Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI47
2007-07-11 13:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL TRACKS WITH IRPO'S ANECDOTAL

Tags:  ECON PGOV KPLS IR 
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INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0136
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RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0102
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000047 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/11/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV KPLS IR
SUBJECT: RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL TRACKS WITH IRPO'S ANECDOTAL
REPORTING

REF: RPO DUBAI 0045

RPO DUBAI 00000047 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000047

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/11/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV KPLS IR
SUBJECT: RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL TRACKS WITH IRPO'S ANECDOTAL
REPORTING

REF: RPO DUBAI 0045

RPO DUBAI 00000047 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(C) Summary. The results of the Terror Free Tomorrow June
2007 survey of 1000 Iranians overall tracks with what IRPO hears
anecdotally from Iranians. Both the survey and IRPO's findings
indicate a large amount of support for Iran's nuclear energy
program among Iranians, but mixed views regarding a nuclear
weapon. While support for the nuclear program runs deep in
Iranian society, the people see Iran's economy as the top issue
of concern. The challenge there in is that while the Iranian
government closely monitors public opinion, its policy making is
not often responsive to public wishes. End Summary.

2.(C) The telephonic survey has the advantage of a much more
methodical assessment of views and much broader access to the
Iranian population than IRPO has in Dubai. The reliability of
polling in Iran is questionable, however, given that Iranians
tell us that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) also
does polling (and never publishes the results. reftel). If
widely known, this would color how freely Iranians are likely to
speak to an unknown pollster. Furthermore, many Iranians are
nervous that their email and telephone lines are monitored.
There always seems to be a cultural tendency to tell people what
they want to hear.

It's the economy, stupid
--------------

3.(C) A main finding of the study is that 29% of respondents
view developing nuclear weapons as a very important priority for
the Iranian government, while 88% of respondents considered
improving the economy a very important priority. At the same
time, 52% favor the development of nuclear weapons and believe
Iranians would live in a safer world if Iran had nuclear
weapons. Not an insignificant number - 31% - thought that if
the government had nuclear weapons, Iranian people would live in
a more dangerous world. This generally tracks with what Iranian
interlocutors tell us. By far, the economy is their greatest

concern, a sentiment then candidate Ahmadi-Nejad skillfully
tapped into, after the previous government was criticized for
prioritizing social reform over the economy. We are not
surprised by the fact that 92% ranked creation of new jobs and
90% curbing inflation as very important tasks for the
government, particularly given that 64% of respondents said they
did not work.

4.(C) It was noteworthy that the percentage who said
Ahmadi-Nejad has failed to keep his campaign promise to "put oil
money on the table of the people themselves" was not higher than
56%. Most Iranians we see in Dubai have only criticism for the
president, but again we are unlikely to meet those people
getting direct handouts on the president's provincial tours. It
would indicate that Ahmadi-Nejad's popularity may not be as low
as it appears from the outside, but that many are still
withholding judgment on his economic program. This might
explain the fact that less than half the respondents (42%) said
they thought the Iranian economy was headed in the wrong
direction, and barely more than half (52%) said the president's
policies have not succeeded in reducing unemployment and
inflation. It seemed surprising that only 31.4% said their own
economic situation was worse than when Ahmadi-Nejad took office
in August 2005. Nonetheless, only 18% of Iranians said the
overall economic situation was excellent or good, despite the
fact that reportedly journalists in Iran have been discouraged
from writing negative stories about Iran's economy. It is also
important to note that some have benefited from rising property
prices or from government largess.

5.(C) On the other hand, it seems significant in a country
riddled with corruption that a larger percent (36%) thought
overall corruption had decreased since Ahmadi-Nejad came into
office - promising to go after the "oil mafia" and others - than
those who thought corruption had increased (28%). Again, this
sentiment is contrary to several IRPO Dubai interlocutors who
believe that those charged with cleaning up the smuggling are
the real smugglers themselves.

Mixed views on nuclear issues
--------------

6.(C) Numerous Iranians have told us they hope Iran develops a
nuclear weapon, but it is clear most would like their government

RPO DUBAI 00000047 002.2 OF 003


to prioritize improving the economy. The reasons why those
Iranians support acquisition of a nuclear weapon seem to focus
on security and national pride. Post-Iran-Iraq war trauma seems
to infuse Iranian society, and Iranians seem to fear that one
day in the future they could again be the victim of an aerial
attack or invasion - either by the US, Israel, or a future
aggressive neighbor. While a few Iranians tell us they are
hoping for a US attack to overthrow their government, most say
Iranians do not want any more violent upheaval. Some Iranians
also cite national pride as a reason why they want a nuclear
weapon, usually indicating that if Pakistan has a bomb, so
should they. They feel that Iran will be taken more seriously
if armed with a weapon. Even some Iranians who are extremely
critical of their government still support acquiring a nuclear
weapon. They do not view this as entrenching the current
government in power but as protecting the Iranian nation. A few
Iranians, however, tell us they do not believe their government
is seeking a nuclear weapon.

