arrived in
Ankara without having negotiated a joint statement (the
Ankara Declaration) in advance. In a day and a half, Shaukat
stressed, the Pakistani and Afghan teams drafted a joint
statement that included important references to intelligence
sharing and repatriation of Afghan refugees. Shaukat also
noted Turkey's involvement in engaging Pakistan and
Afghanistan was especially welcome for two reasons: Pakistan
and Afghanistan both enjoyed good relations with Turkey; and
Turkey's participation offered leaders of both nations a new
forum in which to forge common understandings on sensitive
issues. Turkey, Shaukat said, was a moderate Muslim country
more acceptable to the public as a broker on Afghan/Pakistani
issues than some western nations.
3. (C) Press reaction indicates that, whatever Musharraf's
demeanor in private, he said positive things in public,
fueling a generally supportive reaction to the Ankara meeting
in Pakistan. On the flight back to Islamabad, Musharraf told
journalists his meeting with Karzai was productive; that he
hoped the Ankara Declaration would help bring an end to the
public blame-game between the two leaders. Post spoke with
leading members of the Pakistani press, who noted Musharraf's
positive public posture but also questioned whether Karzai
would ever "admit part of the responsibility" for the
insurgency in Afghanistan.
BODDE