INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT

S E C R E T HARARE 000938

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS ZI
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT
PRACTICES--INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING

REF: SECSTATE 133921

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren under 1.4 b/d


1. (U) This cable responds to Reftel.


2. (S) Questions and Responses.


A. Watchlisting:
-- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many
records does the watchlist contain, and how many are
terrorist-related?

The GOZ does not have a master watchlist or any central
repository of watchlisted individuals. Each border post or
POE has a list or series of lists, which are maintained by
either the Immigration and/or Central Intelligence
Organization (CIO) representative at the post. There is no
standard for maintaining, updating, sharing or enforcing the
watchlist.

-- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist?

Per above, there is no standard. At most major border posts
and Harare International Airport, the list is maintained by
CIO.


B. Traveler Information Collection:
-- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates,
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in
the country?

The Immigration service has a standard form that all
non-resident travelers are required to complete upon entry
into Zimbabwe. It asks for basic biographic data, passport
data, host and residence in Harare, residence in home
country, prior criminal convictions, and amount of foreign
currency brought into Zimbabwe. No traveler information is
collected upon departure.

-- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry
and for domestic flights?

Entry by air and land requires the same immigration form.
There are no sea POEs for Zimbabwe. There is no requirement
for identification on domestic flights.

-- Who collects traveler information?

Traveler information is collected by an Immigration official
at POE.

-- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share
that information with foreign governments?

The immigration service will not directly share that
information with foreign governments. If police CID or the
CIO request the information from Immigration, it may/may then
be shared with some foreign governments via Interpol or
existing bilateral relationships.

-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is
this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes
to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing
treaties to share PNR data?

Flight manifests on all incoming flights are provided to CIO
and Immigration for screening upon arrival. This data is not
collected and stored for future access. No treaties exist to
share this data.

-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems
(APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems
(IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been
effective at detecting other national security threats, such
as wanted criminals?

None of these are in place in Zimbabwe.


C. Border Control and Screening:
-- Does the host government employ software to screen
travelers of security interest?

There are no immigration computers at any POE except for
Harare Airport, which has an IOM-provided immigration
computer system, and Beitbridge land border crossing (South
Africa),which uses an internally designed immigration
computer system. No other POEs are computerized. No
specific software is used to screen travelers.


-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only
non-host-country nationals? What is the frequency of
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information
is not actually recorded electronically? What is the
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and
exits?

Only at Harare International Airport are any travelers
tracked electronically. At the airport, passengers do not
appear to be waived through, however, VIPs are often met by
security officials who expedite their processing. Corruption
is rampant in the immigration service, thus the process of
waiving through travelers at land POEs may be greater. The
number and frequency is impossible to estimate.

-- Do host government border control officials have the
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this
authority (legislation, mandates, etc).

Immigration officials rarely have access to criminal data.
If an individual is to be detained or denied entry on grounds
of criminal data, that will be done by police or CIO
officials at the POE.

-- What are the host government's policies on questioning,
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting
themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which
agency would question, detain, or deny entry?

In cases of suspected alien smuggling, fraudulent travel
documents, or insufficient means to remain in Zimbabwe, the
CIO has been diligent in questioning, detaining, and
deporting suspicious travelers. If an individual has
fraudulent documents or simply is suspected of being involved
in alien smuggling, the CIO will request that the police
detain the traveler until he or she can be deported on a
return flight. At land POEs, the traveler is simply denied
entry.

-- How well does information sharing function within the
host government, e.g., if there is a determination that
someone with a valid host-government visa is later identified
with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved
internally?

Information sharing within the GOZ is ad hoc and generally
unreliable. In the case of a suspected terrorist, the CIO
would likely handle the issue internally, given the level of
corruption within the police and immigration.


D. Biometric Collection:
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs?
What are the systems and models used?

There are no biometric systems.

-- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the
host government target a specific population for collection
(i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection
systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the
biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport)
or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented
against a database of known biometrics)?

N/A. There are no biometric systems.

-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints?

N/A

-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?

There are no procedures for fingerprinting travelers.
Although it has not been done in recent history, there is a
police station at or near most border posts, which could
conceivably fingerprint an arriving passenger if he or she
were arrested upon arrival on a criminal matter, but
fingerprinting is not a standard procedure even for arrests.

-- Which agency is responsible for the host government's
fingerprint system?

There is no GOZ fingerprint system. The police maintain some
fingerprints on file, as does the CIO. They do not share and

neither system is searchable.

-- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS,
UK1 or RTID compliant?

Unknown.

-- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which
agency collects the fingerprints?

Unknown.


E. Passports:
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport
containing biometric information, does the host government
share the public key required to read the biometric
information with any other governments? If so, which
governments?

The GOZ does not share passport data with any other
government.

-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for
full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?

Replacement passports are issued for full validity periods.

-- Does the host government have special
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen
multiple times?

It is extremely difficult and a lengthy process to obtain
replacement passports in Zimbabwe. Replacements may take
over a year to acquire, thus, &habitual8 losers are rare.
No known system is in place to track or deal with habitual
losers.

-- Are replacement passports of the same or different
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration
passports)?

There is no difference between regular passports and
replacements.

-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?

&Emergency8 passports do not exist as a separate entity.
The GOZ only issues regular passports, which conceivably
could be done on an emergency basis for someone with correct
political connections.

-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?

No increase has been noticed.

-- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic
number series or otherwise identified?

There is no special identification included in a passport
that is used to replace a lost or stolen passport.


