CUBA'S MASSIVE MOBILIZATION CAPACITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HAVANA 000609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA; ALSO FOR S/CRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017
TAGS: ECON PGOV PINR PREL CU
SUBJECT: CUBA'S MASSIVE MOBILIZATION CAPACITY

Classified By: COM: Michael E. Parmly: For reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite its limited resources, the GOC has
proven that, when it wants to, it can successfully mobilize
people and assets. This cable describes some examples of
this and provides a window into the existing organizational
infrastructures and capabilities. It is an open question how
many of these would survive the end of Cuba's totalitarian
rule, and then another question whether their survival would
be good for Cuba or for Cuba/U.S. relations. If we arrive at
acceptable answers to these open questions, then USG
agencies may consider tapping into them during a transitional
humanitarian assistance scenario. End Summary.


2. (C) Through the years, the GOC has demonstrated a
capacity to mobilize its organizations -- at every level, its
resources, and the population at large. The GOC's
overarching presence in every aspect of Cuban society,
combined with its totalitarian nature and its defensive
posture (with regard to the U.S.),have made it an efficient
mobilization machine. This cable describes some examples of
this and provides a window into existing organizational
infrastructures and capabilities.

Natural Disaster Preparedness
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3. (U) During the weekend of 19-20 May, a national disaster
preparedness exercise, Meteoro (meteor) 2007, took place
throughout Cuba. The goal of the exercise was to improve the
national Civil Defense System in the event of major natural
disasters, mainly hurricanes, and other catastrophes. The
system is made up of National, Provincial, and Municipal
Defense Councils which divide up the country into Defense
Zones. The organizational structure of the civil defense
system is separate from and supersedes that of the
Revolutionary Defense Committees (CDRs),which can be found
every few blocks throughout Cuba. Meteoro 2007 also included
the activation and mobilization of numerous other GOC
organizations: Command posts, units and equipment from the
FAR (Army) and MININT (Interior Ministry); firefighting,
emergency medical, and law enforcement personnel; major
logistical and transportation resources; and the population
at large.


4. (U) Most components of the civil defense system are
civilian, but are ultimately under the control of the
military. That said, most of the planning, coordination and
execution is carried out by civilians and at regional levels
-- national, provincial, and municipal civil defense councils
responsible for the various Defense Zones. Heading every
defense council is the First Secretary of the PCC (Cuban
Communist Party) at each level. Other council members come
from a mix of representatives from provincial and municipal
governments (PCC officials),CDRs, and other state
organizations.


5. (U) The civil defense system is mostly based on preventive
measures that can be taken by local authorities, directing
the general population, and using local resources. In cases
where, for instance, a rescue operation becomes necessary,
civil defense authorities coordinate with the FAR for
helicopter, amphibious craft or other required support. In
real hurricane-threat scenarios, the civil defense system has
designated entire defense zones as at-risk and been able to
evacuate all inhabitants located in those areas, sometimes in
excess of one million people. 19 civil defense councils were
activated and 7,000 people evacuated during heavy rains at
the end of May 2007 that affected areas in the central and
eastern parts of Cuba, especially the city of Camaguey.

National Defense Mobilization
--------------


6. (U) Operation Caguairan is a defense preparedness
exercise, in which Cuban armed forces and reserves, as well
as all other security-related organizations are mobilized --
essentially to defend Cuba from a U.S. military invasion.
Most recently, a massive Caguairan exercise accompanied the
"temporary" transfer of power from Fidel to Raul Castro last
August. The exercise involved the mobilization of more than

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200,000 active and reserve forces as well as their logistical
support -- shelter, food, etc. -- for periods varying between
15 and 30 days. The Caguairan execution also included a
"precautionary" increase of "preventive" security and police
control measures.

Political and "Anti-Corruption" Mobilization
--------------


7. (U) The GOC has shown the capacity to mobilize up to two
million people for political demonstrations. Such
mobilizations require the transfer of large groups of people
through a variety of means (by foot, buses, trucks, trains)
from multiple locations (different neighborhoods, workplaces,
and schools in different municipalities and provinces,
including rural locations). Most political demonstrations
require additional logistics to support the large crowds,
such as water, some food, emergency medical services, and
makeshift toilet facilities.


8. (U) The GOC has also mobilized non-military/non-civil
defense personnel for other political reasons. Beginning in
October 2005, as part of an anti-corruption drive ordered by
Fidel Castro, thousands of so-called "social workers" and
students were mobilized to take over the management and
operation of gas stations throughout the country. In a
similar anti-corruption offensive, also in 2005, FAR general
Moises Sio Wong was temporarily placed in charge of Havana
port operations.


