CORRECTED COPY: KARBALA: GOVERNOR PUTS HIS HEART INTO THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000096

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/30/2017
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER PINR IZ
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: KARBALA: GOVERNOR PUTS HIS HEART INTO THE
TRANSFER OF THE SECURITY FILE

REF: REFTEL 000005

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CLASSIFIED BY: Andrea Donnally, Acting Team Leader, Karbala
Provincial Reconstruction Team, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a corrected copy of Hillah 00000095 (wrong
classification) a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Karbala
classified cable.


2. (U) SUMMARY: On June 27, Karbala Governor Aqeel Mahmood
al-Khazali met with 3ID Deputy Commanding General (DCG) and PRT
representatives at the Regional Embassy Office (REO) in
al-Hillah. This was the first meeting between these parties
since the PRT was denied access to the province ostensibly under
the Governor's command. The meeting began with a discussion of
the Anbar Salvation Council and a seemingly similar committee in
Karbala province. Feigning heart palpitations, the Governor
shifted the conversation to manageable topics such as the
transition to Iraqi control, an upcoming tourism conference and
a future Anbar-Karbala security dialogue. The Governor agreed
without hesitation to the transition of Karbala to Iraqi control
and is scheduled to travel with 3ID representatives in July to
present the request for consideration to senior Coalition Forces
(CF) and Embassy representatives. Al-Khazali was apologetic
about the PRT's recent difficulty in accessing the province and
agreed that free access is needed. The PRT continues to seek
out alternatives to facilitate travel and engagement
opportunities with Karbala government and non-government
interlocutors. END SUMMARY


3. (C) General Cardon opened the meeting by showing the Governor
a recent news clipping describing a newly formed Karbala
security committee. Before complaining of heart palpitations
and requesting medication, al-Khazali explained that he inspired
its formation. He did not elaborate further on the committee or
its specific function, however, the PRT did report on the
formation of this committee on May 12 in a situational report to
the Office of Provincial Affairs. This committee was formed
after the two April car bombs in downtown Karbala that wounded
and killed more than 400 civilians and resulted in the arrest of
15 suspected terrorists. Media reporting from that period
attributes the formation of these committees to Sistani's
representatives at the holy shrines in Karbala as a response to
the insecurity created by the car bombs. Six other committees
were formed at the same time to engage parliament members, the
local religious Hawza, the tribes, and the media. The last two
committees that were formed provide social support and
coordinate the efforts of the other six committees. Governor
al-Khazali agreed to provide the PRT with further information
about the security committee. It is unclear what relationship
any of these committees have with local security forces (ISF)
and the provincial government (SEPTEL).


4. (C) Governor Al-Khazali immediately agreed to the DCG's offer
to transfer the Karbala security file. The Governor explained
that he had obtained authorization from the Ministry of Defense
for two Iraqi Army brigades, which is in addition to recent
authorization granted by the Ministry of Interior for two
thousand foot police. He explained that the GEN Mahon, the
director of the Joint Coordination Center (a security
coordination cell in the Governorate),is having success
fighting militias and that security is generally good. During
the last six months Governor al-Khazali balked and hesitated
about the transfer of security citing militia infiltration and
instability as the reason for his disinclination. The Governor
was both stalling for time with CF and lobbying both CF and GOI
for equipment, training and Iraqi soldiers. Upon receiving his
wish list from the GOI, he made clear his intention to sever
military cooperation with CF. On June 28, locally engaged staff
and CF reported that GEN Mahon was unexpectedly transferred to
Basra and that a LTG Salah has taken his place. The number of
monthly assassinations and other terrorist activities appear to
be stable, however USG interpreters continue to be under severe
threat of assassination. On June 26, a long time Karbala police
officer and interpreter for CF was assassinated. This raised
fears with PRT staff and the few remaining CF interpreters in
the province.


5. (C) In May, the Mayor of Ain Tamur, a northwestern district
that shares a border with Anbar, requested PRT assistance in
engaging the Anbari government in a dialogue about cross border
terrorist activities. For the last six months, Karbala ISF has
been reporting suspected Sunni extremist and AQI terrorist
movement around the Anbar-Karbala border, threatening the
security of the province. Following up on that request, at the
meeting, the PRT inquired about the Governor's interest in
meeting with his Anbar counterpart. Al-Khazali expressed an
interest in meeting with his Anbari counterpart and appeared

