CUBAN DELEGATION AT LASA: GOC APPROACHES ACADEMIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000913

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU
SUBJECT: CUBAN DELEGATION AT LASA: GOC APPROACHES ACADEMIA

Classified By: COM: Michael E. Parmly: For reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY: The 2007 International Congress of the
Latin American Studies Association (LASA) was held in
Montreal, Canada, September 5-8. The Cuban delegation was
the largest ever to a LASA conference and they portrayed the
successful change of venue from the U.S. to Canada as a
"victory" over U.S. policy. Most, although not all,
Cuba-related sessions were balanced in makeup and discussion.
Most Cubans were approachable to Econoff, others a bit
apprehensive. There is a fervent academic debate about
possible reforms going on. It is clear that the highest
levels of the GOC have shown at least some receptiveness to
academia. Post will report separately on the economic and
then on other issues discussed at LASA by Cuban academics.
End Summary.


2. (C) The 2007 International Congress of the Latin American
Studies Association (LASA) was held in Montreal, Canada,
September 5-8. Originally supposed to be Boston, the venue
for the conference was changed by a vote of LASA's governing
body. The reason for the change was to avoid a recurrence of
the problem of Cubans being excluded from attending the
conference in U.S. venues due to U.S. visa denials. At the
conference, the 135 scholars, researchers and academics who
made up the Cuban delegation -- the largest ever -- exploited
every opportunity to praise LASA for their decision. While
in the main conference lobby, during a conversation between
Econoff and Simon Cridland, Canadian Embassy Pol/Econ
Counselor in Havana, Cristina Diaz Lopez, Vice Rector of the
University of Havana and head of the Cuban delegation,
politely interrupted to tell Simon how much she appreciated
his embassy's assistance with the visas. She then, possibly
because of Econoff's presence, felt the need to tell Simon,
"Ganamos esta batalla" (we won this battle). Predictably,
Cuban National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon also
manipulated this issue when he delivered the conference's
keynote address on September 7. The speech was actually a
diatribe against the U.S. containing nothing worth reporting.

The Cuban Delegation
--------------


3. (C) The Cuban delegation included a large representation
of Cuban academia: Economists, anthropologists,
sociologists, writers, artists, professors, researchers, etc.
Out of the conference's 1,111 panels, 131 included
presentations by Cubans or about Cuba. Most Cuba-related
sessions were balanced in makeup and discussion. A few of
the panels, however, were clearly stacked with GOC defenders
and U.S. bashers; this was also the case with some of the
audiences. (Note: One panel was so biased against U.S.
policy that Econoff felt it necessary to express, during the
Q&A session, disappointment at the lack of balance in the
panel's exposition. Most panels, however, were quite
equitable in their discussions. End Note.)


4. (C) A good number of the panels focused on specific Cuban
issues, while others covered regional topics. The regional
or transnational issues panels conveniently provided Cuban
presenters with an excuse not to answer specific questions
about Cuba. Even with panels dealing specifically with Cuba,
when asked the hard questions about Cuba -- such as: To
economists, when are the much-debated economic reforms
coming?; to Afro-Cuban experts, what is the GOC really doing
about racism?; to sociologists and artists, why, with the
exception of dissidents, is the current civil society debate
happening outside official media channels?; etc. -- the
panelist would answer reluctantly with, "This is a question
for another panel." (Comment: Even though one could tell some
panelists would have liked to answer the question, it was
clear that panelists felt that answering would equate to
crossing a line that might cause repercussions from the GOC,
like jeopardizing their job. End Comment.)

State Security
--------------


5. (C) Contacts in Havana tell us that the Cuban delegation

HAVANA 00000913 002 OF 003


had "training" sessions prior to and in preparation for the
trip. (Comment: We speculate that the sessions, in addition
to public speaking and Powerpoint (almost every Cuban had
prepared Powerpoint slides, though unfortunately the Montreal
hotels did not have the necessary equipment),ensured that
everyone clearly understood the limits about what they should
talk about and that all were "on message." The message
clearly included the LASA "victory" on moving the venue to
Montreal. End Comment.) According to one foreign academic
expert on Cuba who was in attendance, the group also included
some "quasi-academics" who in actuality worked for GOC-state
security and were charged with keeping an eye on the rest of
the delegation. The academic hypothesized that the reason
several Cubans were no-shows at some of the conference panels
was that they had submitted bogus papers, though good enough
to be accepted by LASA and therefore a ticket into the
conference, yet were not in Montreal to present any paper,
but rather to spy on each other.

