A PRO-VELAYATI CONSERVATIVE DISCUSSES IRANIAN POLITICS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000014

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TAGS: PGOV PREL IR KNNP
SUBJECT: A PRO-VELAYATI CONSERVATIVE DISCUSSES IRANIAN POLITICS

REF: IRPO DUBAI 0012

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CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: In a conversation that predated passage of
UNSCR 1747, an Iranian doctor with reportedly close connections
to conservative circles discussed Iran's nuclear issue and the
domestic political situation. He predicted Iran would
eventually cave to international pressure and suspend
enrichment, but he clearly felt Iran was entitled to nuclear
weapons to protect itself from a perceived nuclear threat from
Israel. The principal focus of his political remarks was
extolling the positive influence of former Foreign Minister
Velayati, who he maintained wanted to build bridges with the
West. While he did not in any way seek a "channel" between
Velayati and the US, at one point he solicited USG financial
backing for Velayati's next campaign run, a subject IRPO did not
pursue. We hear multiple views concerning who has the ear of
the Supreme Leader, so this report should not be considered
definitive by any means, but the source offered some noteworthy
views regarding politics in Iran. End summary

2.(S/NF) An Iranian doctor reportedly well connected to
conservative circles discussed Iran's nuclear dilemma and
domestic politics with IRPO Director in mid-March. (He called
the Supreme Leader a former patient but said he could not help
his undefined problem with his arm, and said his current
patients include the Supreme Leader's son and the governor of
the province of Tehran, but did not say for what.) He discussed
a number of issues, including the nuclear issue, domestic
politics, IRGC, Basij, and Ansar-e Hizballah (reftel). His
views on regional politics, as well as on drug abuse in Iran (he
also runs a drug addiction clinic),will be reported septel.

His view: Iran will accept suspension
--------------

3.(S/NF) In a conversation prior to passage of UNSCR 1747, the
doctor predicted Iran will accept the enrichment suspension
requirement (no time frame given),because pressure from
sanctions will leave it no choice. Nonetheless, he was very
critical of what he saw as the US acting as the "arbitrator" of
who can have nuclear technology and who cannot. It was clear he
believed that Iran's goal was to build nuclear weapons. Given
that he claimed "all" Iranians believe Israel would use nuclear
weapons against Iran as a first strike, he appeared to feel Iran
was justified in arming itself.

4.(S/NF) What troubled the doctor most was the notion that
President Ahmadi-Nejad -- whom he does not support -- would reap
the political benefits from any subsequent improvement of
relations with the West should Iran suspend enrichment and enter
into negotiations. Rehashing the old argument from Iranians
over who gets credit for any rapprochement with the US, he
claimed Ahmadi-Nejad's principal goal at this point is to get
reelected in 2009 and that he needed to do something to reverse
his sinking popularity.

5.(S/NF) In contrast to the doctor's views, several other
sources seemed to think Iran would need more incentives to
suspend. One source suggested allowing Iran to ask for a
reciprocal precondition for talks, such as US first unfreezing
Iran's assets. Another source suggested Iranians could announce
they have reached a percentage of enrichment which would be
"acceptable" to West, then say they are stopping activity
because their factories are "not ready." Another claimed that
Iran would trust the UK more than it would trust Russia to do
enrichment for them.

His view: Velayati for president
--------------

6.(S/NF) The doctor acknowledged, however, that the call on
whether or not to suspend enrichment was not the president's,
but ultimately the Supreme Leader's. He further claimed that
Ali Velayati, foreign minister under President Rafsanjani, was
the most influential voice on the Supreme Leader's foreign
policy committee. (Note: this is a reference to the Strategic
Council for Foreign Relations, created by the Supreme Leader in
June 2006 to act as an advisory panel on foreign relations. It
is not clear how influential this body has been in foreign
policy decision-making. Endnote) The doctor maintained that

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Ahmadi-Nejad has no voice on this committee.

7.(S/NF) The doctor, clearly a fan of Velayati, reportedly
served on former FM Velayati's failed 2005 presidential
campaign. He said Velayati plans to run again in 2009, and he
plans to join his campaign again. The doctor claimed Velayati's
star is rising in Iran, along with Tehran Mayor Qalibaf. He
thought Velayati made a mistake in pulling out of the 2005
election.

