Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI49
2007-07-18 12:20:00
SECRET
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

"WELL-CONNECTED" IRANIANS GIVE DIFFERING VIEWS OF POWER

Tags:  IR PREL PGOV KNNP 
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VZCZCXRO5805
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0049/01 1991220
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 181220Z JUL 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0157
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0150
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0141
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0107
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000049 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN; PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/18/2027
TAGS: IR PREL PGOV KNNP
SUBJECT: "WELL-CONNECTED" IRANIANS GIVE DIFFERING VIEWS OF POWER
STRUCTURE

RPO DUBAI 00000049 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000049

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD
BAKU FOR HAUGEN; PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/18/2027
TAGS: IR PREL PGOV KNNP
SUBJECT: "WELL-CONNECTED" IRANIANS GIVE DIFFERING VIEWS OF POWER
STRUCTURE

RPO DUBAI 00000049 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ramin Asgard, Acting Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S) Summary: Three Iranians who claim to be well-connected -
a former IRGC official, a former Guardian Council staff member,
and a leading businessman - gave contrasting views of the
behind-the-scenes power structure of the Iranian regime.
According to the former IRGC official, the bazaaris (traditional
merchant class) run the country, having bought off the ruling
clergy. The former Guardian Council staff member claimed that
the clerical elite in Qom make ultimate decisions on all major
policies, because Supreme Leader Khamenei does not have
sufficient religious credentials to make those decisions. The
businessman claimed that a group of 500 "fascist neocons" headed
by 10-12 influential men run the country. All three sources
claimed the Supreme Leader's son Mojtaba is an avenue to reach
the Supreme Leader, although the IRGC official said Mojtaba is
used by others and is not influential in his own right. There
have long been competing theories among Iran scholars and
analysts about who actually wields authority in Iran. Even
these purported regime insiders differ on where ultimate
authority resides, lending credence to the view that no one
power center predominates. End Summary.

Bazaaris are in charge, says former IRGC official
-------------- --------------
--------------

2.(S) Three Iranians who claim to be well-connected recently
offered IRPO contrasting assessments of the behind-the-scenes
structure of power and influence in the Iranian regime. A
former IRGC official maintained that the bazaaris, the
well-established and traditionally influential merchant class,
essentially run the country. He claimed that they have placed
"their people" in government offices and that they have bought
off the ruling clergy. The former IRGC official noted that
bazaaris have long collected alms on behalf of the clerics. He
added that since the Islamic revolution, the bazaaris have been

permitted to invest alms on behalf of the clerics, who would,
theoretically, redistribute the profits to the poor. The
contact claimed that much of this money is invested or held in
Dubai.

3.(S) The former IRGC official described the bazaaris as
different from the rest of the private sector, saying that the
bazaaris are generally a well-established and well-organized
group of mostly traders that are present in every major city.
He said that banks will not loan money to ordinary people
without a bribe, but that bazaaris will get bank loans and then
re-loan the money. The contact claimed that bazaaris, IRGC and
other groups offer loans at very high interest rates (60% or
more),notwithstanding the Islamic prohibition on usury. Asked
why the bazaaris would not force the privatization of the oil
industry in order to gain control of it, he said that they are
traders not producers, and that they make money selling
equipment to the government. The bazaaris will resist change
unless it benefits them economically, but are adept at deriving
business advantage from changes in Iranian domestic and foreign
policy. For example, asked how President Ahmadi-Nejad's
anti-Israel and Holocaust rhetoric serves bazaari interests, the
contact said that it increased their trade with Arab
businessmen, with whom Ahmadi-Nejad is popular.

4.(S) The former IRGC official claimed that the Supreme Leader's
son, Mojtaba, is well-placed but is not powerful himself. The
contact alleged that Basij commander Hejazi and other members of
the Supreme Leader's office use Mojtaba as an avenue to
influence his father. The former IRGC official claimed that the
Supreme Leader discourages his sons from entering business or
politics.

Former GC staff member says clerics in Qom and their hardline
supporters run the country
-------------- --------------
--------------

5.(S) A former staff member on the Guardian Council where he
was an aide to Presidential Office spokesman Gholam Hossein
Elham, maintained that Supreme Leader Khamenei does not have
sufficient religious credentials to make authoritative decisions
and that he relies on the senior clerics at the seminaries in
Qom to bolster and sometimes make major policy decisions. The

RPO DUBAI 00000049 002.2 OF 003


contact said that the religious community is divided between
supporters of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri - a noted critic of the
regime and the concept of absolute rule by the jurisprudent
(velayat-e-faqhi) - and the more hard-line pro-government
clerics associated with the Qom Theological Lecturer's
Association (QTLA). He said that these hard-line clerics have
influential advisers, some of whom are bazaaris.

