FORMER IRGC GENERAL ON US-IRAN RELATIONS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000002

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE, PARIS FOR WALLER, BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD, BAKU
FOR HAUGEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/3/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR
SUBJECT: FORMER IRGC GENERAL ON US-IRAN RELATIONS

REF: RPO DUBAI 0001

RPO DUBAI 00000002 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: A longtime Iranian-American contact introduced
IRPO Director to a former IRGC general, with whom he claimed a
long acquaintance. Like many other contacts, he claims many in
Iran support rapprochement and believes other countries are
working to keep US and Iran apart, to serve their own interests.
His comments, however, about a weakened top hierarchy of the
IRGC and a disgruntled but influential sector of the IRGC in
teaching institutions were interesting. He only spoke
tangentially on the nuclear issue, essentially viewing it as a
facet of US-Iran bilateral relations. His views of the IRGC and
Iranian power circles are reported septel. End summary

US-Iran relations
--------------

2.(S/NF) In a December 28 meeting, a former IRGC general called
the US a strong friend and a strong enemy. He claimed that the
lack of ties between the American and Iranian people is an
unnatural state of affairs, but that the longer the status quo
drags on in Iran, the more it becomes rooted. He acknowledged
the need for a change in Iran -- an apparent allusion to changes
in policy direction, not regime change. He believed that a
complicating factor on both sides was the increasing number of
new offices -- at high levels -- in military and intelligence
organizations that focus on confronting the other country. In
his view, these new structures are creating negative forces
directing both countries towards conflict. To counter this, he
suggested creating new offices in the State Department and MFA,
as well as in the NGO sector, to focus on ways to reestablish
ties.

Blaming others
--------------

3.(S/NF) Like the majority of Iranians we encounter, the former
official claimed other countries are deliberating acerbating
US-Iranian relations. He said individuals in France, Germany,
Russia, China, Arab countries, as well as in Iran, benefit
politically and economically from the lack of US-Iran ties. He
blamed the EU-3 for the lack of agreement over the nuclear issue
last summer, in particular France, pointing to deals between
Iran and Peugeot and Total as evidence of its perfidy.

4.(S/NF) He, like many Iranians, maintains that the UK still
controls Iran. When asked how, he said through the clerics, but
indirectly. He said his father, a cleric, had told him that the
UK pays off advisors to clerics and that often the clerics do
not even know that they are being manipulated. When these
clerics enter government, they bring these co-optees with them.
Separately, he claimed that for the past 10 years, both the UK
and Israel have influence inside the IRGC. Furthermore, he was
very mistrustful of Russia as an ally for Iran.

How to change direction
--------------

5.(S/NF) The former general, though out of the IRGC more than 10
years, felt the IRGC could play a positive role in changing
Iran's direction. He maintained that the organization is not as
monolithic as it appears and claimed there had been a recent
change in character within the organization. He claimed that
when a politicized group left the IRGC to follow Ahmadinejad
into government, these people chose as their replacements
officers they could control. As a result, these officers are
weaker, with less influence.

6.(S/NF) While not proposing any particular course of action or
role for himself in this meeting, he maintained that a powerful,
but untapped, force for influence in Iran are the IRGC officials
who became disgruntled over the direction of the IRGC and
distanced themselves by taking teaching positions at IRGC's Imam
Hossein University and at other institutions. He said they are
unhappy with the direction that Ahmadinejad is taking the
country but so far have not asserted themselves. Nonetheless,
he said, they remain very influential and are well-respected,
and as such, they could play a future role. (Note: the source
said he serves as a consultant - NFI - to Tehran University.
Endnote)


RPO DUBAI 00000002 002.2 OF 002


7.(S/NF) He maintained that such people were concerned about the
prospect of a war and see no benefit for Iran from a conflict
with the US, but out of loyalty would fight if confrontation
happened. He maintained that when the US approaches Iran in a
threatening manner, it reinforces negative trends inside the
country and works contrary to US goals. The former general said
Iranians are very sensitive about specific issues, such as
national dignity and religion. He advised against the US trying
to choose a future leader for Iran, saying the Iranians would
destroy anyone they viewed as a puppet of foreign governments.
He claimed, for instance, that President Clinton made a mistake
when he voiced his support for student demonstrators, saying
this outside support damaged them in the eyes of Iranians.

8.(S/NF) When asked his view of the influence of the Iranian
diaspora, he looked at the issue from the point of view of
influence through economic investment and used it to object to
US sanctions. He said that if the economy in Iran sinks,
Iranians outside could influence the course of events through
investment in Iran. However, he said, sanctions tie their
hands. He also repeated a common warning that Iranians will say
one thing, think one thing, and do another. This, he said, is a
reason for frequent political surprises in Iran, such as
Khatami's 1997 defeat of presumed presidential winner
Nadeq-Nouri.

9.(S/NF) In the conversation, the Iranian-American, a long-time
supporter of Rafsanjani, predicted that the most practical path
to change in Iran is if Rafsanjani becomes Supreme Leader. He
claimed some outside Iran predict an IRGC-led coup, installing a
military strongman to run the country, but he doubted it would
occur.

10.(S/NF) Comment: This was our first meeting with this contact
and a rare chance to examine views of a former IRGC official,
albeit one who has been out of the organization for over a
decade. While his criticism of sanctions, of third country
interference and of any attempt by the US to choose a future
leader are predictable, his comments about a weakened IRGC
hierarchy was interesting, particularly if eventually the former
IRGC officials still yielding influence from their positions in
the administration get pushed out. His view of a disgruntled
but influential sector of the IRGC in teaching institutions was
also noteworthy. In this meeting, he did not try to offer
himself as a conduit to the Iranian government in any way. Nor
did he seem to be on any kind of expedition to try to collect
intelligence. Although his motivation for agreeing to a meeting
with IRPO is unclear, he appeared to simply want to express his
views of the current situation and to give advice. At several
points, he said he wanted to think further on issues, implying
readiness to meet again.
BURNS