Lucrative Opportunity
--------------


6. (C) With regard to lodging, the Cuban delegation was
spread throughout Montreal, reflecting the various sources of
funding that made their trips possible. Some were funded by
the GOC, but many others were funded by various academic
foundations, NGOs, or other institutions. Accordingly, some
stayed with friends or at other cheaper locations outside of
town. International outings, for any Cuban, are an
opportunity to amass hard currency. The per diem they
receive alone can significantly improve their economic
livelihood in the island. Tomas Fernandez Robaina, a Cuban
race and gender expert from the Cuban National Library,
revealed to Econoff that after a fire burned his house in
Havana he purposely began to seek out opportunities to go
overseas. For the money, he went on extended stays to places
like Brazil, Nigeria and the U.S.

Behind the Communist Mask
--------------


7. (C) Making one-on-one contact with members of the Cuban
delegation was a very sensitive undertaking. The vast
majority were congenial, others were apprehensive and a few
were actually scared to speak to a USINT officer. In private
conversations with several Cuban academics, however, everyone
said they would welcome further contact with Econoff in
Havana, but acknowledged that permission was necessary.
(Note: The normal procedure is to request such a meeting via
diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MinRex).
After more than a year in Havana, Econoff has yet to receive
a positive response to this type of request from MinRex. End
Note.) A few even expressed their willingness to meet
without official MinRex approval, and provided a cell phone
or private email.


8. (C) There were a few Cubans who elected to stay hidden
behind the Communist/anti-Imperialist/oppressed victim mask
(these individuals preferred to project the GOC's problems
onto Econoff and USG policy, using examples like the embargo,
CIA plots, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, Puerto Rican
independence, Posada Carriles, the "five heroes" or Cuban
spies, and on and on),but the vast majority of Cubans who
interacted with Econoff soon revealed -- in private or even
in their papers and presentations -- that they are
critical-thinking human beings who believe in trying to
improve the current situation in Cuba. They acknowledge the
immensity of the country's problems, but they are not
dissidents and must therefore aim for improvement from within
the system. Most fully understand their socialist system is
highly flawed, yet idealistically believe in what it aims to
do.

Unprecedented GOC Receptiveness of Academia?
--------------


9. (C) Consistently throughout the conference, publicly and
privately, Cubans -- particularly those involved in
socioeconomic research -- were of the opinion that the GOC

HAVANA 00000913 003 OF 003


has been increasingly receptive to their input throughout the
past year. Dr. Mayra Paula Espina Prieto, from Havana's
Center for Psychological and Sociological Research (CIPS),
said in a revealing panel about Cuban social policy
challenges that, "We are living in an interesting time full
of debate over research studies." Dr. Omar Eveleny Perez
Villanueva, economist from the University of Havana's Center
for the Study of the Cuban Economy (CEEC) and who co-authored
with Harvard University's Jorge Dominguez and Lorena Barberia
the just-released -- at the LASA conference -- book "The
Cuban Economy at the Beginning of the 21st Century," told
Econoff in private that, "Raul Castro has set up a think tank
dedicated to brainstorming and evaluating possible economic
reforms in one of the floors below his office, which he had
ordered cleared and readied for that purpose." Still, they
caution that similar approaches between the GOC and academia
have taken place in the past and in the end nothing happened.



10. (C) Professor Juan Triana Cordovi, from University of
Havana's CEEC, and who has participated in such approaches
during the past 30 years (including the formulation of what
eventually became the 1995 law that allowed foreign
investment in Cuba),said that the GOC and academia are like
"doctor and patient, the GOC comes to us only when it is
really sick." He said, "Academia is doing what it always has
done, it's just that we have been almost always taken for
granted. I can tell you that some of the measures that are
being considered now are measures we recommended 12-13 years
ago." He added, however, that in his many years of
experience, the current level of GOC receptiveness is
unprecedented and this causes him to be cautiously optimistic
that "some things will actually happen." Even so, he
reiterated that history has taught him to keep expectations
low.


11. (C) Comment: There is a fervent academic debate about
possible reforms going on. This may reflect just how "sick"
the GOC really is, but it mirrors similar debates that have
taken place in other non-official sectors, such as among
artists, intellectuals, and, to a more limited extent, common
people. Academia, however, specifically the segment that
studies socioeconomic perspectives, could influence GOC
thinking and potentially short-term reform. It is clear that
the highest levels of the GOC have shown at least some
receptiveness to academia, have condoned the debate and could
possibly be promoting it. Thus far this year, the GOC has
taken tiny economic measures that are easily enacted by
decree and, at best, will have minimal impact. Whether the
GOC leadership intends to adopt and implement some of the
more structural changes being debated among academia, remains
a mystery -- we believe an unlikely one. We are getting more
signs that economic changes will take place, but it is worth
noting that, even though this may constitute a step in the
right direction, the changes being considered are minuscule
when compared to popular expectations, much less the
country's real needs. Post will report separately on the
economic and then on other issues discussed at LASA by Cuban
academics.
PARMLY