NEW IRGC HEAD JAFARI DESCRIBED AS A BETTER SOLDIER AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000060

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/4/2017
TAGS: IR PGOV MARR PTER
SUBJECT: NEW IRGC HEAD JAFARI DESCRIBED AS A BETTER SOLDIER AND
MODERATE THAN SAFAVI

REF: RPO DUBAI 0055

RPO DUBAI 00000060 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S//NF) Summary: A contact who claims to have worked for
three years as the deputy of new IRGC head Jafari described him
as an excellent soldier, a war hero, and more moderate than his
predecessor Safavi. The contact did not think the timing of the
change was linked to rumors that the US would designate the IRGC
as a terrorist group. He claimed that it was a normal rotation,
actually overdue, requested by Safavi. He also claimed that two
groups had been working for Safavi's ouster: an internal group
including Jafari who disagreed with Safavi over administrative
matters, and an external group led by Deputy Interior Minister
Zolqadr who disagreed with Safavi over political issues. The
contact clearly thought Jafari was better qualified for the job
for Safavi, but at the same time noted that he thought the
appointment signified that Iran was seriously preparing itself
in case of military attack. End Summary

2.(U) Supreme Leader Khamenei named Brigadier General Mohammad
Ali Jafari to replace Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi as head
of the IRGC September 1 and promoted him to major general.
Khamenei appointed Safavi as his advisor for military affairs.
(Note: In a subsequent press interview, Safavi noted it was the
first time the Supreme Leader has appointed a military commander
as an advisor. Endnote)

3.(S//NF) An ongoing contact, purported a former IRGC general,
said he served as Mohammad Ali Jafari's deputy for three years
while Jafari headed the IRGC infantry. The contact said he
worked in the budget and planning office. The former general
clearly has a positive opinion of Jafari, describing him as a
good soldier and a good man. He said Jafari is tough, a
professional soldier, a war hero, a better organizer and fighter
than Safavi. He also believed that Jafari is more moderate than
Safavi and not political. He claimed that Jafari is not in the
group close to Ahmadinejad. In his judgment, Jafari does not
lie, and he thought Jafari would give the Supreme Leader
realistic assessments of Iran's military capabilities. The
contact said that Jafari, an architectural engineer by training,
has long been involved in the IRGC's traditional construction
projects, but claimed that Jafari is opposed to IRGC's
involvement in business, licit or otherwise.

Reasons for change
--------------

4.(S//NF) The contact said that Jafari would not seek conflict
but if ordered to fight, would do a better job than Safavi. He
believed the significance of the selection of Jafari to be that
Iran was seriously preparing itself for the threat of war.
(Note: When asked how he thought Iran would respond in case of
a military attack, the former IRGC general indicated he thought
Iran would respond using both conventional and asymmetrical
means. Endnote) The contact, similar to analysts quoted in
various press reports, did not think the timing of the
announcement had anything to do with press reports that the US
was considering designating the IRGC a terrorist entity. He
said the replacement of Safavi was a normal rotation, that in
fact Safavi had been in his position for longer than normal. He
claimed that Safavi was "tired" and had been requesting to step
down for a year.

5.(S//NF) The ex-general also claimed that two separate groups
had been working for Safavi's ouster. One was a group internal
to the IRGC which reportedly differed with Safavi over how the
IRGC was being administered (NFI). This group included 11
commanders, of which Jafari was the most significant one, and
was supported by former IRGC head Mohsen Rezaie, now secretary
of the Expediency Council. The second, external group was
reportedly led by Deputy Interior Minister for security affairs
Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, formerly deputy IRGC commander,
considered ultra-right wing. This group reportedly had
political differences with Safavi and thought he was too
moderate.

6.(S//NF) One apparent cause of friction between Safavi and
Zolqadr was Zolqadr's alleged continued dominance over the Qods
Force, as well as the IRGC counter-intelligence unit. Zolqadr,
before moving to the Interior Ministry, reportedly put his own

RPO DUBAI 00000060 002.2 OF 002


people in both organizations and retains significant influence
over both organizations. The ex-general claimed Zolqadr tried
to recruit him when he was in the IRGC, promising him
promotions, but Safavi warned him not to join with Zolqadr. The
contact, when asked about the Ramazan force, claimed that the
Ramazan Force, led by Zolqadr, operated inside Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war but indicated that this group was no longer in
existence. He also claimed that Zolqadr and his group are
backing hardline cleric Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi to
be the next Supreme Leader but for now do not have sufficient
power to try to effect a change.

7.(S//NF) According to the contact, Jafari and Zolqadr are not
close and belong to different groups, but they are not enemies,
like Safavi and Zolqadr. One area in which Jafari and Zolqadr
do not agree is reportedly Zolqadr's support for IRGC business
activities.

Jafari Biographic data
--------------

8.(S//NF) According to the contact, Jafari began university a
year before the revolution. After the revolution he volunteered
to fight against the Iraqis and later joined the IRGC. While
still in his 20s, he headed the Western unit at one point during
the war (reportedly there were three units - Northwestern,
Western, and Southern). The contact did not think Jafari had
traveled outside of Iran. According to press reports, Jafari
was one of the 24 IRGC commanders who sent a letter to then
President Khatami in 1999, threatening action if Khatami did not
control the student demonstrations. According to a September 3,
2007 article in conservative Keyhan newspaper, Jafari was
"active" in the US Embassy hostage-taking.

Other comments
--------------

9.(S//NF) The former general said he supports talks between the
US and Iran, saying he believed Iran would take positive steps
if it got a security guarantee from the US. He made clear he
had no information to confirm this but thought that the recent
six month ceasefire announced by Moqtada al-Sadr in Iraq was
likely the result of Iranian pressure and could be viewed as a
positive outcome from the US-Iran Baghdad talks.

10.(S//NF) The ex-general said the IRGC and the regular army
were set up to be complementary, with different taskings, to
avoid competition. He said they copied the US system, modeling
the IRGC on the US Marine Corp. He claimed that years ago in a
private meeting, Khomeini had told them to copy the US military
and focus on long-term planning "like the Americans."

11.(S//NF) Comment: While we have no way of confirming the
contact's claim to have been an IRGC general and to have worked
under Jafari, he was introduced by a long-time contact and
appears from his comments to have a deep knowledge of the IRGC.
He appeared uncomfortable only once, when IRPO Director asked
about the Ramazan Force, as if he had not been prepared to talk
about it. He reportedly left the IRGC over eight years ago but
claims continued contact with regime insiders. He exhibits a
clear dislike of the extreme right in Iran, calling President
Ahmadinejad "crazy." End comment
BURNS