GERMANY ON CUBA/EU AFTER MORATINOS VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 000355

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM CU EUN
SUBJECT: GERMANY ON CUBA/EU AFTER MORATINOS VISIT

Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) German Charge Michael Klepsch told Pol-Econ Counselor
April 11 that EU embassies in Havana this week would be
sending in their on-the-ground observations to the EU's
COLAT, at which Spain was expected to report on Foreign
Minister Moratinos' visit and try to sell a new approach to
Cuba. Klepsch, representing the EU presidency, predicted
that Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, The Netherlands and
Sweden would object to EU-wide political-level contact with
Cuba, but that Spain would push hard with the others, who
tend to see dialog for its own sake as better than no dialog.
Klepsch said that Spain would have until May's COLAT to
demonstrate that engagement with the GOC yielded results.
Otherwise the EU would find it hard to change its common
position, which links political-level engagement to
improvement in human rights.


2. (C) Klepsch's assessment of Cuba's human rights
performance was not too dissimilar from our own: Certain
overt and visible measures of repression are slightly relaxed
(fewer overall political prisoners and fewer acts of
repudiation),but the essential police-state apparatus is
intact and fundamentally unchanged. He added that he did not
expect the Cuban government to release political prisoners
immediately, but might do so in the next month as a way to
give Spain something to work with in the EU. Klepsch
predicted that such releases would be of prisoners whose
sentences were completed in any case, so not a great
humanitarian gesture.


3. (C) Pol-Econ Counselor pressed Klepsch on EU-wide
endorsement of a Fidel-to-Raul Castro succession, which the
USG viewed as potentially the most harmful possible outcome
of Moratinos's visit. Klepsch said European governments did
not see it the same way, preferring instead to deal with the
reality of Raul Castro succeeding his brother in power.
Pol-Econ Counselor acknowledged the reality of Raul
inheriting that power, but said countries had a choice:
"They could suck up to Raul Castro or hold back full
recognition until there is a process that involves
consultation with the Cuban people over their future."
Klepsch's reply referred to the conditions imposed by Cuban
Foreign Minister Perez Roque on the new relationship with
Spain: "Mutual respect," and a political dialog that does not
raise internal Cuban issues that Cuba does not want on the
table. As an example of Cuban tenacity on these matters,
Klepsch said the GOC was demarching the German government to
send no official representatives to an April 24 conference in
Berlin on Cuban human rights/democracy, hosted by the Adenaur
Foundation and two Czech-based NGOs.


4. (C) Comment: We are frustrated that this un-enforced
common position is all we have to work with, but believe that
objective facts about Cuba should make the case for resisting
an enhanced EU/Cuba relationship. The GOS and GOC, now
allies in this endeavor, can be expected to make a
glass-half-full argument: That repression is on the wane and
that Cuba under Raul Castro will be amenable to reform if
only Europeans would treat the regime with respect. The
April 24 conference in Berlin will be an excellent
opportunity, in the heart of Europe, to report exactly the
opposite: The Cuban police state is as cruel and
undemocratic as ever, Raul Castro is no reformer, and no
self-respecting European government should be fooled by
cosmetic human rights gestures.
PARMLY