9. (U) And in USINT's front yard, the GOC mobilized a public
works and construction team to build the flag park that
blocks the public's view of USINT's facade. They did this in
the second half of January, 2006, in direct response to
USINT's unveiling of our streaming electronic billboard: 138
flagpoles with supports and flags, plus a reviewing stand.
The flagpoles reach as high as the USINT building and, by
Cuban construction standards, were built in record time.
(Note: Average Cubans looked on in disillusionment, as their
own housing, roads and environmental quality continued to
deteriorate.)

Preventive Health Mobilization
--------------


10. (U) The GOC has for decades carried out national
vaccination campaigns, particularly for children. The
Ministry of Public Health is in charge overall since it
oversees the hospitals, clinics and medical personnel. The
Ministry of Education plays a supporting role as a good
portion of the vaccines are administered in the schools.
CDRs also administer vaccinations at the neighborhood level.


11. (U) Other mechanisms are used to mount national
preventive measures against Dengue fever or to collect blood
donations. These campaigns are good examples of "coercive
volunteerism" in Cuba. Dengue fumigation, publicity
campaigns and inspections are executed down to the
neighborhood level by the CDRs and by "volunteer" communist
youth organizations. Blood donations take place at the donor
banks belonging to the Ministry of Public Health, but the
promotion campaign to find "volunteers" is tasked to the
CDRs. A recent announcement revealed that the campaign would
be temporarily interrupted as the blood stocks are currently
full.


12. (U) As a result of the experience gained from its
overseas medical missions, the GOC has been able to develop a
capacity to rapidly deploy humanitarian assistance teams and
equipment. A good example of this was a significant Cuban
contingent deployed to Pakistan during the aftermath of a
massive earthquake last year. The teams are typically made
up of doctors, paramedics, nurses, teachers and other
professionals. The GOC transports the personnel with the
necessary equipment and provides them with logistical and
administrative support during their deployment. The GOC also
accompanies these teams with heavy security details, to
prevent defections, and political activists, to ensure that
whatever assistance is rendered scores a requisite amount of
propaganda value for the regime.


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Food Distribution and Humanitarian Aid
--------------


13. (U) The Cuban rationing system reaches every corner of
the island and constitutes an already-existing network for
the distribution of humanitarian aid to the Cuban population.
The system falls under the Ministry of Domestic (Interior)
Commerce but involves imported as well as domestically
produced food. Food is imported through state-firm ALIMPORT,
while food produced in Cuba falls under the purview of the
Ministries of Agriculture and Food Industry. Distribution is
carried out by trucks and trains from a variety of sources.
Although many belong to the Ministry of Transportation,
others come from other GOC agencies or companies, and some --
pre-1959 trucks -- even belong to private citizens.


14. (SBU) Other potential means of distribution are the
networks used by United Nations agencies for the
implementation of their programs (Food and Agriculture
Organization, World Food Program, UN Development Program, and
UNICEF). These agencies operate throughout the island and
have established working relationships with Cubans -- GOC and
non-GOC -- with directed but nonetheless key roles in the
transportation and distribution networks.

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Comments:
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15. (S) CAFC II and civilian-military exercises that have
rehearsed delivering emergency USG assistance to a
post-Castro Cuba have grappled with the question of Cuban
distribution networks. One problem is to determine how much
of Cuba's crumbling infrastructure and vehicle fleet is in
working order. With all its problems, however, Cuba has a
creaky but functioning infrastructure that has managed,
albeit with considerable leakage throughout, to deliver
enough food for Cubans to, as they call it, "get by."
Current USG planning focuses on building capacity to
"independently" deliver aid. If only USG and other donor
assets are used, even at a later phase when USG-led efforts
could bring vast quantities of aid to Cuba, such aid will
only reach a minority of Cubans. In contrast, by tapping
into the existing Cuban infrastructure -- and the Cubans who
know how it works -- aid could potentially reach all 11
million Cubans. Our goal in such an effort should be to
create the conditions that would enable use of every
available truck in Cuba, whether it belongs to the GOC or not.


16. (S) A second problem is to determine how much of the
communist mobilization system that survives can be trusted to
work with us and with a transitional leadership. We believe
that a post-Castro Cuba will require some level of
"debaathification." We would expect, for example, that CDRs
and other conduits for totalitarian rule should be
dismantled, as Oswaldo Paya puts it, "brick by brick."
Another realistic assumption, however, is that a legitimate
Cuban transition government -- one that meets CAFC II and
Helms-Burton conditions, and requests aid from the U.S. --
would also carry out such clean up on its own. To meet the
conditions, CDRs will have gone out of business and/or
morphed into some form of de-politicized organization that is
acceptable to the Cuban transition government and the USG.
We would expect the same to happen with other GOC
organizations with which the USG would consider cooperating
during a US-led humanitarian relief effort. We therefore
suggest not completely discounting some form of the existing
Cuban infrastructure when the time comes.
PARMLY