Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07IRANRPODUBAI10
2007-03-06 09:35:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Iran RPO Dubai
Cable title:  

CRITICISMS OF US NUCLEAR POLICY FROM AN IRANIAN SECULARIST

Tags:  PREL IR KNNP PGOV 
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VZCZCXRO6598
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0010/01 0650935
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 060935Z MAR 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0066
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0034
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0061
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI 0059
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000010 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BAKU FOR HAUGEN; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2012
TAGS: PREL IR KNNP PGOV
SUBJECT: CRITICISMS OF US NUCLEAR POLICY FROM AN IRANIAN SECULARIST


RPO DUBAI 00000010 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000010

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR GAYLE; BAKU FOR HAUGEN; BERLIN FOR PAETZOLD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2012
TAGS: PREL IR KNNP PGOV
SUBJECT: CRITICISMS OF US NUCLEAR POLICY FROM AN IRANIAN SECULARIST


RPO DUBAI 00000010 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian L. Burns, Director, Iran Regional
Presence Office, Dubai, UAE.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary. A dual national who in most ways represents
the most pro-Western, secular segment of the Iranian population,
gave IRPOffs a critical assessment of US strategy on Iran's
nuclear program. He maintained that US arguments against an
Iranian enrichment program have not swayed even the elite of
Iranian society. All of Iran, including secularists who dislike
the government like him, took two lessons from the Iran-Iraq
war, he said. One, Iran has to be self-reliant in all things.
Two, in the one area of WMD, he said, the mullahs have a better
track record than the US. He cited a widely-held view in Iran
that the US, along with France and Germany, helped Iraq carry
out chemical attacks against Iran during their eight-year war.
He said memories from the war are still fresh in Iranians'
minds. He advised the US to proactively engage Iranian elite on
the subject and to take the initiative in trying to restore the
trust deficit between the two countries. His recommendation was
to find a way to talk to the regime now, rather than risk having
to revise US positions later by new facts on the ground. His
comments are particularly noteworthy, given his very pro-Western
stance on most other issues, and seemed to epitomize the Iranian
nationalist viewpoint about which we hear so much. End Summary.

Trust deficit
--------------

2.(S/NF) Speaking to IRPoffs February 25, an Iranian-American
reformist bemoaned what he perceives as a "trust deficit"
between Iran and the US. The contact, who comes from the most
pro-Western, reform-minded segment in Iran, has a good
understanding of both Iranian and US perspectives. In his view,
the recent escalation of tensions could have been mitigated had
USG officials acknowledged the trust deficit early on and
appealed to the elite of Iran. He did not understand the
rationale for not publicizing the contents of the P5-1 package

from the outset, saying that doing so could have given fodder to
those people advocating talks. The contents of the package are
still not understood in Iran, he said. A publicized offer by
the US to "compensate" Iran in some concrete way while it
suspends enrichment could help build trust, he added.

Lessons learned
--------------

3.(S/NF) A portion of the trust deficit, this reformist told us,
stems from lessons taken from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. All
Iranians now believe that -- regardless of the fact that such an
approach would not be economically rational -- the country
should be self-sufficient in all things. Because of this, US
arguments that Iran does not "need" civilian nuclear energy
because of its oil and gas reserves are not persuasive and are
possibly counter-productive, in his view. Furthermore, he
agreed with what he termed the widespread view in Iran that it
is not up to the international community to determine domestic
energy policy or energy needs of other countries, and that under
international law, Iran has the "right" to pursue nuclear
energy.

4.(S/NF) This pro-Western reformer was also dismissive of the
argument that the US has advanced to demonstrate that Iran's
intentions must be to build nuclear weapons, that the design of
Iran's nuclear program does not make economic sense for a purely
civilian program. His reasoning was that outsiders should not
assume the worst when looking at the Iranian government's
development plans, given all the illogical decision-making
apparent in other state-run projects. He inferred that the
Iranian government rarely spends its money efficiently.
(Another contact, an economist, recently made the same argument,
claiming that Iran had wasted more money in its failed attempt
several years ago to become independent in sugar production than
it has spent to date on its nuclear industry.)