7.(C) The high numbers (79-80%) who responded they would favor
Iran providing full inspections and a guarantee not to develop
or possess nuclear weapons in exchange for various incentives is
noteworthy, particularly as few Iranians we meet seem to know
much about the contents of the P5+1 package on the table. These
results would suggest that they would support the package if
information with more specifics could reach them. It further
reinforces the notion that the economy is much more important -
at least to the Iranian people - than a nuclear program. The
finding that support for nuclear weapons drops to below 17% if
Iran were to receive outside assistance in return for full
inspections and a guarantee not to have nuclear weapons likely
means that the respondents assumed such an agreement would
improve the economy and at the same time, reduce the likelihood
of military confrontation in the future.

8.(C) It is not surprising that 78% of Iranians favor the
development of nuclear energy, given all the government's
rhetoric equating nuclear energy with progress and international
stature. Also, at the time the poll was taken, the price of
gasoline had just been increased 25% and rationing was being
discussed. In addition, Iranians have long suffered from
electrical outages and high levels of pollution in large cities.
This statistic tracks with what we hear from Iranians.

US rapprochement
--------------

9.(C) The figure of 68% of Iranians strongly or somewhat
favoring normal relations and trade with US tracks with Iranian
pollster Abbas Abdi's infamous 2003 survey that landed him in
prison. It seems low compared to what we hear (mostly from
Iranians in Dubai for US visas, which tends to color what they
say to us). However, we are cognizant of the fact that we meet
few Iranians from the estimated 10-20% of society who are
considered hard-core supporters of the Islamic Republic.

10.(C) While it was not surprising that the European Union and
specifically France rated higher than the US for desired trade
relations, given their longstanding presence in Iran, we were
surprised China and Russia outranked the US (64% strongly
favored normal trade relations with China and 48% with Russia,
versus 33% with the US). Iranian markets are reportedly flooded
with cheap Chinese goods. While many say they would prefer
higher quality US goods, perhaps many realize they would not be
able to afford them even if they were available. Although they
may be perceived as reliable trade partners, as far as political
partners, most Iranians tell us that the Chinese and the
Russians cannot be trusted. On the other hand, we were not
surprised by the low rating the UK received (39%),given the
widespread conspiracy theories we hear about continuing British
"dominance" over Iran and "alliance with the mullahs."

Attitudes toward government
--------------

11.(C) It is remarkable that 61% of respondents said over the
phone that they strongly oppose (53%) or somewhat oppose (8%) "a
political system where the 'Supreme Leader' rules according to
religious principles and cannot be chosen or replaced by a
direct vote of the people." In the corollary question, 72%
strongly supported and 7% somewhat supported a political system
where the 'Supreme Leader,' along with all leaders, can be
chosen and replaced by a free and direct vote of the people.
This would indicate a high degree of disagreement with the
concept of velayet-e faqih in Iran and a high desire for greater

RPO DUBAI 00000047 003.2 OF 003


democracy, which tracks with what Iranians tell us. Because the
wording of the question contain too many variables (existence of
a 'Supreme Leader,' government based on religious principles,
and issue of direct vote),however, it does not reliably measure
level of overall approval of the existing government. The very
low degree of support (10%) for a return of a monarchial system
tracks with what IRPO hears, although a number of people
maintain that Iran "needs" an authoritarian leader.

Financial assistance to terrorist groups
-------------- -

12.(C) The wording of several other questions - at least as
translated into English on the organization's website
terrorfreetomorrow.org - were also open to several
interpretations. The findings noted almost two-thirds of
Iranians support "financial assistance" to groups like Hamas,
Islamic Jihad, Hizballah, and Iraqi Shia militias (notably a
slighter larger "strong support" rating for Sunni Palestinian
groups than Lebanese Shia Hizballah or Iraqi Shia militia
groups). This seems to contradict with what we largely hear -
resentment that funds badly needed at home are shipped off to
Arabs. However, the question did not specify funds for
humanitarian versus military support. Groups like Hamas and
Hizballah are widely recognized to be involved with many
humanitarian projects, such as hospitals. There is pervasive
sympathy in Iran for Palestinian and Iraqi suffering, as well as
fear that a normalized Iraq would once again turn against Iran.
We also note that few Iranians with whom we talk seem to know
anything about Iranian military assistance to Iraqi Shia groups.
Dividing the question would have given a more useful response.
It is noteworthy in any case that support for this assistance is
ranked lower than seeking trade and political relations with the
West, even at the cost of recognition of Israel (55%). Again,
the economy is the Iranian people's primary immediate concern,
with security likely a close second.

Ranking priorities
--------------

13.(C) Another set of questions could be read in two different
ways, at least in the English translation: "I am going to read
you a list of possible long-term goals for the government of
Iran. Please tell me whether you think these goals are very
important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at
all important for the government of Iran." The respondents
could have understood the question to ask if I think that the
government should prioritize this or how I judge the government
to be actually prioritizing this. In any case, again, the
economy by far got the highest rating of importance.
BURNS