IRANIAN REACTIONS TO BRITISH DETENTIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000021

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/9/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR MOPS UK IZ
SUBJECT: IRANIAN REACTIONS TO BRITISH DETENTIONS

REF: DUBAI IRPO 0018

RPO DUBAI 00000021 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: Several Iranians discussed their views of
what prompted the March 23 detention of British sailors and
marines by the Iranian military. All three thought the action
was preplanned, although it was less clear whether it had
pre-approval by the Supreme Leader. All felt the detention of
the five Iranian Quds Force personnel by US forces in Irbil
contributed to Iran's motivation for taking such an action, with
Iran wanting to demonstrate its strength. One contact claimed,
however, that the detention of the five Iranians was not a major
issue in Iranian public opinion. Another contact thought the
Iranian action may have also been an attempt by radicals to
seize power away from the so-called pragmatists who purportedly
gained strength with the outcome of the December elections. The
recommendations of these contacts for dealing with Iran vary
greatly between those living in Iran and those outside. End
comment.

Former IRGC General believes Supreme Leader approved action
-------------- --------------

2.(S/NF) A purported former Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) general maintained that the motivation for the March 23
detention of British soldiers was the US detention in Irbil of
five IRGC personnel, as well as UK-Iranian clashes (NFI) in
Basra predating the detention. According to the general, the
IRGC was likely concerned that the British were planning an
Irbil-type raid in Basra against it and wanted to preempt them
with a show of strength. He added that the incident appeared
very well planned and was convinced the Supreme Leader gave his
pre-approval. He believes that President Ahmadi-Nejad is not a
political decision-maker in Iran.

3.(S/NF) When asked why target the British if IRGC anger was
mostly focused on the Irbil detentions, the former general
reasoned that unlike the Americans, the British are already on
their way out in Iraq so Iran would reason they would be less
inclined than the Americans to escalate the situation. Also, he
said, Iran would like to be able to claim that they helped push
the British out of Iraq, similar to Hizballah claims that it
ended the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. He doubted that the
Iranians used the detention to test Western reaction to such an
incident but said it served this purpose regardless. Asked if
he thought the intent of the Iranians was to change the subject
of international discourse from the nuclear issue, he said he
did not know, but that if that had been their intent, they were
wrong to think it would work.

4.(S/NF) When asked if the Iranian government likely understood
the highly negative international reaction that the video
"confessions" of the detainees would provoke, the general said
he doubted it, saying that those involved in the operation are
largely ignorant of the West. The general asserted that the
peaceful resolution of the incident would likely have a positive
impact on overall Iranian-Western relations, setting a precedent
that diplomatic solutions work. In contrast to some of our
interlocutors (reftel),the former general asserted that Iran
does not want direct conflict with the US.

5.(S/NF) The general went on to reason that releasing the five
Iranians detained by the US in Irbil would provide a "golden
opportunity" for further improving the political atmosphere. He
said it would send a message to Iran that when it takes a
"positive" step, i.e. releasing the detainees, the US is
prepared to reciprocate. He claimed this strategy would weaken
the extremists in Iran more than passing UN Security Council
resolutions against the country. He believes the Iranian people
as a whole supported the detention of the British soldiers, as a
warning to the West not to detain Iranians. On the other hand,
he acknowledged that the Iranian people do not seem too well
informed or irate about the five Iranian detainees in Irbil.
Nonetheless, he argued, their release without conditions would
have a positive impact. He said Iranians had taken note of an
evolution in US rhetoric on Iran, based on a calmer, less
aggressive tone. Therefore, he reasoned, if the US made a
positive gesture, public opinion in Iran would put pressure on
the Iranian government to respond in kind.

6.(S/NF) When asked about public opinion in Iran regarding the

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IRGC-Quds Force, he said the general public knew little about
the various divisions within the IRGC and saw it as one
organization. He deflected the question about general attitudes
towards the IRGC and talked instead about the history of the
Quds Force. He said it was created about 20 years ago, towards
the end of the Iran-Iraq war, initially to help Palestinians
combat Israeli aggression. Since then, its mandate had been
expanded to unconnected issues, such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, and
Iraq. He added that its members are more competent and more
committed to the revolution than the rest of the IRGC, and
membership is very selective.

