Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ISLAMABAD1570
2007-04-10 08:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Islamabad
Cable title:  

PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF MEETS WITH COMMANDER USCENTCOM

Tags:  PGOV PK PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9327
PP RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHIL #1570/01 1000817
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100817Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8311
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 2205
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0090
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0266
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 0119
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 4126
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 7000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5440
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0706
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4607
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 2938
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 5500
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 1979
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0273
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2132
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001570 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF MEETS WITH COMMANDER USCENTCOM


Classified By: Charge Peter Bodde 1.5 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001570

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2017
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF MEETS WITH COMMANDER USCENTCOM


Classified By: Charge Peter Bodde 1.5 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: New U.S. Central Command Commander, Admiral
William J. Fallon, met March 31 with Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf. They discussed Musharraf,s participation
at the recent Arab League Summit (disappointing),Musharraf's
interest in engaging on Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts (as
a go-between),his efforts to construct an alliance of
moderate Muslim states (slow going),the situation in Iraq
(Sunnis need to be given more),continuing concerns about
Iran (too unpredictable),and the status of
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations and a plea for better
understanding of Pakistan,s perspective (can,t trust
President Karzai). Admiral Fallon explored with Musharraf
ways that the Government of Pakistan could improve security
control and economic prosperity in the FATA and adjacent
areas. Throughout the lengthy and substantive discussion,
President Musharraf was relaxed and in command of the issues
and only becomae highly animated when the talk turned to
Afghanistan and the Pakistani media. END SUMMARY.


Moderate Muslim States Initiative


2. (C) On March 31, Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander
USCENTCOM, paid his inaugural call on Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf. Musharraf opened by explaining his
Moderate Muslim States Initiative to the Commander. (Note:
Pakistan's Moderate Muslim States Initiative, in which
like-minded nations work together toward defusing tensions in
Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq, includes Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia. End Note.)
Musharraf said the Israel/Palestinian impasse was the "core
problem" facing the Muslim world, including Pakistan. The
participation of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt in the
Moderate Muslim States Initiative notwithstanding, the
President was not convinced that Arab states fully recognized
the degree to which problems in the Middle East impacted
non-Arab Muslim countries. Some Arab states also failed to
take Israel's needs and interests into account, exacerbating
the problem, according to Musharraf. The President noted a
need to encourage Israeli flexibility. He said that Muslim

states, both Arab and non-Arab, should unite to seek a
solution to the Palestinian question; Pakistan could play a
role in working on the issue. He offered that Saudi King
Abdullah would soon call a summit of the moderate Muslim
states to discuss issues of concern, including the
Palestinian question. Admiral Fallon agreed on the
importance of Islamic unity to work toward real solutions to
various problems.


3. (C) Musharraf believed more Muslim countries should be
engaged in calming Iraq to help prevent sectarian tensions
from spilling over into other countries. In particular,
Syria should mend its ways and join the group of countries
that are part of the solution, not part of the problem. In
order for various interrelated Middle Eastern problems to be
resolved, an agreement on the Golan Heights was crucial and a
good reason to maintain dialogue with Syria.


4. (C) The Admiral said the support of Iraq's neighbors for
President Maliki and his government would contribute
importantly to strengthening Iraqi self-confidence and to
helping Maliki and his government face the difficult
challenges ahead. Musharraf said Maliki needed to show
more resolve and courage.
Iraqis must develop a political solution to current problems,
which he suspected would involve a unified but highly
decentralized Iraqi state. He added that Sunnis needed to be
assured with "guarantees" on their key concerns. He warned
feelingly against over-strengthening the Shias, which he said
would ultimately benefited Iran.

ISLAMABAD 00001570 002 OF 003



Iran


5. (C) Musharraf said he spoke with the Iranian Foreign
Minister at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh two days earlier
and urged him to resolve the crisis over the British naval
personnel immediately. Musharraf counseled the Iranian FM
that Iran should, in general, "avoid confrontations."

Pakistan and the Taliban


6. (C) Musharraf launched into an explanation "to correct
misperceptions" about Pakistan's role in the Afghanistan
conflict. He said that blaming only Pakistan for problems in
Afghanistan was counterproductive, as well as wrong. The
Government of Afghanistan's negative attitude toward Pakistan
and its public criticism of Pakistan's efforts against the
Taliban were "demotivating." He wanted President Karzai to
pay more attention to the substance of the problem (which he
thought was largely Pashtun disillusionment with the status
quo) and less to "optics" like bashing Pakistan. He believed
the Government of Afghanistan needed to offer the Pashtuns
more "carrots" to balance the necessary security measures
taken against militants.


7. (C) Musharraf reported that Pakistan's efforts against
militants operating out of Pakistan were going well. Pakistan
had isolated many of the foreign fighters, and the rules of
engagement of Pakistan,s military did not restrict it in any
way from actions against militant targets. Musharraf
reported that local tribal groups were making progress in
their fight to remove foreigners (Uzbeks) from South
Waziristan. He underscored his commitment to "choke off"
support from Pakistan to Taliban elements in Afghanistan.


8. (C) The President stressed that some press reports of a
new Bajaur political agreement were incorrect. Bajaur tribal
leaders had approached government representatives with an
"undertaking" that would promise various actions against
militant activity. The government had not signed the
agreement, despite press reports to the contrary.


9. (C) Musharraf explained that part of his plan to control
the movement of Taliban forces was to emplace fences at two
parts of the border that funnel personnel and materiel into
Afghanistan. (He did not rule out the possibility of adding
additional fences if these proved successful.) Another
component of his plan was to provide development assistance
in the FATA. Specifically, Musharraf said that political
agents and other civil representatives needed quick access to
funds to provide high-impact development projects.

Pakistan and Extremism


10. (C) Musharraf described the situation in Pakistan as
"complex". The extremism pendulum -- which had swung far to
the right under Zia -- was now swinging in the other
direction, in his view. The President stressed the
importance of a long-term strategy and expressed
disappointment with international media articles that focused
on short-term problems rather than long-term goals. Pakistan
had embarked on a social development strategy that could be
modified as needed; other countries should allow Pakistan to
be flexible as it implementsed its strategy.


11. (C) Musharraf predicted that moderate democrats in
Pakistan would be victorious in the next general election --
a defeat for extremists. He suggested that the religious
parties' percentage of the vote would drop from 18 percent in
the previous election to around 5 percent in the next. He
described recent reforms to Pakistani textbooks and curricula
as important in the fight against extremism. Registering

ISLAMABAD 00001570 003 OF 003


madrassahs and cracking down on foreign students attending
those madrassahs were also helping, and the passage of the
Women's Protection Bill had been another significant signal
that Musharraf's government was committed to rolling back
fundamentalist Islam in Pakistan. The President said he
looked forward to further legislation protecting the rights
of women.

Economy


12. (C) Musharraf asserted that economic development was
key to defeating extremism. He stressed the importance of
maintaining economic growth and encouraging foreign
investment.

Chief Justice Controversy


13. (C) Musharaff described the Chief Justice as a
"complicated man" with a large ego. He accused the justice
of nepotism and other acts of favoritism and stressed that
the actions he had taken against the justice were completely
constitutional. That said, he admitted his government's
tactics in the early days of the controversy made the
situation difficult.


14. (U) Admiral Fallon reviewed and cleared this cable.
BODDE