ABRUPT RESIGNATION OF IRAN'S TOP NUCLEAR NEGOTIATOR MAY SIGNAL HARDENING REGIME POSITION

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV PMASS PREL PINR IR
SUBJECT: ABRUPT RESIGNATION OF IRAN'S TOP NUCLEAR NEGOTIATOR MAY
SIGNAL HARDENING REGIME POSITION


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CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Dubai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



1.(C) Summary: The abrupt resignation of Ali Larijani as
Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on

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Oct 20 is being read by many observers as a move to forestall
any compromises on the nuclear issue, despite the assertion of
the government spokesman that Iran's nuclear policy will remain
the same. One Iranian-American political analyst said the move
indicates that Iran is confident of its position and does not
perceive a credible threat from the US. An Iranian political
science professor noted that the move will have implications for
conservatives in the 2008 Majles elections. Larijani's
replacement as SNCS Secretary and chief nuclear negotiator is
Saeed Jalili, the Deputy Foreign Minister for European and
American affairs, who has been described as devout and
ideologically in line with President Ahmadi-Nejad. Jalili also
reportedly served as director general of the Supreme Leader's
office from 2001-2005.

2.(C) Summary cont'd: It remains to be seen whether the change
was initiated by Supreme Leader Khamenei, who may feel that
Larijani was becoming too compromising a negotiator, or by
President Ahmadi-Nejad, in a bid to increase his control over
nuclear policy. It is notable that neither Khamenei nor
Ahmadi-Nejad has made any public comments about Larijani's
resignation. Larijani will remain on the SNSC as one of the
Supreme Leader's representatives. It is not clear whether he
will continue to have a role in Iranian nuclear policy, or
whether he intends to run in the 2008 Majles elections or
position himself to challenge Ahmadi-Nejad for the presidency
again in 2009. End summary.

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Timing of resignation unexpected

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3.(U) Iranian government spokesman Elham announced the
resignation of Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)
Secretary Ali Larijani on October 20. The fact of the

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resignation was unsurprising-the rivalry between Larijani and
President Ahmadi-Nejad is well known-but the timing was
unexpected. The announcement came only days after a meeting
between Russian President Putin and Supreme Leader Khamenei, on
the sidelines of a summit of Caspian Sea countries in Tehran.
Larijani, who was reportedly not present at the Khamenei-Putin
meeting, told state-run news IRNA on Oct 17 that Putin had
presented a special view about Iran's nuclear program during the
meeting and that Iran would study the view proposed by Putin.
However, the following day President Ahmadi-Nejad directly
contradicted Larijani, denying that Putin had proposed anything
regarding the nuclear program. In the resignation announcement,
government spokesman Elham said that Larijani had submitted his
resignation several times in the past, and that Ahmadi-Nejad had
finally accepted it on this occasion. Elham said that Larijani
resigned for "personal reasons" and to pursue other political
activities.

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Replacement announced simultaneously

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4.(U) On the same day that Larijani's resignation was announced,
presidential advisor Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi also announced the
appointment of Saeed Jalili as Larijani's successor. According
to press profiles of Jalili, he is a veteran of the Iran-Iraq
war and a close friend of Ahmadi-Nejad. Jalili was reportedly
born in 1965, has a PhD in Political Science (NFI) and served as
director general of the Supreme Leader's office from 2001-2005.
After the 2005 presidential elections, he became and advisor to
Ahmadi-Nejad, and in September 2005 became Deputy Foreign
Minister for European and American Affairs. Jalili has been
described as devout ideologically in line with the president.

5.(U) Some conservative MPs and newspapers have criticized
Jalili's appointment, complaining of his comparative lack of
experience. Conservative newspaper Hamshahri wrote that
although the resignation will not change Iran's policies, "it
will influence the course of the talks. The absence of a
skilful diplomat in the talks will have serious repercussions."

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Other conservative newspapers, including Resalat, Jam-e-Jam, and
Keyhan, praised Larijani in editorials and commentaries.
Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai called Larijani's
tenure "successful and productive" and that he "successfully
foiled many threats using his acumen and acting within the
framework of his mandate from the Leader." MP and Majles
Research Center director Ahmad Tavakoli (reportedly a cousin to
Larijani) said he was "saddened" by Larijani's resignation,
adding that Larijani's status and power to attain the rights of
Iranians was more than that of a "deputy foreign minister with a
low profile."

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Changes in nuclear policy?

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6.(C) Government officials have asserted repeatedly that the
resignation will not result in any changes in Iranian nuclear
policy. However, several observers and analysts have commented
that the change indicates a hardening of Iran's negotiating
position. Two Iranian businessmen separately told IRPOff that
Larijani was likely perceived as too flexible, suggesting that
Larijani had become more compromising during the course of his
nuclear talks with the EU. One Iranian-American political
analyst who was based in Tehran said that the resignation means
that Tehran is confident of its position on the nuclear issue
and does not perceive a credible threat.

7.(C) It remains to be seen whether the change was initiated by
Supreme Leader Khamenei, who may feel that Larijani was becoming
too compromising a negotiator, or by President Ahmadi-Nejad, in
a bid to increase his control over nuclear policy. It is
notable that neither Khamenei nor Ahmadi-Nejad has made any
public comments about Larijani's resignation. Larijani will
remain on the SNSC as the Supreme Leader's representative, but
this is likely simply a face-saving gesture. The foreign
ministry spokesman also confirmed that Larijani, along with
Jalili, will meet EU foreign policy chief Solana as planned Oct
23 in Rome. Beyond the Oct 23 meeting with Solana, it is not
clear whether Larijani will have any further role in Iranian
nuclear policy.


8. (C) Larijani's resignation and apparent abrupt diminution in
status mirrors the similar fate of Iran's preceding SNSC
secretary and chief negotiator on the nuclear program, Hassan

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Rowhani. Rowhani was similarly defrocked in July 2005, a
sensitive juncture in negotiations with the EU-3, and replaced
in both capacities by Larijani. According to press reports at
the time, Rowhani submitted his resignation to Supreme Leader
Khamenei just prior to the inauguration of president
Ahmadi-Nejad the following month. Under Rowhani, Iran had
voluntarily suspended nuclear enrichment for two years during
negotiations with the EU-3. Observers speculated that Rowhani,
who was close to Khamenei and generally considered a trusted
conservative pillar of the regime (much like Larijani),was
removed for being too accommodating in nuclear negotiations.

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Election implications

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9. (C) The political analyst also suggested to IRPOff that
Larijani may have voluntarily resigned in order to disassociate
himself from nuclear policy and avoid being blamed for any
serious repercussions, particularly in advance of the 2008
Majles elections. The analyst suggested that by resigning
Larijani disassociated not only himself, but also the
traditional conservatives, from the more radical Ahmadi-Nejad.
The analyst was not optimistic, though, about Larijani's chances
of winning the 2009 presidential election, if he decided to run.
An Iranian political science professor said the resignation
should be viewed in the context of the Majles elections. He
suggested that the conservatives needed an insider to "play the
role of opposition," a tactic which he said was successful for
them in the past. The professor said that in the 2005
presidential election, Larijani strongly criticized Khatami-era
compromises with the IAEA, while Ahmadi-Nejad's comments were
somewhat more moderate. It is not clear yet whether Larijani
intends to run in the Majles elections in March, or to challenge
Ahmadi-Nejad for the presidency again in 2009. Conservative
groups have had difficulty coalescing to create an electoral
strategy, and Larijani may be a figure that traditionalists and
moderate conservatives could rally around in the run up to the

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March Majles elections.
BURNS