Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI71
2007-11-28 14:39:00
SECRET
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

COALITION-BUILDING FOR IRANIAN ELECTIONS: PART ONE-

Tags:  IR PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0071/01 3321439
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 281439Z NOV 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0202
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0001
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0001
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0001
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0150
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0182
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0195
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000071 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM; BAKU FOR HAUGEN
PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: IR PGOV
SUBJECT: COALITION-BUILDING FOR IRANIAN ELECTIONS: PART ONE-
REFORMISTS AND CENTRISTS

RPO DUBAI 00000071 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000071

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
ISTANBUL FOR ODLUM; BAKU FOR HAUGEN
PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: IR PGOV
SUBJECT: COALITION-BUILDING FOR IRANIAN ELECTIONS: PART ONE-
REFORMISTS AND CENTRISTS

RPO DUBAI 00000071 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(C) Summary: Although campaigning for the March 14, 2008
Majles elections is not officially allowed until two weeks prior
to the elections, Iran is already very much in election mode.
Both reformists and conservatives are attempting to create broad
electoral coalitions. Reformist parties have urged former
President Khatami to run; while he has called on reformist
groups to unite, he has consistently declined to run himself.
Nonetheless, Khatami still appears to be the leading figure
around whom reformists are rallying. Reformists appear opposed
to any electoral boycott; one reformist privately expressed
concern that the reformist cause could be undermined if the USG
encourages a boycott. The lynchpin issue for the 2008 Majles
elections will clearly be the economy; both conservatives and
reformists are criticizing the Ahmadinejad government's economic
performance. While the international crisis over the nuclear
issue will likely play into votes, the upcoming elections
promise to be even more about the price of bread than the last
one. A look at the conservatives' approach to the elections
will be reported septel. End summary.

Reformists try to build coalition

--------------

2.(C) Campaigning for Majles elections is not officially
permitted until two weeks prior to the elections, which are
scheduled for March 14, 2008. Nonetheless, Iran is already very
much in election mode. With four months left, reformists appear
to have been somewhat more successful to date than conservatives
at building an electoral coalition. Former Majles speaker Mehdi
Karrubi has, however, thus far kept his National Trust Party out
of the larger reformist coalition, a tactic some groups charge
may damage reformists in the elections. Karrubi has long viewed
himself as a distinct from the main body of reformists, leading
him to set up his own party. Despite the National Trust Party
keeping its own electoral list, Karrubi has maintained publicly
that "90% of those in our list are coordinated with the

reformists."

3.(C) Several reformist parties, including the National Trust
Party, have publicly urged former President Khatami to run for a
Majles seat, but he has consistently declined. He has
nonetheless urged reformist groups to consolidate their efforts
for the elections. An official of the reformist Islamic Iran
Participation Front (IIPF) said in an interview on a reformist
news site that if Khatami does not run for the Majles, they will
urge him to run again for the presidency in 2009. Khatami
reportedly plans to make a series of provincial visits, which
some observers are reading as possible campaign stops. Whether
or not he runs, it is noteworthy that despite being criticized
while in office as ineffectual, Khatami appears to be the
leading figure around whom reformists are rallying. According
to contacts, other possible reformist presidential candidates
are former vice president Hamid Reza Aref and former science
minister Mostafa Moin.

Reformist strategy is to run big names and encourage voting

-------------- --------------

4.(S) A reformist MP asserted that if there were free and fair
elections, the Majles would be split 70-30 between reformists
and conservatives. He said the goal of the reformists for the
2008 elections is to win 50% of the seats, although a minimum of
100 of the 290 seats would still be considered good. The MP
claimed that the electoral strategy of the conservatives is to
encourage internal divisions among reformists and added that
conservatives are relying on the Guardian Council to disqualify
scores of reformist candidates.

5.(S) A Dubai-based businessman who claims to be involved in
reformist politics, said that reformists are putting forward
prominent, well-known former government and parliamentary
officials in order to make it more difficult for the Guardian

RPO DUBAI 00000071 002.2 OF 003


Council to block their candidacies. He said this is the
opposite of the reformist strategy in the December 2006
municipal elections, when reformists put forward no-name
candidates in hopes that their anonymity would give the Guardian
Council no grounds on which to bar them from running. The
businessman predicted that the current strategy would be more
successful, as Iranians tend to favor well-known quantities.