Professor assumes pre-approval
--------------

7.(S/NF) An Iranian professor said that the detention of the
five Iranians in Irbil had a "huge effect" on the Iranian
government, and that the government's response was the detention
of the British sailors and marines. He obviously believed
Iranian press reports that the US would release the detainees by
Nowruz and wondered why this had not occurred. He added that
the local IRGC commander (no name given) in the region where the
Brits were picked up is not the type to take unauthorized
actions, so he assumed there had been some kind of pre-approval.

Oppositionist says 50-50 chance leader approved
-------------- --

8.(S/NF) In a phone conversation prior to their release about
the British detentions with US-based Mohsen Sazegara (please
protect),a founder of the IRGC who has since become a reformer,
Sazegara said there was a 50-50 chance that the incident had
preapproval from the Supreme Leader. Not everything in Iran is
preplanned, he said. He reasoned that such an event could have
been orchestrated by a group of radicals to assert its political
hand over pragmatists, who were bolstered by their general
success in the December 2006 elections. Whether or not the
Supreme Leader had advanced warning of the incident mattered
little, he said, since Supreme National Security Council
Secretary Larijani's subsequent statements about the possibility

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of trying the detainees indicated that the Supreme Leader was in
control of the situation. Larijani would not have gotten
involved without the explicit instructions from the Supreme
Leader, Sazegara reasoned.

9.(S/NF) Sazegara's explanations for why the detention occurred
included several tacks:

-- whenever Iran has internal problems, it creates an external
crisis -- for instance, the 1979 hostage situation (to distract
from the chaos of the revolution) and the Salman Rushdie affair
(to distract from the Iran-Iraq war ceasefire). In this way,
Iran can divert attention from internal issues and have an
excuse to stir up nationalism and crack down on internal
dissent. (Note: The British detentions occurring just prior to
the passage of UNSCR 1747 certainly served to preempt news of
the resolution's passage in Iran. Endnote)

-- to demonstrate Iran's strength after three "humiliations":
1) detentions in Irbil of top Quds Force personnel; 2) two
UNSCRs passed unanimously, including by "friends" of Iran; and
3) demonstrations by Russia of its ability to start and stop the
Bushehr project.

10.(S/NF) Sazegara said that Iran likely had little fear it
would pay a serious prices for the detentions. He claimed that
the Supreme Leader's New Year message demonstrated his
confidence that the US and West will not attack Iran.
Furthermore, according to Sazegara, the Supreme Leader has tried
for the last 10 years to create a situation where people think
they have no power to do or change anything in Iran. Therefore,
reasoned Sazegara, the Supreme Leader currently believes he
faces no real threat from internal groups or external forces.
In Sazegara's view, Iran feels it can tolerate any sanction,
short of an oil boycott, and it does not think the international
community would impose an oil boycott because of oil demands.

11.(S/NF) Sazegara said he heard Khatami had met with the
Supreme Leader (no timeframe given) and told him the situation
was dangerous, and Iran was risking war, but the Supreme Leader
told him not to worry, that Iran has the upper hand. Many
technocrats in the regime don't like the current situation, but
they have no say, claimed Sazegara. He added that if Rafsanjani

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tries to exert influence, his sons are threatened with
corruption investigations, leaving the Supreme Leader and the
security and intelligence forces the upper hand.

12.(S/NF) Comment: The policy recommendations regarding dealing
with Iran from those still connected to Iran and those outside
often vary widely. In this case, the former general (now a
Dubai-based businessman) and the professor both claim not to
like Ahmadi-Nejad, and the professor in particular was critical
of what he saw as a fundamental flaw of the regime trying to mix
Islamic rule and democracy, but neither could be categorized as
oppositionists. (Note: both were introduced to IRPO by the same
longstanding Iranian-American contact. Endnote) Sazegara has
apparently completely broken with the regime and faces charges
in Iran. The general and the professor both advocated changing
Iran's behavior through engagement, which they said would
increase public pressure on the Iranian government to move
toward rebuilding relations, although their recommendations seem
unlikely to succeed. The general proposed starting by releasing
the Irbil detainees, and the professor claimed that opening up
US trade would have greater impact on Iran than military action,
while at the same time sparing the region greater instability.
The professor, in particular, did not seem to realize how
unlikely it was that the US would open trade relations with Iran
prior to resolving differences. Sazegara, on the other hand,
advocated threatening to deny Iran the ability to repatriate its
profits from oil sales until it agrees to a Helsinki-type
process and frees political prisons, reopens its shuttered
reformist press, and holds free elections. It would seem that
this threat would only be effective if other countries would
sign on, and that appears unlikely for the time being.
BURNS