8.(S/NF) He claimed that Rafsanjani will not run for president
again in 2009 and has already lent his support to Velayati. He
maintained that Velayati had the confidence of both the Supreme
Leader and Rafsanjani and that the Supreme Leader knew that any
advice from Velayati already had Rafsanjani's support. The
doctor said that Velayati shares foreign policy goals with
Rafsanjani and that he wants to establish ties with the rest of
world. On the other hand, he indicated differences between the
two on domestic policy but did not elaborate. (Note: He also
claimed that Velayati, numerous others in politics today, and
himself were members of the Hojjatiyeh prior to the revolution,
which he called the "pure" resistance to the Shah. However, he
said both he and Velayati, as well as many others, had since
left the group. Endnote)

Takes money to win an election
--------------

9.(S/NF) The doctor accused Ahmadi-Nejad of misusing large
amounts of Tehran municipal funds to buy votes during the
election, such as $120 "loans" to Basij members. He also
accused current Tehran Mayor Qalibaf of corrupt practices in the
election, saying he used money for his campaign that police
received (not clear whether legitimately or illegitimately) for
resolving problems people had with importing goods into Iran.

10.(S/NF) In what was otherwise a normal conversation with a new
contact, at one point the doctor changed tacks and said the US
should help pave the way for better relations by playing a role
in deciding who wins the 2009 elections. He said that it will
take money to win the elections, and Velayati needs some. He
gave IRPO Director the business card of a company he said was a
trading company he set up to raise funds for Velayati's
campaign. He suggested that the US allow this trading company
to import goods normally blocked by sanctions to allow Velayati
to start compiling funds. IRPO Director did not pursue the
matter. When asked why Velayati would not have access to
Rafsanjani's reported immense wealth if Rafsanjani was backing
him, the doctor responded that Rafsanjani was under such
scrutiny for corruption these days from Ahmadi-Nejad, who
"hated" him, he could not risk it. The doctor also maintained
that the Iranian diaspora did not contribute money for Iranian
political campaigns.

His view: Ahmadi-Nejad made many mistakes
--------------

11.(S/NF) Despite his argument about the importance of financial
backing to win the presidency, the doctor underscored the
Supreme Leader's role in influencing elections. He claimed that
after Khatami twice won the presidential election, the Supreme
Leader decided to ensure future winners had his pre-approval.
For this reason, he mobilized the IRGC and the Basij in the 2005
presidential elections, but, said the doctor, the results
backfired on him. Khameini did not realize how much influence
others, particularly Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, would have on
Ahmadi-Nejad. The doctor was very critical of Ahmadi-Nejad, who
he said made many mistakes in his first six months, including
listening to Mesbah-Yazdi. He said President Ahmadi-Nejad's
popularity is now on the decline but that the Supreme Leader
will not drop him as president.

Rumor mill
--------------

12.(S/NF) Another source, an Iranian-American who travels
frequently to Iran, said he heard rumors in Iran that 150 MPs
were prepared to impeach Ahmadi-Nejad, but the Supreme Leader
told them not to because Khameini knows he is dying. Another
source maintained that the Supreme Leader is worried that if he
dies and Ahmadi-Nejad is impeached, the Islamic system will
fall. In the meantime, the Supreme Leader is reportedly trying
to select his own replacement. One source maintained that

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Rafsanjani is proposing former President Khatami, but supposedly
only because he knows the Supreme Leader will say no and then
maybe consider Rafsanjani. Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi is reportedly
proposing Judiciary chief Shahrudi, while others are advocating
replacing the position of supreme leader with a council. One
rumor is that the Supreme Leader is refusing chemotherapy to
hide visible signs of his illness. (Note: It is important to
note how rumor-prone Iran is. End note)

13.(S/NF) Comment: Another contact, a purported former IRGC
general, was dismissive of Velayati's influence on foreign
policy and claimed that Hassan Rohani, formerly Iran's top
nuclear negotiator and now the Supreme Leader's representative
on the Supreme National Security Council, has a stronger voice.
We often hear different prognoses from different Iranians as to
who is the ascendant power. Some Iranians have predicted that
Qalibaf or Larijani will be the next president; this is the
first time we have heard the prediction for Velayati. We would
also note that while we frequently hear claims that Rafsanjani
is a pragmatist seeking closer ties with the West, we hear this
less said about Velayati. In any case, all Iranian prominent
figures seem to be towing the party line in statements
surrounding passage of UNSCR 1747, with none right now arguing
for rapprochement over enrichment. Velayati called the UNSC's
intervention in Iran's nuclear case illegal and said that Iran
will not suspend uranium enrichment even for a short period of
time. He said that putting up with international pressure was
the high price the country was to pay for materializing great
projects such as development of nuclear energy. He called
access to the nuclear fuel cycle the redline of the ruling
system on the nuclear issue. "Iran will not withdraw from this
redline but will rather use various political, international and
economic levers to reduce the inevitable cost," he added. We
were surprised by the request for USG funding for Velayati, and
it discredited the contact to a degree, although the rest of his
comments seemed genuine. The goal of such an inquiry may have
been just to test the reaction, or it may have demonstrated our
interlocutor's ignorance of US policy, despite having lived in
the US 15 years. It may also have been simply an attempt at
personal gain.
BURNS