Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HARARE627
2007-07-12 12:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

THE MDC VIEW OF THE MBEKI TALKS

Tags:  PREL PGOV ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000627 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN AND L.DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: THE MDC VIEW OF THE MBEKI TALKS

REF: A) PRETORIA 2209 B) HARARE 552

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000627

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN AND L.DOBBINS
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/09/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: THE MDC VIEW OF THE MBEKI TALKS

REF: A) PRETORIA 2209 B) HARARE 552

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

--------------
Summary
--------------

1. (C) Tendai Biti, secretary-general of the MDC anti-Senate
faction, told Poleconchief July 11 that South African
mediators were furious that ZANU-PF negotiators had failed to
travel to South Africa last week for SADC-sponsored talks
under the auspices of South African president Thabo Mbeki.
Biti and fellow MDC negotiator Welshman Ncube took advantage
of the absence of the ZANU-PF representatives to brief the
South Africans on what they see as the GOZ's efforts to avoid
a negotiated resolution to the Zimbabwean crisis. Biti was
cautiously optimistic about the talks. He believed Mbeki was
determined to broker an agreement and that his mediation team
was informed and capable. Despite the MDC split, he and
Ncube were working well together in the negotiation process.
The MDC was preparing for elections, but absent an agreement
resulting in a level electoral playing field, the MDC was
prepared to boycott the election and take to the streets.
End Summary.

--------------
South Africans Steamed
--------------


2. (C) Biti and Ncube traveled to South Africa last week to
engage in the next round of talks following agreement on an
agenda in mid-June (Ref A). According to Biti, the South
African mediation team (Local Government minister Sydney
Mufamadi, Director General in the Presidency Reverend Frank
Chikane, and legal advisor Mujanku Gumbi) was furious when
ZANU-PF negotiators Justice minister Patrick Chinimasa and
Labor minister Nicholas Goche failed to travel to South
Africa without forewarning them. He said their was a silver
lining, however, to their absence--he and Ncube had ample
time to relate their perceptions of ZANU-PF's positions and
negotiating strategy.


3. (C) Biti and Ncube told the South Africans that Mugabe
and ZANU-PF were in denial about the existence of a crisis.
ZANU-PF regarded the MDC as puppets of the U.S. and UK and

were not prepared to deal with them as equals. They engaged
in the talks because South Africa was one of their few
friends and they did not wish to offend that country. Biti
also emphasized to his interlocutors that Mugabe considered
Mbeki a junior partner, intimating that he could be
manipulated.


4. (C) Biti said he and Ncube next outlined what he saw as
the ZANU-PF strategy. They thought ZANU-PF would try to drag
out the negotiations while at the same time preparing to
introduce and pass Constitutional Amendment 18 (Ref B) which
would solidify ZANU-PF's grip on parliament and facilitate
its perpetuation of power. (Note: Parliament is due to
consider Amendment 18 when it reconvenes on July 24. End
Note.) Proof of ZANU-PFs lack of sincerity was recent
speeches by Mugabe and Vice-President Msika arguing that a
new constitution was unnecessary--this after the ZANU-PF and
MDC negotiators agreed last month that a new constitution
should be the top agenda item (Ref A). Ultimately, Biti
thought that ZANU-PF might pull out of the negotiations,
blaming lack of progress on the MDC and/or the South
Africans, or they might attempt to get the MDC to sign a

HARARE 00000627 002 OF 003


meaningless agreement. Biti and Ncube concluded by telling
the South Africans directly that Mugabe was "playing" them
and that they needed to come up with a strategy to get
ZANU-PF to negotiate meaningfully.

--------------
Cautious Optimism
--------------


5. (C) Unlike in years past when Biti thought the South
African goal was a reformed ZANU-PF government, he told us he
now thought Mbeki was genuinely seeking constitutional reform
permitting a fair election. He believed Mbeki did not want
the negotiations to fail, realizing that it could negatively
affect his legacy. According to Biti, Mbeki, in a meeting
with both sides on June 18, had bluntly told them that
Zimbabwe was in a crisis that needed to be resolved for the
sake of Zimbabwe and for the region as a whole. The
following day, Mufamadi "hit the roof" after reviewing
ZANU-PF's position paper on negotiations which declared the
land dispute between the UK and Zimbabwe should be the
primary focus, attacked the MDC as puppets of the West, and
criticized sanctions while ignoring issues of constitutional
and electoral reform. The South Africans were subsequently
able to mediate an agenda,viewed favorably by the MDC,
focusing on reforms. (Ref A).


6. (C) Tempering optimism with realism, Biti said he knew
ZANU-PF would have to be dragged to a good agreement. And
noting the importance Mbeki placed in arriving at an
agreement, he acknowledged that it would be up to the MDC
negotiators to press Mbeki and his team to come to a good
resolution.


6. (C) Biti said he and Ncube had confidence in Mbeki's
mediation team and thought Mbeki's point person, Mufamadi,
was informed and capable, albeit low key. Despite the split
between MDC factions, he and Ncube were working well together.

--------------
And if Optimism is Misplaced...
--------------


7. (C) The MDC, according to Biti, was actively preparing
for elections. He pointed to large crowds that have attended
Tsvingirai-led rallies in the last couple of weeks.

SIPDIS
Nevertheless, participation in the scheduled elections was
dependent on a level electoral playing field. The MDC's
ultimate weapon was the "delegitimization" of the election.
Biti maintained that the MDC would abandon its electoral
campaign and take to the streets if a fair election were not
possible.

--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) Although an agreement was reached in mid-June to put
constitutional and electoral reform on the negotiating agenda
(Ref A),Mugabe and Vice-President Msika have since given
speeches declaring a new constitution unnecessary--amending
the current constitution in their eyes is sufficient.
Further, Amendment 18, introduced by the GOZ, will be taken
up when Parliament reconvenes on July 24. GOZ persistence in
debating and adopting this amendment would be evidence that
ZANU-PF does not take the talks seriously.


HARARE 00000627 003 OF 003



9. (C) With regard to the talks, critical questions are
whether Biti is right that Mbeki is determined to forge an
agreement and whether the South African president is prepared
to take necessary measures, such as public criticism of
ZANU-PF's negotiating role or the threat to withhold approval
of an unfair election, to force Mugabe's hand. Even with
strong intervention from Mbeki, however, Mugabe seems bent on
continuing his destructive policies, and we have serious
doubts whther he will sign an agreement leading to democratic
reform and permitting fair elections.
DELL