PAKISTANI PRESSURE ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001279

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2017
TAGS: IN MNUC PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI PRESSURE ON IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) President Musharraf, Foreign Minister Kasuri, and
Foreign Secretary Khan have all recently emphasized to
Ambassador that one purpose of Pakistan's "Moderate Muslim
States" initiative is to pressure Iran to modify its
behavior. Pakistan believes that by not inviting Iran to the
February 24 meeting of Muslim Foreign Ministers in Islamabad,
the other participants (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey,
Indonesia and Malaysia) have made clear that Tehran must
moderate its policies on nuclear development and foreign
relations and that it should adopt the Beirut Declaration on
the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Foreign Minister Kasuri
says he has told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki that Iran
must change its unrealistic and destabilizing stances toward
Israel, the U.S., and nuclear issues. Kasuri reports that
Iran is flexible on some issues, "but it absolutely will not
break ranks on nuclear enrichment."


2. (C) President Musharraf visited Tehran in February as
part of his outreach to Muslim nations. According to Khan,
Musharraf met with Ahmedinejad to explain the broad
parameters of his initiative and to "clearly convey concerns
that Iranian confrontation (with the U.S. and the West) must
be prevented." Ahmedinejad responded that Iran was not
responsible for tensions. He also denied Iran was supporting
sectarianism in Iraq.


3. (C) Musharraf told the Ambassador that, in a phone
conversation following the Islamabad Ministerial, Ahmedinejad
expressed unhappiness over Iran's exclusion. Musharraf said
he responded that a common point of departure for the seven
participating states was the 2002 Beirut Summit Declaration
on a two state solution to the Palestinian issue, which Iran
rejects. He said he urged Ahmedinejad to reconsider Iran's
position. Kasuri told the Ambassador separately that the
Pakistani Ambassador in Tehran was called in to receive a
complaint about the ministerial. The Iranian Ambassador in
Islamabad delivered the same complaint. Kasuri said the
Ambassadors received the same reply as Musharraf gave
Ahmedinejad.


4. (C) Foreign Minister Kasuri and Foreign Secretary Khan
recently told Ambassador that Pakistan's initiative was
probably one motivator spurring Iran to visit Saudi Arabia in
early March. (Comment: The connection between the Musharraf
initiative and the Ahmedinejad trip to Mecca could take two
forms: The Iranian President may have wanted to convince the
Saudis not to cooperate with the Pakistanis; or he may have
been trying to prove that he is not averse to dialogue. End
Comment.)

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Aman 07: Another Message
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5. (C) Pakistani leaders have intimated that one purpose of
the recent Aman 07 Naval Exercise was to demonstrate to Iran
that the U.S., Pakistan, China, and other countries are able
to cooperate militarily. Mission's Defense Attache's Office
and the Office of Defense Representative - Pakistan have
confirmed that Iran did not/not participate as observers in
Aman '07 and that reporting in other channels claiming that
Pakistan invited Iran to observe the exercise is inaccurate.

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Moderate Muslim States Initiative: Its Genesis
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6. (C) In a March 16 meeting, Foreign Secretary Khan
explained to Ambassador the roots of Musharraf's initiative.
He said that various recent visitors to Islamabad, including
the King of Jordan, had told Musharraf that like-minded
nations should find a way to combat the deteriorating
situation in the Middle East. Khan reported that naysayers,
particularly in the Foreign Ministry, warned the President
against involving Pakistan in the labyrinth of Middle East
problems. Musharraf countered doubters by asking them four
questions:
--Is the situation in the Middle East not deteriorating?

ISLAMABAD 00001279 002 OF 002


--Is Pakistan not involved or effected?
--If the situation implodes -- e.g. in Iran -- would it not
have disastrous consequences on Pakistan?
--So should we stand still with folded hands?


7. (C) According to Khan, Musharraf began his initiative by
contacting Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. (Note:
Pakistan ultimately excluded Syria from the February Foreign
Ministers' meeting because Syria was not adequately committed
to playing a helpful role in the Middle East. End Note.)
The original countries agreed on broad parameters on two main
issues: the need for a specific timeline for the
establishment of a Palestinian state; and the need to play a
constructive role in tamping down sectarian tensions in Iraq.


8. (C) Khan said that, at the February 24 meeting of
Foreign Ministers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey,
Indonesia and Malaysia, countries were reluctant to "push
Iran" and Arab representatives seemed uncomfortable over
non-Arab countries involving themselves in Middle East
issues. Musharraf responded that, if Muslim countries were
serious about resolving Iraq and the Palestinian question,
participants should put their reservations aside.
Ultimately, all seven Foreign Ministers issued a joint
statement viewing "with deep distress the conflict in Iraq,"
worrying that sectarian tensions would spill across Iraq's
borders, and decrying a "festering" Palestinian dispute,
violence in Lebanon, and rising tensions over Iran's nuclear
program. (Ref A).


9. (C) Comment: In two important ways, Musharraf's
moderate Muslim states initiative has already been a success.
It has brought together key foreign ministers, including
those from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, on relatively short
notice; and it has made Iran uncomfortable. Musharraf's
initiative creates an interesting, unplanned synergy with the
UNSC resolution and the Iraq neighboring states initiative.
The three actions together provide both incentives and
negative consequences to encourage Iran to moderate its
behavior.

CROCKER