F. Fraud Detection

- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are
instances of fraud involving documents followed up?

The GOZ is attempting to improve its efforts at detecting
fraudulent travel documents and will refuse entry to a
traveler if suspicions exist. Generally, once a document is
determined to be fraudulent, the traveler is detained and
deported as soon as possible. Follow-up investigation on the
source of a fraudulent document is generally not done.

-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken
out of circulation, or made harder to use?

Older passports, which have less security features, are taken
out of circulation only when they expire. Due to the
difficulty in obtaining new passports, there is no system for
replacing older passports while they are still valid.


G. Privacy and Data Security

-- What are the country's policies on records related to the

questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered
at points of entry into the country? How are those records
stored, and for how long?

Record keeping is not standardized between services
(Immigration, police, CIO) and often is not documented at
land POEs. There are no standardized reporting or storage
procedures.

-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or
use of sensitive data?

In practice, there are no restrictions. Police and CIO can
collect and use any information or data that they wish.

-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public
on the implementation of new databases of records?

There is no requirement. Databases, if they exist, are not a
matter of public record.

-- Are there any laws relating to security features for
government computer systems that hold personally identifying
information?

No.

-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access
data that homeland security agencies hold about them?

Citizens and non-citizens have no rights to access
information or records held on them by CIO.

-- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about
enforcement actions)?

Unknown.

-- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the
government to obtain these types of data?

No.


H. Immigration Data Bases:

-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track
entries and exits?

The Harare International Airport has an IOM-provided
immigration database, which is not connected to any other
POE. The Beitbridge land POE also has an internally designed
computer immigration system, which is not connected to any
other POE. There is no interface between the Beitbridge
system and the Harare Airport system. No other POEs are
computerized.

-- Is the immigration database available at all ports of
entry (POEs)?

No.

-- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but
not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will
receive the tool?

The Harare airport is computerized because IOM gave them the
computers. This was a contentious issue and required years
of negotiation. Immigration officials have refused to allow
computer systems to be put in place at other border posts.
The Beitbridge computer system, designed within Immigration
and thus not auditable by other GOZ entities, was presented
to the GOZ as a pilot program that would eventually be
expanded to encompass all POEs. In reality, there are no
plans to expand the system.

-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the
systems? For example, limited training, power brownouts,
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.?

No interface with other border posts, frequent power outages,
rampant corruption, no oversight on data entry and usage.

-- How often are national immigration databases updated?

There are no national immigration databases.


I. Watchlist and Information Sharing:

-- Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen
travelers at POEs?

Each POE has a separate system. At Harare International
Airport, a small notebook with handwritten names is
maintained by a CIO officer at the departure terminal,
apparently to monitor activities of the opposition and
dissidents. At other land POEs, it is a list or stack of
lists, that may or may not be present at the border crossing.
Immigration and other border security officials are expected
to remember and recognize the names of watchlisted
individuals at most POEs.

-- What domestic sources of information populate the
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons,
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants?

CIO, Immigration and police CID contribute to the watchlist.

-- What international watchlists do the host government use
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists,
UN, etc.?

No international watchlists are used. If CID receives a name
from Interpol or CIO obtains a name through a bilateral
relationship, it determines whether to include it on the
Zimbabwean watchlist. Most watchlisted names appear to be
related to internal Zimbabwean politics.

-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist
between host government and its neighbors?

None.


J. Biometrics:

-- Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air,
land, sea)? If no, does host government have plans to
install such a system?

No. GOZ has no plans to install any biometric systems.

-- If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not
all, how does the host government decide which POEs will
receive the tool?

N/A

-- What biometric technologies, if any, does the host
government use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial
recognition, iris recognition, hand geometry, retinal
identification, DNA-based identification, keystroke dynamics,
gait analysis? Are the systems ICAO compliant?

None used.


-- Does the host government issue a machine-readable
passport containing biometric information? If e-Passports
are issued, what biometric information is included on the
document, i.e. fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc?
If not, does host government plan to issue a biometric
document in the future? When?

No biometric data is included in Zimbabwean passports. No
plans exist for including biometric data in near future.


K. Identifying Appropriate Partners:
Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether host
government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing.
Considerations include whether host government watchlists may
include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to
terrorists),and whether host governments would share or use
U.S. watchlist data inappropriately, etc.
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement
with the U.S?

Relations between the U.S. and Zimbabwe are poor and it is
unlikely we could enter into an agreement at this time.

-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and
nondisclosure of information?

While Zimbabwe has a relatively sophisticated legal system,
it is corrupt and subject to political influence. Therefore,
it is unlikely to reliably provide safeguards for the
protection and nondisclosure of information.

-- How much information sharing does the host country do
internally? Is there a single consolidated database, for
example? If not, do different ministries share information
amongst themselves?

Zimbabwe does not have a consolidated data base. It is
unlikely ministries share information among themselves.
Information sharing, to our knowledge, is done informally
through the Joint Operations Command (JOC),comprised of the
State Minister for Security, the head of the CIO, the heads
of the security forces and the head of the Zimbabwe Republic
Police.

-- How does the country define terrorism? Are there legal
statutes that do so?

The Suppression of Foreign and International Terrorism Act
became law in August 2007. Terrorism is defined as "(a)the
doing of any act inside or outside Zimbabwe against the
government of any State which, if committed against the
Government of Zimbabwe, would constitute an act of
insurgency, banditry, sabotage or terrorism; or (b) engaging
in mercenary activity."
DHANANI