Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HONGKONG1447
2007-05-30 08:24:00
SECRET
Consulate Hong Kong
Cable title:  

HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY INVESTIGATES PRC

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9568
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHHK #1447/01 1500824
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 300824Z MAY 07
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1778
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 001447 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2032
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC
SUBJECT: HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY INVESTIGATES PRC
INFILTRATORS

REF: HONG KONG 458

Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Jeff Zaiser. Reasons: 1.4(b,d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 001447

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER
DEPT FOR EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2032
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL SOCI CH HK MC
SUBJECT: HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC PARTY INVESTIGATES PRC
INFILTRATORS

REF: HONG KONG 458

Classified By: Acting E/P Chief Jeff Zaiser. Reasons: 1.4(b,d).


1. (S) Summary: Democratic Party (DP) legislator James To
(strictly protect),who is chair of the Hong Kong Legislative
Council (Legco) Security Panel, warned us in early February
2007 that infiltrators from Beijing had successfully
penetrated the DP and put it in a "dangerous position" (ref).
At that time, To said the DP had identified several
infiltrators from Beijing who had "challenged the stability
of the party." In early May, the Falun Gong newspaper "Epoch
Times" reported that a DP "special panel" had conducted an
eight-month investigation to assess the infiltration
allegations and provide recommendations to strengthen the
party's defenses against political sappers. The special
panel's key findings, based largely on oral interviews and
analysis of emails submitted by DP members, included: a)
Chinese personnel had provided or attempted to provide many
DP members with benefits; b) Chinese personnel had extensive
contacts with DP members and tried to influence them, buy
their loyalty, guide their speeches, plot their behaviors,
intervene with the party's operations, affect party unity,
and weaken the party's capabilities; c) DP members had
deliberately tried to "plant votes"; d) members who had close
contacts with Chinese personnel had formed a faction within
the party to spread false information, foment discord, and
generally create internal discord to undermine the party's
credibility and image; e) some staff personnel failed to
report their close contacts with Chinese personnel, got
involved in "planting votes" and factional activities, and
spread false information and messages. To date, the contents
of the report have not been made public. End Summary.
(Note: Paragraph 2 below includes excerpts from the first 28
pages of Chinese-language text in the report. The entire
report, once translated, will be posted in Chinese and

English languages for broader USG consumption. End note.)

PRC Infiltrations of Hong Kong's Democratic Party
-------------- --------------


2. (S) The DP special panel, including Cheung Yin Tung
(convener),Chan Ka Wai, Martin Lee, Szeto Wah, and Tsui Hon
Kwong, expressed broad concern that DP staff personnel had
become the targets of infiltration. Their proposals were
based on five primary concerns that resulted from the
investigation, which follow below. (Note: Excerpts from the
report, as translated from Chinese to English, are provided
in lightly edited form. In the same report, the term
"Chinese personnel" was defined to include: (1) state
leaders and personnel who have close contacts with the
mainland government; (2) official organizations such as
Xinhua News Agency, Office of the Central Liaison Department,
the Office of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs, the United Front
Department, the National Security Department, the Public
Security Department, and provincial governments; (3) academic
organizations, including university institutes and institutes
of all descriptions; and (4) business organizations,
including those operated with Chinese funds. End note.)

a) The special panel learned from talks with DP members that
Chinese personnel had provided or attempted to provide many
Democratic Party members with benefits. Because the special
panel did not have investigative authority, it could only
entertain information voluntarily provided by participating
members. The party was concerned that Chinese personnel also
would attempt to provide benefits to other members, that some
members already had accepted their benefits, or that some
members had been bribed by Chinese personnel and infiltrated
the party.

b) The special panel learned from talking to members that
large numbers of so-called middlemen, communicators and
information collectors of China have had constant contacts
with lawmakers of the party, Central Committee Standing
Committee members, party members and the party's staff
workers, but that some of these people had not reported their
contacts according to the party's report system. Then, when
the special panel requested the personnel concerned to
provide information, they would either conceal the
information or provide false information. Meanwhile, quite a
number of Chinese personnel had often advised the members
with whom they had contacts not to report these contacts to
the party. The panel was concerned whether, if party members
had regular and extended contacts with Chinese personnel, or
had accepted their benefits and had hidden the contacts from
the party, the DP would know and whether the party's system
had loopholes that Chinese personnel could exploit in order

HONG KONG 00001447 002 OF 002


to gradually influence party members' minds, buy their
loyalty, tell them what to say and plot their actions,
thereby intervening the party's operations, affecting the
party's unity, dividing the party and weakening the party's
capabilities.

c) The panel learned that some members, with the deliberate
attempt to plant votes, had recommended a large number of
people to become new members. The panel expressed concern
that such members, instead of paying attention to whether the
applicants were people who identified with the party's
beliefs or whether they would take part in the activities of
the party and only pay attention to increasing the number of
new members so that they can play "human-head politics"
during the party congress and party elections. The panel
noted concerns over the party's current "liberal" membership
system and its "loopholes," including opportunities for
members to be bribed, infiltrated into and divided. The
report also expressed concern that "the scheme plotted for
quite sometime" could change the DP's support for democracy
and other objectives prescribed in its charter, thereby
changing the party's stand, political platform and basic
nature.

d) The special panel held that "a healthy phenomenon" had
resulted from the different views within the party, through
exchanges and debates, that lead to competition and "rotation
of leading hierarchies." However, the panel learned that
certain members who had close contacts with Chinese personnel
had formed factions within the party and then, through
disseminating misinformation and through provocations,
including divisive activities, instigations and abusing
authority, attacked members of other factions, causing
internal dissensions, struggles and scandals, thereby
undermining the party's credibility, tarnishing the image of
the party, and exhausting the party's operational capability.


e) The special panel learned from the information provided by
members that some paid staff workers of the DP took an
"active part" in activities such as: having contacts with
Chinese personnel, planting votes, and participating in
factional activities. The panel noted its concern about
those staff workers who are in control of the party's
information, and even classified information, would become
"objects susceptible to infiltration."


3. (S) Several events probably sparked, or exacerbated
interest in, the DP's investigation. First, the DP
historically, but especially following the historic July 1,
2003 pro-democracy rally, increasingly has grown concerned
about mainland monitoring of its activities and membership.
Also, since early 2006 there has been a widening rift between
mainstream and reformist factions, intensifying internal
struggles among party members. In May 2006, the so-called
"Real Brother" incident, involving the discovery on the
Internet of confidential email exchanges criticizing DP
leaders, further fanned charges of infiltration and internal
party struggles. In June 2006, the legal requirement under
Hong Kong's Companies Ordinance for all political parties to
publish their membership lists increased pressure on the DP.
(Note: The DP registered as a company, similar to other
major political parties in Hong Kong, when it was launched in

1994. End note.) As a result, a few dozen members resigned
from the party, in part due to concerns that their safety or
business on the mainland would be jeopardized. Finally, in
July-August 2006 consideration and passage of new covert
surveillance legislation further intensified concerns over
communications security, including among political parties
such as the DP and Civic Party.


4. (S) Comment: In his remarks to us in early February, James
To claimed that "the U.S. Government needs to know what is
happening to the Democratic Party, because it is the only one
who can put a stop to infiltrations from the mainland."
Through that statement and his subsequent provision of the
DP's investigative report, To may have sought to influence
rather than inform the USG; however, the level of detail
included in the report, as well as potential repercusions
arising from his rather transparent collusion with the USG --
including an open email with the report attached -- seem to
suggest that its contents and purpose are genuine. End
comment.
Sakaue