Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HARARE685
2007-08-02 09:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

WELSHMAN NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS, MDC SPLIT

Tags:  PREL PGOV ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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R 020927Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1743
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1665
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1535
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1669
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0315
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0935
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1298
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RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4143
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RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2159
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0790
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1886
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000685 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN AND L.DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: WELSHMAN NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS, MDC SPLIT

REF: HARARE 552

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren under 1.4 b/d

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000685

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN AND L.DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: WELSHMAN NCUBE ON SADC NEGOTIATIONS, MDC SPLIT

REF: HARARE 552

Classified By: Pol/Econ Chief Glenn Warren under 1.4 b/d

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Welshman Ncube, MDC pro-Senate faction
secretary-general and one of the MDC negotiators in the

SIPDIS
SADC-sponsored Zimbabwe talks, told us he was "cautiously
optimistic" about the talks. Contrary to news reports,
ZANU-PF was still engaged and discussions had taken place on
a new constitution. If a national election takes place as
scheduled, Ncube believed that only a united or coalition MDC
could prevail. Although several days earlier, Ncube's MDC
faction had announced it would go it alone and field its own
candidates, Ncube said the pro-Senate faction was still
willing to negotiate a coalition agreement. Turning to
elections, Ncube said U.S. assistance was important. He
though U.S. assistance had been slanted toward the other
faction. End Summary.


2. (C) Visiting Staffdel Phelan and polecon chief met with
Ncube on July 31.

--------------
Focus on SADC
--------------


3. (C) Noting news reports that ZANU-PF was not seriously
engaged in the Mbeki-led SADC negotiations, Ncube said that
in fact substantial progress had been made on negotiating a
new constitution. Negotiators were using the 2002 draft
constitution negotiated by Ncube and ZANU-PF Minister of
Justice Patrick Chinimasa that was subsequently rejected by
their superiors.


4. (C) Acknowledging that President Mugabe, in his address
to Parliament last week and in other speeches had maintained
a new constitution was not required and that any necessary
changes could be made through Amendment 18 (Ref),Ncube
maintained that this was political posturing. South African
mediators had made clear in the talks that the proposals
contained in Amendment 18 should be considered in the context
of the negotiations, and that it would be bad faith for
Mugabe and ZANU-PF to move unilaterally in Parliament for its
adoption.


5. (C) Ncube was "cautiously optimistic" about the SADC

talks. ZANU-PF had not walked out and had made some
compromises. At the beginning of the talks, ZANU-PF had
promised to negotiate in good faith. He pointed out that at
the opening of Parliament, the Tsvangirai-led faction had
attended for the first time, and Mugabe in his remarks had
not criticized the MDC.


6. (C) Ncube credited continuous pressure by the U.S. and EU
for forcing Mugabe into the SADC negotiations. According to
Ncube, Mugabe knows that the West blames him for having
brought Zimbabwe to the brink of destruction, while he would
view his legacy as having stood up to imperialism. Any
solution to the Zimbabwean crisis, therefore, would have to
come from Africa so that Mugabe could say he had stood up to
the West and Africans had helped him solve Zimbabwe's
problems.


HARARE 00000685 002 OF 003



7. (C) Finally, Ncube opined that if negotiations leading to
elections were successful, elections could not reasonably be
held in March. Additional time would be necessary to
implement constitutional and electoral changes to create a
level electoral playing field.

--------------
Decision to Go It Alone Not Final
--------------


8. (C) Ncube reviewed the history of the MDC split. He
argued that negotiators had signed a coalition agreement in
April under which sitting parliamentarians would keep their
seats in the next elections, and there would be a 50-50
allocation to each faction of candidacies for ZANU-PF-held
seats and proportional distribution of ministers under a new
government. Tsvangirai's faction then insisted on a new
agreement that would provide for a nominating process for all
seats, including those currently held by the pro-Senate
faction.


9. (C) Ncube admitted that the Tsvingirai faction was
stronger. Nevertheless, to defeat Mugabe would require both
factions working together. He and faction president Arthur
Mutambara had said they were open to further negotiations;
Tsvingirai had not indicated, however, any interest. With

SIPDIS
time to elections running out, Ncube said his faction felt it
had no choice but to strike out on its own. Ncube stated his
faction, at this point in time, was still open to
negotiations to achieve a coalition. The ball was in
Tsvangirai's court.

SIPDIS


10. (C) According to Ncube, the absence of an MDC coalition
would not directly affect the SADC negotiations. He and
anti-Senate secretary-general Tendai Biti would continue to
work well together. He believed the South Africans would
ignore the internal MDC problems for now and continue with
the negotiations.

--------------
U.S. Assistance Crucial
--------------


11. (C) Ncube was appreciative of U.S. assistance to
democratic forces in Zimbabwe. He thought the U.S. could
continue to play an important role through voter education
and strenthening election capability and suggested this could
be done through SADC. Ncube also commented that he thought
U.S. assistance in the past had been slanted toward the
anti-Senate faction.

--------------
Comment
--------------


12. (C) We believe that Mugabe is not genuinely interested
in negotiations, currently intends to stand for election, and
intends to insure that he wins. Part of his reelection and
succession plan is Amendment 18 which, inter alia, would
increase the size of Parliament and gerrymander districts.
An acid test of ZANU-PF's willingness to negotiate with the
MDC through SADC will be whether it tries to push the
amendment through the new session of Parliament, or whether
the substance of the amendment is revised as a consequence of
the South African talks.


13. (C) As to the MDC split, there is no question that the

HARARE 00000685 003 OF 003


Tsvangirai faction has the lion's share of grass roots

SIPDIS
support. Nevertheless, a split MDC (especially one in whose
leaders engage in mutual mudslinging) will play into Mugabe's
hands and foster voter apathy. The announced decision of the
pro-Senate faction to go it alone was an effort to force
Tsvingirai and company to negotiate and make concessions.

SIPDIS
Mutambara, Ncube, and their followers are hoping Tsvangirai
will conclude he needs them to have a good chance of winning.
However, although most MDC members and parliamentarians from
both sides would like to see a coalition, the personal animus
between Tsvangirai and Ncube does not augur well. End
Comment.
DHANANI