5.(S/NF) Furthermore, this reformer said, the trust deficit is
compounded by Iranian views of US culpability in Iraqi chemical
attacks against Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war. He said in
this area (and apparently in this one only) he thinks "the
mullahs" have a better track record than the US. He noted it is
"common knowledge" in Iran that the US provided the Iraqi
military not only with weapons, but also with satellite imagery
depicting "best" targeting opportunities, information the Iraqis
then used in their chemical attacks. He also noted French and

RPO DUBAI 00000010 002.2 OF 002


German responsibility for supplying components for chemical
weapons. It is also widely remembered, he said, that the USG
initially accused Iranian forces of what were eventually proven
to be Iraqi chemical attacks against the Iraqi Kurdish town of
Halabja. This reformer claimed that even had Iranian forces had
access to chemical weapons, they would not have used them. He
also claimed Iran took greater care in general at avoiding
civilian targets than the Iraqis.

6.(S/NF) Echoing Israeli commentary about Ahmadi-Nejad's Iran,
the reformer added that there are some in Iran, and apparently
not just those in the regime, who view the US as "an existential
threat." He repeated an assertion we here regularly from
Iranian interlocutors - that the US would drop all objections to
Iran's nuclear program if only it were to shake hands with
Israel.

7.(S/NF) The dual national - no fan of Ahmadi-Nejad -- also
credited the latter with winning US "acceptance of a civilian
nuclear energy program in Iran," and predicted Ahmadinejad would
continue to push back on US red-lines on the nuclear issue.

NGO concerns
--------------

7.(S/NF) The dual national was also critical of State
Department's classified DRL and MEPI grants for Iran, saying his
own work with foreign NGOs had suffered from the increased IRI
suspicion these grants had provoked. He noted that he now had
to hide affiliations with outside NGOs, even on non-political
projects, to avoid raising government suspicions. The reformer
was also concerned that like other Iranians, he could face
future repercussions in Iran for work he did with US NGOs
predating the introduction of these new grants. He said that
while he is not allowing his concerns to stop his work on
NGO-related projects, he is taking many more extra precautions.

8.(S/NF) Comment: Some of our interlocutor's arguments are
specious or naove -- e.g., that the US should not assume Iran's
nuclear program has a military component just because it is not
designed in a cost-effective way for civilian uses. Coming as
it does from one of the most pro-Western Iranian of our contacts
-- that we have failed to sway the elite -- is notable, and we
should bear this in mind as we contemplate future public
statements. Judging from the passion with which he presented
them, his statements seemed to go to the core views of Iranian
nationalism. At the same time, he is very pro-American --
albeit critical of some aspects of US policy.

9.(S/NF) Comment con't: We were struck by this contract's
degree of high anxiety and agitation on the question of US-Iran
relations. This pro-Western interlocutor's main theme was that
the US comes to the Iran equation with a lot of past baggage and
Iranians universally (even the Western-oriented) feel they have
genuine reasons to question US motives. Therefore, he argued,
the US should focus publicly on the win-win potential of
negotiations, underscoring the benefits for average Iranians
should solutions be found to the litany of bilateral and
international issues that must ultimately be addressed. While we
pushed back strongly at the notion that Ahmadi-Nejad had won any
concessions from the US (e.g., recognition of Iran's civil
nuclear "rights"),our interlocutor appeared to be arguing that
the US should decide now what a realistic end scenario is for a
mutually acceptable Iranian nuclear program - and be ready to
communicate that. By doing so, he argued, the US will deny
regime hardliners the ability to achieve new "facts on the
ground" in the nuclear program. At the same time, those
desirous of negotiations could win public support - and put
pressure on the regime - for the P5+1 package and the future it
holds out to Tehran.
BURNS