BABIL PROVINCIAL ELECTION SHAPSHOT: CHASING A SHADOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000006

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV SOCI KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BABIL PROVINCIAL ELECTION SHAPSHOT: CHASING A SHADOW

REF: A) 06 BAGHDAD 4772 B) 06 HILLAH 156

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CLASSIFIED BY: Charles F. Hunter, Babil PRT Leader, REO
Al-Hillah, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



CORRECTED COPY OF HILLAH 0003- Upgrading overall classification
to Secret


1. (SBU) Summary: Corruption, stagnation and not wanting to
repeat the mistakes of two years ago figure among the reasons
Babil citizens would like to see elections take place sooner
rather than later. An extended delay in scheduling them could
plunge more potential voters into cynical abstention, just as
deterioration in the security situation could keep people away
from the polls out of fear. Despite the fact that many
officials do not see provincial elections happening any time in
the near future, Babil's five major political parties are trying
to find ways to address some of the current local issues,
including sectarian violence and the effect Provincial Iraqi
Control (PIC) will ultimately have on the province, and to use
their successes or ideas to their benefit at the polls. For the
moment, however, there are too many variables to hazard a guess
on outcomes. End summary.

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OFF TO THE POLLS?
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2. (SBU) With no sure date on the horizon for provincial
elections (pending action by the Council of Representatives),
the citizens of Babil are gradually beginning to focus on the
desirability of heading to the polls - though not necessarily
all for the same reasons. For the Sunnis, concentrated in the
northern third of the governorate and comprising about 30
percent of its population, a primary motive is lack of
representation. Due to their electoral boycott two years ago,
they have no voice on the Provincial Council (PC) and now view
their 2005 abstention as an error needing to be addressed by new
elections sooner rather than later. Among the Shi'a too there
appears to be growing consensus that they made a mistake in
2005, in their case by letting the guidance of the marja'iya
(the four ayatollahs of the Quietist Hawza in Najaf) determine
their choice of candidates rather than thinking for themselves.
All told, according to Deputy Provincial Council Chairman Dr.
Na'ma Jasim Hamza, at least forty to fifty percent of the
province will vote in the next elections simply because they are
"tired for having nothing to show" from the current leadership.

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KEY POLITICAL ISSUES
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3. (C) As noted in ref A, several key political concerns are
surfacing in Babil as elections slip farther into the future.
Many potential voters, Sunni and Shi'a, have come to believe
that their current provincial leadership is unfit: the governor
because of his lack of education, the PC because of alleged
corruption, and the lot of them for not doing enough to improve
conditions of daily life. (Comment: The prolonged absence of
the governor, the PC chair and several PC members on the recent
hajj only reinforced the perception of officials' disregard for
duty. End comment.) For the Sunnis, a related issue is a
perception that Shi'a favoritism is depriving north Babil of its
fair share of reconstruction projects.


4. (C) As religious extremism and sectarian violence in the
province rise, partisan affiliations increasingly crystallize
along confessional lines. In this regard, with Iran continuing
to weave a web of economic ubiquity in a bid for political
influence (ref B) and with the ability to form federal regions
only a little over a year off, the more astute citizens on both
sides of that divide - Shi'a versus Sunni and Shi'a versus Shi'a
- are coming to recognize the broader implications of voting for
one party over another.


5. (S) Another worry, though with only limited resonance at this
point, concerns the implications of Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC),currently forecast for Babil in April 2007. At several
of the weekly PRT-led security coordination meetings, Deputy
Governor Hasoon Ali Hasoon and Hillah Mayor Imad Lefta al-Bayati
have claimed that the Babil security forces will not be ready to
switch from Coalition to Iraqi protection this spring. A
further deterioration in the security situation, if attributed
to politicians rather than to terrorists, would clearly have
implications at the voting booth. (Comment: Of greater import
to us is the amount of control the governor and the PC could
gain over provincial security forces following PIC, especially
if the office of IP Chief becomes politicized. End comment.)

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MITIGATING FACTORS
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6. (S) The longer the delay in setting a date for provincial
elections, the greater the chances that disillusionment and
cynicism may dissuade people from voting in the first place.
Among the Sunnis, for instance, some prominent tribal leaders
are at risk of giving up on the political process, concluding
that bias in the PC and the security forces leaves them no
choice but to take up arms themselves to protect their tribes
and neighborhoods. Similarly, growing distrust of elected
officials who further their own agendas and pocketbooks, without
real concern for the people, could convince some potential
voters simply to stay home the next time around. Security
concerns on Election Day could also diminish voter turnout,
which otherwise is likely to be relatively strong. Babil IP
Chief General Qais Hamza Aboud Al-Mamouri does not have a
detailed security plan yet for the elections but intends to
recreate the approach that won him praise from several quarters
in 2005. This plan would be based on providing IP protection
around each polling site province-wide. In the instance of
Hillah, three rings would form a multi-layer protective force:
IP surrounding each polling site and on the streets, a ring of
Iraqi Army (IA) around the outskirts of the city, and finally
Coalition patrols encircling the rest of the province.

