CUBA/SPAIN: MORATINOS VISIT CAUSES HARM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000332

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR AND WHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM CU SP
SUBJECT: CUBA/SPAIN: MORATINOS VISIT CAUSES HARM

REF: A. HAVANA 322


B. MADRID 629 (NOTAL)

HAVANA 00000332 001.7 OF 002


Classified By: COM Michael E. Parmly; Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos'
high-profile visit to Cuba, which ended April 3, gave a boost
to the Cuban regime, at the expense of Cuba's democratic
opposition. To the extent that Cuba and Spain have created a
Human Rights "mechanism," it does not appear to obligate the
Cuban regime to take any action to ease its totalitarian
rule, such as releasing political prisoners. Reactions from
Cuban civil society have been harsh:

-- Key dissident leaders Oswaldo Paya and Martha Beatriz
Roque, as well as the Damas de Blanco, have turned down an
April 4 meeting with Javier Sandomingo, who stayed behind
after Moratinos and the rest of his delegation departed;

-- These and other dissidents have issued public declarations
of their disappointment, emphasizing that this was a lost
opportunity to push the regime hard to release political
prisoners;

-- Miriam Leyva, a Dama de Blanco and former Cuban MFA
official, told COM that the Spanish objective was to lock in
existing business ventures, including some debt
restructuring, before the inevitable American business
onslaught that will accompany a genuine transition.

European representatives sat on the sidelines and watched the
Spanish carry on as if there were no EU "common position."
One exception was Slovakia, which joined us in organizing a
live videoconference between Cuban youth dissidents and
veterans of the 1989 "Velvet Revolution." End Summary.


2. (U) The GOC made a big show of the Moratinos visit and
featured it as the lead item in their state-controlled media
on April 2-3. TV footage highlighted the Spanish delegation
visiting the Latin American School of Medicine, touring
Havana, sitting with all smiling faces across a negotiating
table, and in a presidential reception room. The two
principal interlocutors were Foreign Minister Felipe Perez
Roque, and Vice President Carlos Lage, with the former
standing side by side with Moratinos for a joint press
statement on Tuesday afternoon, April 3. Perez Roque went
out of his way to emphasize that the two countries met as
equals, and showed mutual respect. Moratinos also met Raul
Castro, and passed him a handwritten get-well message for
Fidel Castro from King Juan Carlos. Raul Castro dressed in
civilian clothing for the occasion, a departure from his
usual practice.


3. (C) The two sides announced creation of a "Human Rights
Mechanism," which will meet yearly and .... meet yearly.
According to Moratinos, any and every issue was on the table.
According to Perez Roque, no human rights issues in Cuba have
any business being discussed in that forum, since human
rights in Cuba are a domestic issue, and the ground rules for
Spain/Cuba rapprochement disallow interference in each
other's internal affairs. Both sides also agreed that Spain
could give bilateral assistance to Cuba, with no political
conditions -- which overcomes Fidel Castro's rejection of
European Union assistance, dating back to the EU sanctions
imposed after Castro's crackdown on dissent in the Spring of

2003.

--------------
DISSIDENTS DISSED:
--------------


4. (C) The key leaders of the Cuban democratic opposition are
disappointed that Moratinos did not meet with them during his
visit. All but Cuesta Morua and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo (each
of whom is a one-man dissident organization) turned down
Spain's consolation prize offer: A Wednesday afternoon,
April 4, meeting with Spanish MFA Latin Americas Director
Javier Sandomingo.

-- Oswaldo Paya told us that "If the Spanish want to prop-up
the Cuban dictatorship, why don't they just come out and say
so; it would be more honest." Paya said the Spanish did not

HAVANA 00000332 002.7 OF 002


contact him in advance of the visit, that the last-minute
offer to see Sandomingo was insulting, and that he would not
go. He added that he would issue a public statement after
the delegation departed.

-- Martha Beatriz Roque (MBR) also told us that she would
turn down the consolation prize, as would her associates in
the "Assembly to Promote Civil Society," Felix Bonne and Rene
Gomez Manzano. MBR commented on the visit as a lost
opportunity, although she thought the regime might, next
week, release a few prisoners to allow the Spanish to claim
credit. Her view was that if they did that, it would be
prisoners whose sentences were complete in any case.
Finally, MBR said that Sandomingo called her a second time on
Wednesday; she responded by inviting him to her house in a
personal capacity (remembering their friendship when he was
DCM here in the mid-1990s),but under no circumstances would
she meet at the Spanish Embassy. The Spanish Ambassador, she
added, is a communist, regime sympathizer.

-- Laura Pollan, representative of the "Damas de Blanco,"
told us she would not meet with Sandomingo after the rest of
the delegation departed. On the 30th of March, Pollan had
issued a public letter to Moratinos, on behalf of the Damas,
urging that he use his visit to press for the release of all
political prisoners.

-- Oscar Espinosa Chepe (economist and released Political
Prisoner) and his wife, Miriam Leyva (Dama de Blanco,
independent journalist, and Former MFA official) told COM and
Pol-Econ Counselor that the Spanish visit was all about
business. They took the view that the Spanish had a
privileged business position now and wanted to preserve it
before a genuine transition began, at which time American
businesses would be expected to come in and wipe the Spanish
off the map. Leyva said she is writing a scathing article
for publication with an independent outlet.

Comment: We saw a report that claimed debt restructuring as
an objective of the Spanish visit. The "El Pais"
correspondent has commented to us that too tough a policy
from Madrid tends to rattle the Spanish businessmen here, and
that even Aznar softened his policies somewhat after the
businessmen complained. End Comment.

-- Jorge Oliveira, a released political prisoner, told COM
April 3 that he would expect the GOC, "As part of the deal,"
to release a number -- 10, 20, even 30 -- political prisoners
in the days/weeks ahead, but none of that would address the
fundamental human rights problems in Cuba.

-- Aurelio Bachiller (independent labor leader) was not even
called by Sandomingo. He told us that if he were, he would
have complained that Spanish companies conspire with the
Cuban government to abuse Cuban workers--paying them slave
wages and denying them bargaining rights.


5. (C) Non-Spanish Europeans were almost completely shut out
of this visit. According to Czech Charge d'Affaires, Vit
Korselt, there was no pre-visit huddle or consultation with
the EU embassies represented in Havana. They found out the
same time the public found out about the Moratinos visit.
Both Korselt and Slovak DCM Jurkevic believed that the Cuban
government would release some small symbolic number of
political prisoners, as a way to give the Spanish some tools
to fight against post-trip resistance inside the EU.
Jurkevic, to his credit, took part in the live
video-conference that USINT and Embassy Bratislava organized
on April 3, connecting Cuban youth dissidents with veterans
of the 1989 "Velvet Revolution."


6. (C) Comment: Moratinos' visit causes considerable damage,
both to US objectives in Havana and to the democratic
opposition. For the Spanish foreign minister to make himself
"a good friend" of the Cuban leadership provides the Raul-led
clique with a sense of legitimacy and respectability that no
amount of money from Hugo Chavez or investment from China
could buy. We will work with the dissident movement here to
help them magnify the impact of whatever grievances they air,
and then look to the Department and our fellow embassies in
EU capitals to work the Europeans to control the damage.
PARMLY