Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI9
2007-03-01 16:17:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

RAFSANJANI ISOLATING AHMADINEJAD?

Tags:  PREL PGOV IR ECON 
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VZCZCXRO1994
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0009/01 0601617
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 011617Z MAR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0063
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0031
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0058
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0056
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000009 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR HAUGEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/21/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR ECON
SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI ISOLATING AHMADINEJAD?


RPO DUBAI 00000009 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000009

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD; BAKU FOR HAUGEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/21/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR ECON
SUBJECT: RAFSANJANI ISOLATING AHMADINEJAD?


RPO DUBAI 00000009 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: A well-connected Iranian professor criticized
the Ahmadinejad's government for gross mismanagement and claimed
that large portions of the population had turned against him. A
clear Rafsanjani supporter, he claimed the Expediency Council is
the one person in Iranian politics who can act as a
counterweight to the Supreme Leader. The contact appeared to
have a good understanding of Western perspectives of Iran, based
on his years studying in the US and the UK. His insights into
Rafsanjani are useful, and his claims of Rafsanjani activism are
shared by others. His assessment of Rafsanjani as the sole
counterweight to the Supreme Leader, however, seems exaggerated.
End summary

2.(S/NF) An engineering professor from Sharif University shared
February 26 his assessment of the current situation in Iran.
Although clearly pro-Rafsanjani, he was not particularly
politically active, although he came from a prominent family.
His views seemed to have been shaped by three important factors.
He is reportedly related by marriage to Rafsanjani and has met
him on a number of occasions. He is from a reportedly prominent
bazaari family, although he says he clashes with his father's
traditionalist views. And his years spent studying in the US
and UK appeared have allowed him to understand the Western
perspective on Iran and given him some fairly pro-Western views.
(For instance, he said his non-objection to his daughter
studying abroad is relatively rare in Iran.) He repeatedly made
clear his views were his own and that he did not have first-hand
access to information, although he mentioned he and his family
go to Rafsanjani's house once a year or every other year to pay
respects. He also claimed that his father is one of chief
informal advisors to the regime on commercial matters and as
such serves as the principal liaison between the bazaaris and

the government. (Note: this assertion has not been
independently confirmed. Endnote) His father was reportedly
imprisoned and tortured by the Shah, accused of funding
Islamists against the government, and held several years in Evin
prison. He later held a high level position at the Ministry of
Ershad when Khatami was minister.

Ahmadinejad: a bad manager
--------------

3.(S/NF) The professor said his traditionalist father supports
President Ahmadinejad because he thinks he is honest, but the
son disagrees and is very critical of the president's
performance. In the professor's view, the Iranian government's
worst enemy is its bad management. Anyone qualified has left
public service or been fired. He also claimed most bazaaris
have turned against Ahmadinejad because of his economic
mismanagement of the country, a view echoed by other contacts.
Another contact claimed that the bazaaris are actively trying to
undermine Ahmadinejad by creating artificial shortages of goods
to increase pressure on the government. A different contact
claimed Rafsanjani is directing such meddling.

4.(S/NF) After a year and a half in office, Ahmadinejad has also
alienated wider swaths of the population by not keeping his
economic promises, the professor said. In a separate
conversation, an Iranian economist said that that the roughly 30
percent of the population who either a) directly benefited from
oil dollars in the past; or b) were staunch conservatives in
support of Ahmadinejad are turning against him as their pockets
become lighter. Another contact commented that Ahmadinejad's
weakness is that his major economic priority from the beginning
was redistribution of wealth, not economic development, but in
any case has failed in his efforts.

Private sector complaints
--------------

5.(S/NF) The professor, who also owns a publishing company, said
he has had to lay off 20 employees since the economy started
plummeting. Other business contacts have also said they've been
forced to lay off large numbers of employees. The professor
echoed others' comments that they are unsure how to make
decisions regarding their privately owned businesses in light of
undefined possible sanctions coming down the pike.

Lessons learned?

RPO DUBAI 00000009 002.2 OF 003


--------------

6.(S/NF) In a view shared by many of our contacts, the professor
believes Ahmadinejad's win resulted from two factors: 1) an
order from the Supreme Leader to the head of IRGC to use IRGC
and Basij to mobilize votes for him; and 2) votes from
uneducated people who believed his promises of economic support.
One source claimed that the Supreme Leader thought that
Ahmadinejad would be a humble, pliable man of the people and was
surprised by his antagonistic posturing. He heard that in the
December 2006 elections, the Supreme Leader instructed IRGC not
to work against Rafsanjani. He is also hearing that large
portions of the IRGC and Basij no longer support Ahmadinejad, a
view shared by some other contacts. The professor said the
silver lining may be that this election will act as a maturing
experience for the Iranian electorate, who will learn from the
"worst mistake they have ever made."