8.(S) The former Guardian Council staff member said that
Habibollah Asgaroladi, the head of the Islamic Coalition Party,
is an influential figure, and also listed some key members of
the QTLA. These include: Guardian Council head Ayatollah Ahmad
Jannati; Ayatollah Momammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi; Ayatollah Hossein
Rasti Kashani; Ayatollah Mohammad Emani-Kashani; Ayatollah
Mohammad Yazdi; Grand Ayatollah Lotfallah Safi Golpayegani;
Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi; Tehran Friday prayers
leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami; Ayatollah Seyyed Hasan
Taheri Khorram-Abadi; Ghazi Khorram-Abadi; Hojatoleslam
Husseini-Bushehri; Ayatollah Reza Ostadi; Majid Momen; Ayatollah
Gholamreza Rezvani; FNU Ghadari; Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani;
Ayatollah Abbas Vaez Tabasi; Ayatollah Mohyeddin Haeri Shirazi;
Ayatollah Ali Meshkini; Grand Ayatollah Nouri-Hamedani (who was
accused of being in charge of the "chain killings" of prominent
Iranian reform activists during the Khatami period).

9.(S) The contact said the Supreme Leader's son Mojtaba plays a
role, but does not have an independent power base. According to
the contact, the ruling clerics operate on the basis of
self-preservation and personal interests instead of national
interests.

10.(S) Speaking about the nuclear issue, the former Guardian
Council staff member said he believes Iran wants to develop a
nuclear bomb for deterrent purposes, but that no one would be
foolish enough to use it. He said he believes that developing a
nuclear weapon and maintaining the status quo in Iraq are two of
the ruling elite's top goals. The contact maintained that the
"semi-government," such as Rafsanjani and Khatami, support
suspension, but the senior clerics in Qom oppose it, and the
latter's views are Iran's declared positions. Regarding future
elections, he said that in a country of 70 million people, there
are 90 million identity cards (which is the only documentation
required for voting). If the QLTA and their hardline supporters
decide to manipulate the next election, he said, Ahmadi-Nejad
could be returned for a second term as president.

Khamenei relies on group of 500 "neocons" says businessman
-------------- --------------
--------------


11. (S) The third contact is a leading businessman whose company
is among the top three soap and detergent companies in Iran. He
claimed that a group of 500 "fascist neocons" led by 10-12 men
actually run the country. He described the group of 500 as the
people that the ruling clerics have always relied upon to "carry
out their dirty work," and said that they report to a group of
10-12 men, specifically naming IRGC commander Rahim Yahya
Safavi, Deputy IRGC commander Mohammad Baqr-Zolqadr, Basij
commander Mohammad Hejazi, and Keyhan editor Hossein
Shariatmadari. These men report to the Supreme Leader through
his son, Mojtaba, the businessman claimed. The contact
recounted that the 1999 student protests worried Khamenei,
because taken to its logical conclusion, the student movement
advocated an Iran without a Supreme Leader. After 1999,
Khamenei relied more on conservative factions to suppress
popular uprisings, alleged the businessman.

12.(S) Regarding the 2005 presidential election, the
businessman claimed that the group of 500 were under the
impression that they would be voting - and encouraging others to
vote for - Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, but that they were instructed
at the last minute to vote for Ahmadi-Nejad.

13.(S) Comment: While IRPO cannot independently assess the
validity of these contacts' claims, we have heard each of these
general theories about the power structure before from other
Iranian contacts. All appear to agree that Supreme Leader
Khamenei does not exercise absolute authority. It is noteworthy
that each of the three separate contacts described the Supreme
Leader's son, Mojtaba, as an avenue to reach Khamenei. It is
IRPO's analysis that the bazaaris and the clerical elite both
exert a strong influence on policy. The Supreme Leader
meanwhile maintains an array of tools to balance the needs of

RPO DUBAI 00000049 003.2 OF 003


these and other constituencies and his priorities for the
regime. What is clear is that the key levers of power are
exercised behind the scenes, through informal contact, and that
even those who claim to be well-connected differ on where the
power and influence in the regime truly lies.
ASGARD