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BABIL POLITICAL BREAKDOWN
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7. (C) Similar to most other provinces within Iraq, Babil's
political landscape comprises both strong national parties and
other more local groupings, some nothing more than loose
affiliations with sparse membership. Whenever elections do take
place, a minimum of five parties, listed below in descending
order of estimated membership and influence in Babil, can be
expected to take part:

-- Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - One
of the two main parties within the religious-Shia United Iraqi
Alliance, SCIRI currently holds most of the major power in
Babil, including the chair and 23 of 41 seats on the PC, the
governorship, and the positions of Deputy Governor and PC Chief
Engineer. However, along with uneasiness over SCIRI's strong
ties to Iran, the perceived corruption of some SCIRI officials
has left many citizens of Babil dissatisfied and looking
elsewhere for leadership. The party appears to be aware of its
vulnerabilities and will work to counter them, planning a media
strategy to support its eventual candidates and not
over-promoting its position on Shi'a autonomy for the time
being.

-- Islamic Da'wa Party (Da'wa) - As the other main party making
up the United Iraqi Alliance, Da'wa enjoys fairly strong support
in Babil. It is seen as neither as cohesive nor as well
financed as SCIRI. Rumors circling the province have led many
to believe that Ali Hassan Jabur, the Babil leader of Da'wa, has
aligned his party with the Sadrists so it too can have a strong
militant wing, similar to SCIRI's popular committees or the
former Badr Corps.

-- Iraqi National Accord (INA) - INA, led by Sabah Allawi, is
viewed by Babylonians as a moderate alternative. Its support
appears to be collapsing, however, because of perceptions that
it is too closely tied to the Coalition.

-- Iraqi Nation Party (INP) - Led by Mohammed Ali, the Sunni-led
NP is gaining some ground in Babil by making inroads among the
Shia. On a nationalistic platform, this party's message is both
moderate and non-sectarian, but it is not seen as a strong
contender in the near future for political notoriety.

Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) -The ICP is comprised mostly of
business professional and educators and is led by Dr. Ali
Ibrahim. Despite its composition, the ICP has little funding
and would not have been able to achieve its two seats on the
Babil PC in 2005 without joining forces with the INA. Because
it is viewed as the "anti-religion" party due to its name, talks
have been held about dropping the "Communist" label.


8. (C) Although the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) is not a
registered political party in Babil at this time, the Sadrists,
whether tied to Da'wa or not, are also seen as a powerful front
within the province. According to several provincial officials,
the Sadrists stand to do very well in the provincial elections
if they were officially to become a political entity and would
be primed for gaining seats on the PC and, possibly, seats of
higher power.

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AND THE WINNER IS~
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9. (C) Dr. Na'ma Jasim Hamza, the Babil Deputy Provincial
Council Chairman and a Da'wa member, ventured a guess with IPAO
as to the composition of the next PC. He anticipated that his
party would gain approximately four total seats on the PC,
instead of their current holdings of two; that the ICP would
retain their two seats; that the Sunni tribal leaders would gain
an undisclosed number of seats; and that SCIRI would lose
several of its seats. The upshot, he predicted, would be a
change from a predominantly self-serving PC to one serving all
citizens of Babil. Asked who would take the governor's seat if
the elections were held today, Dr. Na'ma did not provide a name;
however, he did hypothesize that SCIRI would probably abandon
the current incumbent (and nominal provincial party head),Salem
Saleh Mehdi al-Muslimawi. Governor Salem commands little
support beyond his home base of Al-Kifl, in the southwest corner
of Babil, and only increased his unpopularity by undertaking the
hajj this year for the third time. In Dr. Na'ma's analysis,
SCIRI believes it could get a moderate, dark horse candidate
elected, helped by Iranian money and possibly an endorsement
from the marja'iya, and then use him as a pawn to push their
agenda.


10. (C) Babil IP Chief General Qais, in a recent meeting with
Babil PRT officials, concurred that although SCIRI is losing
favor among the citizenry of Babil, its campaign strategy is
strong (ref A). He sees SCIRI as a very formidable competitor
in provincial elections. Qais anticipates that, among other
strategic moves, the party plans to use "limitless" funding from
Iran, claim credit for all notable reconstruction projects
within Babil, pay off Directors General to stay quiet, and
purchase media outlets to relay the party's campaign platforms.


11. (C) Although few specific names have been tossed around as
the next potential leaders of Babil, our contacts seem convinced
of one thing: that in contrast to the current governor, who
claims a college degree but apparently didn't finish secondary
school, the next incumbent will be forced to present legitimate
diplomas before being elected. Furthermore, they say, besides
clear proof of intelligence, contenders for leadership positions
will have to demonstrate the will to serve as uniters of Babil's
citizens in order to quell the tiresome violence in the province.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) Although many officials and locals are willing to
discuss provincial elections, each meeting is colored by Iraqi
interlocutors' feeling of disbelief that the elections will
actually take place anytime before autumn of 2007 at the
earliest. Amongst the differing opinions PRT Babil received,
one common theme remains constant: that the information given
now is speculation and will be null and void by the time
elections come to pass. Provincial Iraqi Control, anticipated
for April 1 for Babil, is likely to have an especially
significant impact on the politics of this province. At present
the shape of things to come is very much a moving target, and
any snapshot of it necessarily blurry. End comment.
HUNTER