Rafsanjani moves to counter the president
--------------

7.(S/NF) The professor said he thought one of Rafsanjani's most
significant recent statements was his speech for anniversary of
the revolution, in which he claimed to have advised Ayatollah
Khomeini that then President Bani-Sadr was not the right person
for the job, prior to Bani-Sadr's ouster. The professor said
this comment was believed to have been a veiled threat that he
could do the same with Ahmadinejad.

8.(S/NF) The professor claimed that Rafsanjani has a good
relationship with the grand ayatollahs and has persuaded them
not to meet Ahmadinejad. He claimed the grand ayatollahs are
generally suspicious that Ahmadinejad is dragging the country
into conflict and specifically peeved that the president took it
upon himself to write a letter to the Pope. Another source also
mentioned that the grand ayatollahs are shunning the president,
but for the more selfish reason in that they believe he is
jeopardizing their interests.

His view of Rafsanjani
--------------

9.(S/NF) The professor asserted that Rafsanjani genuinely cares
about Iran, wants a better relationship with West, and can make
it happen. He called him the only counterweight to the Supreme
Leader in Iranian politics. Without indicating how many times
he has met Rafsanjani, he indicated at least several occasions
of family gatherings. He described the Expediency Chair as
honest in his politics, though he quickly qualified that perhaps
he is less honest in other ways, alluding to the rampant rumors
of corruption. He said Rafsanjani is very intelligent, with an
IQ of 170. He also said he has the knack of remembering details
about people. The first time he met him, he said, they
discussed the Internet. When they met again years later,
Rafsanjani recalled the conversation.

10.(S/NF) The professor said Rafsanjani made a lot of mistakes
as president, although he claimed he was the only person who
would give the Supreme Leader realistic assessments of the
situation during the Iran-Iraq war. The professor felt that
then President Khatami and the reformers made a mistake by
humiliating Rafsanjani instead of bringing him onboard to help
them fight their battles. He said Rafsanjani's two electoral
humiliations sent him into a state of depression but that his
landslide win in December had reenergized him. When asked about
the rumor that the Supreme Leader may be replaced by a council,
he didn't answer, simply saying Rafsanjani has the ability to
energize any institution with which he is associated.

Differing views of Supreme Leader's current take on Ahmadinejad
-------------- --------------

11.(S/NF) The professor believes that unlike Rafsanjani, the
Supreme Leader changes his opinion frequently, according to
whoever gets his ear. The professor believes the Supreme Leader
dropped support for Ahmadinejad briefly in the time around the
December election but has given him back his support in the past
few weeks. He argued that although the leader knows he made a
mistake by bringing Ahmadinejad in, cutting him loose will
undermine the leader's authority. On the other hand, a
Tehran-based businessman disputed this assessment and said he
did not think Ahmadinejad had returned to the leader's good
graces, citing his absence at several recent meetings the leader

RPO DUBAI 00000009 003.2 OF 003


had with cabinet members.

US-Iran relations
--------------

12.(S/NF) Regarding relations with the US, the professor
understood the US need to forcefully counteract Iranian
aggression in Iraq, but he thought it was necessary to find a
way for the two countries to talk. He was very worried that the
countries were drifting into war, predicting disastrous results.
He said there was little understanding of the US position on
the nuclear issue inside Iran because of the spin the regime
puts on the news. Specifically, he said there was little
knowledge of what P5-1 is offering Iran, little understanding of
the US position on civilian energy, and little recognition of
the symbolic importance of the offer that Secretary Rice would
conduct the negotiations herself.

13.(S/NF) He maintained that the US now sees itself as a father
figure in the world, and it should therefore deal with Iran as
an errant son, assuring him that acceptance back in the fold is
possible, rather than like someone who will always be an
outsider. He said acts of "kindness" go a long way and
applauded efforts such as the recent travel to Iran by the US
wresting team. He believed that President Bush should offer a
meeting with no preconditions, but only with the Supreme Leader
or Rafsanjani. There would be enormous pressure from Iran to
accept. The leader would likely refuse, but Rafsanjani would
find a way to do it.

14.(S/NF) Comment: While his statements to a US official may
have been colored by the fact that his son was applying for a US
student visa the next day, he repeatedly stressed that these are
simply his views and what he is hearing others say, and didn't
claim any firsthand access to knowledge. Both he and the
Iranian-American who introduced him to IRPO Director are clear
supporters of Rafsanjani, who they pitch as the key to solving
the Iranian problem. Given our limited access to the Iranian
population, it is difficult to assess the general sentiment on
Rafsanjani at this time, although Rafsanjani's December election
results would seem to indicate significant popularity in Tehran.
Several contacts claim that Rafsanjani is actively working to
isolate Ahmadinejad and influence decision-making, in
cooperation with Khatami. On the other hand, calling Rafsanjani
the only counterweight to the Supreme Leader seems to run
counter to the predominant view of Iranian politics as dominated
by multiple spheres of influence.
BURNS