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flexible regarding a date. He reminded the PRT of a recent
assassination in Ain Tamur of six individuals, including a local
council member by unknown assailants. PRT Anbar has already
laid the groundwork with the Anbar Governor and it appears that
there is potential for a dialogue, a first for these two
Governors. Where Anbar is a predominantly Sunni province,
Karbala is its Shi'a counterpart, except for Ain Tamur which is
rural, mostly tribal and a little of both. The PRT is in close
contact with PRT Anbar and is monitoring developments. (SEPTEL)


6. (C) The investigation into the January attack on CF at the
Governance Compound (REFTEL) and PRT mobility are closely
intertwined. CF repeatedly requested the results of the ISF
investigation into the January attack, however the local
government has been less than forthcoming. At this meeting the
DCG pressed the need for Karbala to share the results of its
investigation to which al-Khazali hesitated. He cited the
inconclusiveness and poor level of professionalism of the
report. Despite his hesitation, on June 28, al-Khazali emailed
the PRT an Arabic and English translation of the report, which
has since been forwarded to 3ID. As al-Khazali claimed, the
interviews with police officers at the scene were short and
superficial. The conclusions reached through the investigation,
based primarily on the profile of the attack, forms the basis
for the governor's current justification for restrictions the
PRT movement.


7. (C) Upon arriving to the REO, al-Khazali asked the PRT
representative about their recent trip to the province. Such a
jab obviated the need to address the mobility of the PRT during
the meeting. Governor Aqeel cited the profile of the PRT
security convoy as problematic given the province's current
security posture. He cited the findings of the January
Governance Compound attack as the logical basis for the
restriction. He also reminded his interlocutors that a recent
attack on the Ministry of Finance that resulted in the
kidnapping of five British citizens employed a similar profile
to the January attack in Karbala. Governor al-Khazali
recommended that the PRT provide his office with 24-hour advance
notice of PRT movement to the province with the names of the
principals, the routes and the times of travel. This detail of
information sharing is unacceptable for a province that claims
to have severe militia infiltration among the ISF, general
insecurity and is known to have a historically anti-American
leaning. A veiled threat to stop reconstruction project funding
inspired the Governor to concede that the PRT should enjoy
unfettered access to the Province. Despite the Governor's
recognition of PRT's need for mobility, at this time it is
difficult to assess if a consensus can be reached to the
satisfaction of Embassy security requirements and within reach
of the Karbala security posture.


8. (U) The meeting ended with the al-Khazali agreeing to support
a future south central regional governor's conference in the
near future. He explained that the monthly Governors'
conferences in Baghdad were going well and that at the last one;
representatives from all 18 provinces were present.


9. (S) COMMENT: Engagements with the Karbala Governor are always
unpredictable. He likely feigned a medical condition to disrupt
the flow of the meeting and to ensure a plausible escape route
if discussion topics became too difficult. His condition
limited the depth of the conversation, but did not prevent
considerable advancements in the Karbala-USG dialogue. The
Governor's solid approval of the transfer of the security file
was an unusual turn of events in that previous discussions on
the topic revealed the Governor's concern about militia
infiltration in the ISF, particularly the police, and an
unraveling security condition. Over the course of the last two
months a new Police Chief and Emergency Response Unit Commander
(suspected of having very close ties to the Prime Minister) may
actually have turned the tables on militia activity in the
province. Additionally, more than 4,000 more Iraqi Army and
Karbala foot police are expected to be on the ground and working
in the very near term. More is not always better, but in the
case of a province with 60 percent unemployment and more than 3
million pilgrims visiting monthly, the additional law
enforcement may be a much needed reprieve for the over burdened
police force. COMMENT CONTINUED


10. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: Karbala PRT movement is most likely
untenable. Intelligence reports on militia activity, whenever
available, describes a severe risk environment to American
convoys. Moreover, Embassy security protocols call for convoys
to pass unrestrained through security checkpoints, which is in
direct conflict with Provincial security procedures. The
Governor agreed to provide the PRT with a letter of transit and
offered an Iraqi Army escort, however these options conflict
with Embassy protocols, which makes them a non-starter. The
Karbala PRT is negotiating mobility with the Governor from a

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disadvantaged position, where it is imprudent to demand
unfettered access, and yet cooperation with the local government
may increase the risk level against the PRT. However, the
increased resources and focus of the newly arrived MND-Central
3ID Division command, has the PRT cautiously optimistic about
the potential for mobility within the province. The PRT is
keenly aware that limited engagement on a random and infrequent
basis is more likely to draw negative attention to our
interlocutors and undermine their security than further the USG
mission. Therefore, with the support of the 3ID leadership and a
moderately cooperative Karbala Governor, the PRT will continue
to use creative methods of engagement and seek opportunities to
travel when prudent to do so. END COMMENT
ADONNALLY