6.(U) The centrists appear to be adopting a similar strategy,
although it is not yet clear whether they will join the
reformist coalition electoral list or remain separate. The
electoral list of the centrist Rafsanjani-affiliated Executives
of Construction party includes prominent figures such as former
nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani, former Iranian ambassador to
France Sadegh Kharrazi, and Rafsanjani's brother Mohammad
Hashemi, among others. Political scientist Farideh Farhi
posited in a November editorial that this "powerful" electoral
list is intended to make it difficult for the Guardian Council
to disqualify its candidates since many are former government
officials and key policymakers.

7.(S) The reformist MP told IRPOff that another part of the
reformist strategy is to encourage voter participation, as
conservatives would benefit if the "silent majority" does not
vote. The MP implied that he did not favor a boycott, even if
the conservative Guardian Council disqualifies many reformist
candidates. The MP claimed, however, that Karrubi has
threatened to boycott the elections if there are massive
disqualifications. (Note: There has been no indication in the
press that Karrubi intends to urge an election boycott if there
are massive disqualifications. In a March 2007 interview,
Karrubi characterized a previous boycott as being responsible
for reformist electoral defeat. End note.)

Concern over possibility of US call for boycott

-------------- --

8.(S) The Dubai-based businessman was weighing the risks of
returning to Iran to help organize the reformist electoral
campaign in a province outside Tehran. He expressed to IRPOffs
his concerns that the reformist cause could be undermined if the
USG encouraged an election boycott using FARSI-language VOA and
Radio Farda broadcasts, as he felt the US had in the 2005
Iranian presidential elections.



Commentary on elections/electoral strategies

--------------

9.(U) Iranian political scientist Sadeq Zibakalam predicted in a
domestic newspaper interview that excessive disqualifications of
candidates by the Guardian Council could lead to decreased voter
participation. He commented, "The principle-ists [i.e.
conservatives] are like tight-rope walkers who are treading on a
very thin rope. If they make extensive use of expedient
supervision, they risk losing public participation; if they
don't, their opponents will take the Majles. I predict that
they will disqualify prominent reformist personalities and allow
minor ones to run, hoping that they lack name recognition."



It's the economy, stupid

--------------

10.(C) The key issue in the March Majles elections, and likely
also in the 2009 presidential elections, will be the domestic
economy. Both conservatives and reformists are criticizing the
Ahmadinejad government's economic policies, a somewhat distinct
issue from the economic pressures from nuclear-related
sanctions. Conservative deputy Majles speaker Mohammad Reza
Bahonar said that the most important challenge faced by
principle-ists is controlling inflation. The secretary general
of the reformist IIPF, Mohsen Mirdamadi, strongly criticized the

RPO DUBAI 00000071 003.2 OF 003


Ahmadinejad government's economic performance, saying, "What our
people currently see through heavy propaganda launched by
official and unofficial media about unrivalled achievements of
the country in all fields is excessive prices, unbridled
inflation, reducing economic growth, declining standards of
living and loss of hope in future."

11.(S) Background: Asked about the procedure for candidacy, the
reformist MP said a potential candidate must have approval from
four parts of the government: the ministry of intelligence; the
judiciary (ensuring that there are no corruption charges against
the candidate); the education ministry (candidates must have a
university degree to be eligible); and the law enforcement
forces (verifying that the candidate has no criminal record).
The MP also said that the government does not fund or subsidize
campaigns in any way, but did not elaborate on sources of
campaign funds.

12.(C) Comment: The upcoming elections in Iran promise to be
even more about the price of bread than the last election.
Although some reformists have criticized the government's
nuclear policies in their speeches, the nuclear issue is not the
driving issue in these elections. If reformist groups manage to
create a united electoral strategy, and appeal effectively to
public dissatisfaction over the economy, they may stand a good
chance of increasing their numbers in the Majles. While
predictions about results are still premature, the idea that
reformists may regain the Majles is perhaps overly ambitious.
Although early indications of coordinated cooperation on the
elections between Karrubi, Khatami, and Rafsanjani, have
reportedly eroded due to personal differences between Karrubi
and Rafsanjani, the three do not appear to be working at
cross-purposes.
ASGARD