IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF TALKS WITH THE US (C-NE7-00968)

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2017
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL IR
SUBJECT: IRANIAN PERCEPTIONS OF TALKS WITH THE US (C-NE7-00968)

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence
Office - Dubai, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(C) Summary: While we have not heard anything outside of
press reporting regarding Iran's goals and strategies for the
upcoming May 28 meeting with the US on Iraq, we have had some
discussions with contacts regarding interlocutors and some
positive and negative reactions to the idea of talks. The
choice of interlocutor will be a good indicator of who is in the
driver's seat of policy right now. The arrest of academic Haleh
Esfandiari may be an effort by some to torpedo talks, although
there is no sign yet from the Iranian side that they are
distancing themselves from attending. Iranian officials seem to
be making major efforts to publicly justify Iran's
participation, despite other signs of crackdowns on links to the
US. Iran may also see Esfandiari as a bargaining chip against
the Irbil 5. End summary

2.A.(S) WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HAVE IRANIAN OFFICIALS DISCUSSED
THEY MIGHT BE WILLING TO OFFER OR NEGOTIATE ON DURING BILATERAL
TALKS WITH THE US? WHAT WILL THEY BRING TO THE TABLE? WHAT
ISSUES WILL NOT BE DISCUSSED OR ARE RED LINES? WHAT ISSUES WILL
THEY BROACH WITHOUT HESITATION? WHAT ARE THE PLANNED TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION FOR THOSE MEETINGS?

-- (U) Iranian official statements have almost uniformly
asserted that the only topic for discussion with the US is Iraq,
and the only reason Iran is meeting with the US is at the behest
of the Iraqi government. The Supreme Leader said May 16 that
the talks would be used to "remind Washington of its failed
duties in the conflict torn country." He reiterated that Iran's
policy toward the US has not changed, asking "how can one have a
dialogue with an arrogant, bullying, expansionist an imperial
American government, especially with its current, brazen,
ill-mannered and boastful statesmen?" In his weekly press
conference May 20, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hosseini said that
Iran is not linking the nuclear issue to US-Iran talks in Iraq.
Official statements continue to assert that Iran will not
consider discussing other topics than Iraq with the US until the
US "changes its aggressive behavior" and makes "a gesture of
goodwill." It also continues to refuse to meet the precondition
of suspension of enrichment necessary for talks with the P5-1.

-- (S/NF) Privately, several Iranian contacts have opined that
these public statements are meant to appease hardliners who
repeatedly point out that ideologically, nothing has changed
between the two countries in the last 28 years. None of our
sources have claimed any insider knowledge of what Iran is
likely to raise in the May 28 talks, other than the obvious
issue of the detained Irbil 5. An influential source close to
Rafsanjani reportedly told a contact that he believed that the
release of the five was a prerequisite to US-Iran talks on Iraq
at the ministerial level.


B. (S) WHAT TYPES OF DEBATE, IF ANY, ARE OCCURRING IN THE ELITE
RANKS, THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, THE EXPEDIENCY
COUNCIL, OR THE CABINET ABOUT THE TALKS? WHO IS FOR AND WHO IS
AGAINST THEM? AND WHY?

-- (S/NF) Prior to the Sharm el-Sheikh talks, the same source
close to Rafsanjani told IRPO Director that contact between US
and Iranian foreign ministers would break a longstanding taboo
and make other kinds of US-Iran contact easier. Given that
there was a degree of exchange in Egypt, albeit not substantive,
it would appear that such contact had been sanctioned at the
highest level. However, the prediction that the taboo would be
broken has not borne out, as evidenced by the arrest May 8 and
subsequent charges against Iranian-American academic Haleh
Esfandiari for working against the Iranian government. Her
arrest, as well as other problems facing Iranian-Americans,
seems designed as a message to scare Iranians off from contact
with the US. At the same time, it reflects increased paranoia
over US intentions toward the regime. However, it cannot be
discounted that the Iranian government may try to see Esfandiari
mostly as a bartering chip for the Irbil 5, a view echoed by
several contacts. Another indication of crackdowns on
interaction with the US, a group of Iranian documentary
filmmakers planning to travel to the US on an IVLP visit was
recently hauled into the Ministry of Culture and advised to turn
down the invitation or face "difficulties."


C. (S) WHO DOES IRAN PLAN TO SEND TO THE TALKS? WHAT ROLE, IF
ANY, WILL AHMADI-NEJAD HAVE? RAFSANJANI? LARIJANI? WHO WITHIN
THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WILL DETERMINE ATTENDANCE AT THE TALKS?


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-- (U) The Iranian government has not publicly confirmed who
will represent Iran in the Baghdad talks. A May 21 Mehr News
article claims the Iranian Foreign Ministry intends to send its
UN PermRep Mohammed-Javed Zarif to lead the talks. Previous
Iranian press pieces had speculated that the current Iranian
Ambassador to Iraq Amir Sa'eed Iravani, Supreme National
Security Council Undersecretary Mohammed Jafari or former
Iranian Ambassador to Iraq Kazemi Qomi would head the
delegation.

-- (C) There appears to be division inside the government over
who will be the Iranian interlocutor with the US -- as evidenced
by the delay in the announcement -- which would indicate a power
struggle over what camp gets the "credit." In all likelihood,
the decision will be the Supreme Leader's. The appointment of
Zarif would make sense in terms of his experience in dealing
with the US, but it would be surprising in light of long-term
efforts by Ahmadi-Nejad to sideline him for being too much in
the pragmatic camp. Such a choice would suggest that
Ahmadi-Nejad has little influence on the decision.

