Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HAVANA402
2007-04-25 10:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
US Interests Section Havana
Cable title:  

CUBAN DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY SPELLS A-R-R-O-G-A-N-T

Tags:  PREL CU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
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RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000402 

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DEPT FOR WHA FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL CU
SUBJECT: CUBAN DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY SPELLS A-R-R-O-G-A-N-T

REF: OSLO 397

HAVANA 00000402 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: COM Michael Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000402

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA FRONT OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PREL CU
SUBJECT: CUBAN DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY SPELLS A-R-R-O-G-A-N-T

REF: OSLO 397

HAVANA 00000402 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: COM Michael Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) The Cuban regime trotted Fidel Castro out for a
meeting with visiting Chinese Politburo member Wu Guanzheng,
following soon after Foreign Minister Perez Roque's visit to
China. Perez Roque also visited India and used Cuba's
presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to obtain a NAM
statement critical of the release of Luis Posada Carriles
from a U.S. court. The regime is still trying to build on
Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos's visit, and received the
Deputy Foreign Minister of Norway, who took a Moratinos-esque
conciliatory approach to the GOC. The Iranian Foreign
Minister is in Havana following right on the heels of the
high-level Chinese delegation, which departed April 24 after
getting its feet wet at Varadero Beach. As if to ask the USG
if it wants to play the game on the regime's terms, the Cuban
Interior Ministry offered to deport to the U.S. an AMCIT
serving time in a long-languishing money-laundering case. We
will proceed to accept the criminal, but do not want Cuba or
any other country to think that there is any quid-pro-quo.
End Summary.


2. (C) Cuba's Saturday April 21 state-run newspapers showed
still photographs of Chinese Politburo representative Wu
Guanzheng meeting with Fidel Castro, who dressed in an
athletic warm-up suit, along with an official photo of a
one-on-one of Wu and Raul Castro, the latter in a business
suit. Miami evening TV talk shows aired footage from Chinese
media of the same meeting, which had no sound, but subtitles
in Chinese. Fidel Castro appeared much the same as he did
when he was videotaped receiving Hugo Chavez in late January:
Withered, the "deer-in-the-headlights" look in the eyes,
able to carry on some conversation from a chair, then stand
up for an embrace at the end. (Comment: No audio is an
indication that Castro was probably incoherent; although his
very presence in front of the camera is still a powerful
message regardless of what he might have said. We are
reasonably certain that the Chinese transacted their
substantive business with Raul Castro; the imagery of the
Fidel Castro segment tells the world that the hard line is as

hard as ever and reform is not on the table. End Comment.)


3. (C) Cuba's active diplomacy took Foreign Minister Perez
Roque to India, Vietnam and China, with two of those three
visits reciprocated in Havana. India is already an investor
in Cuba's offshore oil exploration, and has just signed on to
an agreement of mutual support for foreign ministries. At
each stop, Cuban media reported Perez Roque winning from his
counterpart some kind of message of support for Cuba's
position vis-a-vis the Posada Carriles case, as well as for
release of the five Cubans (always referred to as "The Five
Heroes of the Republic") imprisoned in the USA for espionage.
The Cuban Foreign Ministry also took advantage of its
position as president of the NAM to issue a statement on
behalf of the whole NAM that criticizes the USG for releasing
Posada Carriles. Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki, in Havana
on April 24, added his voice of anti-terrorism authority to
the criticism of Posada's release.


4. (C) As Embassy Oslo reported (Reftel),Deputy Foreign
Minister Raymond Johansen visited Havana in mid-April, the
week after Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos was here.
Johansen followed Moratinos' lead in taking a conciliatory
approach to the Cuban regime and not seeing any dissidents
while he was here. Norwegian Charge Tore Holvik protested to
us on April 24 that Johansen had "insisted to the Cubans"
that they "accept" the simultaneous visit of Norway's MFA
head of human rights. This individual, Holvik said, was able
to see both official Cubans and a number of dissidents.


5. (C) In U.S. - Cuba relations, the month of April has
featured Luis Posada Carriles, a case that has generated the
full blast of regime media output: Special TV magazine
shows; newspaper reports and editorials signed by Fidel
Castro; constant radio announcements; public service
announcements between innings of the telecasts of the Cuban
equivalent of the World Series; and messages of solidarity

HAVANA 00000402 002.3 OF 002


from every Cuban regime sympathizer in the world. And out of
nowhere, the Interior Ministry called in USINT's Drug
Interdiction Specialist, to offer up an arrested American
Citizen for deportation to the U.S. to be prosecuted for
money laundering. This is a case that had been kicking
around for over a year, and for no reason related to the case
itself, the Cubans put it on the table (Septel - NOTAL).


6. (C) Comment: Our sense is that the GOC's strategy to deal
with its own uncertainty regarding Fidel and Raul Castro's
leadership is to project a robust international image, always
taking the offensive on every issue. Perez Roque
communicated this arrogant attitude to CODEL Flake/Delahunt
last December: "We're on a roll, with macroeconomic numbers
all going up, and friends all over the world, and so on. If
you want to deal with us on our terms, fine; otherwise, we
don't need you." Dealing with Cuba on its terms means that
we work more closely on drugs, alien smuggling and
counter-terrorism, while Cuba otherwise waits for opponents
of trade sanctions to tear them down from within the USA.
Needless to say, we don't accept this view of the world. The
reality, which so many who ply the Havana circuit can't
easily see through, thanks to the distorted Cuban media
prism, is that the U.S. economy is the one that is booming
and that a third-world basket case like Cuba needs us much
more than we need them. The Castro dictatorship has done
nothing lately to earn any new attention or legitimacy; the
fact that it wins some from Spain or Norway or others in the
third world has to do with NAM and UN votes or probably just
plain anti-Americanism. The latter might even explain some
of the European behavior too.
PARMLY