-- (S/NF) We heard more from contacts about the issue of who
should represent the US in talks at the ministerial level than
at the ambassadorial level. One conservative contact close to
former FM Velayati claimed the reason that there was no
Secretary Rice-FM Mottaki meeting at Sharm El-Sheikh was because

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it was decided that Mottaki was not the right interlocutor. The
contact called Mottaki weak, in contrast to his predecessors FM
Velayati and Kharrazi who he said were policy advisors as well
as implementers. The source claimed that Ahmadi-Nejad had
chosen Mottaki to be his "puppet."

-- (S/NF) We have heard speculation that Velayati may be
selected to conduct talks, but it is not clear whether that
would only be for talks at the ministerial level or also
ambassadorial. One source recently returned from Iran said
there is discussion of creating a new position for Velayati
within the government, possibly to prepare him to "take over,"
but the source close to Velayati had reportedly told him he was
doubtful that Velayati would agree to join Ahmadi-Nejad's
government. The same source also told IRPO Director that
Velayati plans to run for president in 2009 but will wait to see
the results of the 2008 Majles elections before declaring his
candidacy.

-- (S) One source recently claimed that Supreme National
Security Council Secretary Larijani is in a relatively weak
position within the government (and that one of his brothers --
not clear which one but presumably Mohammad-Javad Larijani --
was more influential than him). Larijani was described as
independent from both the Ahmadi-Nejad group and the Rafsanjani
group.


D. (S) WHAT WILL THEIR MARCHING ORDERS BE? WHAT DIRECTIVES
WILL THE PARTICIPANTS BE GIVEN AND WILL THEY HAVE ANY LATITUDE
TO NEGOTIATE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, BESIDES IRAQ ARE
THE PARTICIPANTS PREPARED TO DISCUSS? WHAT PREPARATIONS FOR
FOLLOW-ON TALKS, IF ANY, ARE IRANIAN LEADERS MAKING?

--(U) In the only public comment we have seen indicating
willingness to broaden the agenda, Secretary of the Human Rights
Headquarters of Iran's Judiciary Mohammad-Javad Larijani said on
the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Jordan May 22 that
it is possible that Iranian and US officials could discuss
"issues related to Iran" while in Baghdad. While reiterating to
IRNA that the talks are being held at the request of Iraqi
officials on Iraq only, he did not dismiss the possibility of
broadening the discussions if "Washington shows good will."


E. (S) WHAT ARE IRANIAN LEADERS SAYING ABOUT THEIR GOALS AND
CONCERNS VIS-A-VIS US ENGAGEMENT? WHAT ARE THEIR PERCEPTIONS
ABOUT US INTENTIONS FOR THE TALKS? WHY ARE IRANIAN LEADERS
INTERESTED IN HOLDING DIALOGUE NOW?

-- (U) Iranian officials in their public statements are framing
their agreement to attend the talks as a sign of their good will
and intentions towards Iraqis and a sign of US weakness. As
reported by PressTV, Foreign Minister Mottaki told Jordan's King
Abdullah May 20 that Iran "will be seeking the correction of
wrong policies the US has adopted in Iraq when the two countries
sit down."

--(S/NF) Iranians have long asserted that one of the main
obstacles to talks with the US is the issue of who will get
credit for eventual reestablishment of ties. The contact close
to Velayati recently claimed to IRPO Director that President

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Ahmadi-Nejad's status is weakening and that his only chance of
being reelected in 2009 is opening relations with the US. This
source claimed that Ahmadi-Nejad's personal ambition would
triumph over his ideological opposition to dealing with the US.
The same source also claimed Rafsanjani's relative strength has
grown over the past five months. Subsequent to this
conversation, former nuclear negotiator Mousavian was arrested,
and we heard that his arrest made others, including Velayati and
Rafsanjani, very nervous. This would indicate they do not
believe themselves to be untouchable.

Public perceptions
--------------

3.(S/NF) At the popular level, prior to the Iraq conference at
Sharm el-Sheikh, we heard there was lots of excitement in Iran
about prospects of Rice-Mottaki meeting, with people handing out
sweets to celebrate. Regarding the Baghdad talks, people seem
to believe both governments' statements that the content will be
restricted to Iraq, but some Iranians say they see these talks
as a first step toward better relations. The source close to
Velayati told IRPO Director that most in the Iranian government
are dying for a green light from US on engagement, motivated in
part by the very bad state of economy. We heard indirectly that
a major Bazaari leader, reportedly close to the Supreme Leader
and an informal advisor to Ahmadi-Nejad, said Iran should have
relations with the US.

4.(C) A negative note about the talks was struck by several
civil society activists, who indicated to IRPoffs concern that
if talks led to political deals between US and Iran, the US
would drop the subject of human rights and democratic reform in
Iran.

5.(C) Comment: Facing growing international pressure and
increased blame by its own population for its economic and
political problems, the government may see in talks on Iraq with
the US a way to deflect domestic and international criticism and
project a more pragmatic image. It may hope that positive
traction in talks will help forestall stepped-up UNSC sanctions
against it. It may also genuinely hope that such talks will
lead to broader engagement. However, the charges against
Esfandiari could indicate an effort by opponents in Iran to
torpedo any kind of engagement with the US. The arrest very
likely indicates Iran will continue its internal crackdown on
civil society and view with suspicion any links with the US --
other than any in which it directly participates.




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