Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HARARE485
2007-06-01 08:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

MUJURU LIEUTENANT PITCHES FOR USG SUPPORT

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2366
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0485/01 1520850
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010850Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1552
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1614
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1481
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1618
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0277
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0883
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1246
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1674
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4081
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1443
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2101
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0741
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1835
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000485 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC ZI
SUBJECT: MUJURU LIEUTENANT PITCHES FOR USG SUPPORT

REF: A. REF A: HARARE 448


B. REF B: HARARE 336

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000485

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC ZI
SUBJECT: MUJURU LIEUTENANT PITCHES FOR USG SUPPORT

REF: A. REF A: HARARE 448


B. REF B: HARARE 336

Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) David Butau, ZANU-PF MP and member of the faction
allied to ex-military commander Solomon Mujuru, told poloff
on May 31 that Mujuru had determined that the time to unseat
President Robert Mugabe was now. Mujuru had flexed his
muscle and wrested control of the party structures in
Masvingo and Bulawayo, and his subordinates had begun to chip
away at Mugabe's key backers. Butau added that while
pressure on Mugabe was needed, the USG needed to quietly
weigh into this intra-party battle to help block Mugabe's bid
for another term. End Summary.

--------------
Mujuru Faction Assesses Time Is Now
--------------


2. (C) Ruling-party MP David Butau told poloff on May 31
that Mujuru had determined that he needed to act decisively
within the next four to five months to unseat Mugabe. If the
Mujuru camp was not able to force Mugabe out by the time of
the Extra-ordinary Congress expected in December (ref A),it
would be too late and Mugabe would by then solidify his
candidature and with it the presidency. Butau ) who is from
the same Shona ethnic sub-group as Vice President Joyce
Mujuru and reportedly employs one of the Mujuru daughters at
his investment company, Dande - noted that the Mujuru faction
had scored important victories in provincial party elections
in Masvingo and Bulawayo, adding to Mujuru's current support
in the three Mashonaland provinces.


3. (C) Adding to this sense of urgency, Butau outlined three
possible scenarios for the near term: 1) continued Mugabe
rule and economic decline that would be unsustainable; 2) a
reformed (read Mujuru-led) ZANU-PF coming to office that
would restore economic stability; or 3) a stalemate leading
to confrontation that would quickly entangle the
military/security forces and pit the Shona ethnic sub-groups

against each other. Butau contended that ZANU-PF was headed
for a train wreck, with one faction led by Mugabe determined
to stay in power at any cost and another faction led by
Mujuru desperate to save its business interests. Unless
Mujuru was able to gain the upper hand soon, Butau said that
the factional battles could spiral out of control. Asked
about the camp led by Rural Housing Minister and former heir
apparent Emmerson Mnangagwa, Butau said they were still
licking their wounds from a strong rebuke from Mugabe in late
2004 and had contented themselves with allying ) at least
temporarily ) with Mugabe in the hope that he would once
again turn his favor in their direction.

--------------
Fierce Battles Ongoing
--------------


4. (C) Despite attempts by the Mugabe faction to undermine
its intra-party opponents, Butau said the reformist element
of ZANU-PF was alive and well. Butau contended that the GOZ
decision to sever ties with a USG-funded parliamentary
support project (ref B) was ultimately an attempt to weaken
critical ZANU-PF MPs, such as himself, Walter Mzembi, and Leo

HARARE 00000485 002 OF 002


Mugabe - whom Butau added was out of favor with the
President.


5. (C) Instead of targeting Mugabe directly, Butau said the
Mujuru faction had decided to undermine his supporters,
chiefly Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, ZANU-PF Commissar
Elliot Manyika, Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, and Deputy
Youth Minister Saviour Kasukuwere. Noting that the on-going
economic crisis was crippling the pocketbooks of ruling party
insiders, Butau contended that the only way to confront
Mugabe's inner circle was on economic issues. To that end,
Butau ) who also chairs Parliament's Budget Committee )
noted that his Committee had recently taken Gono to task on
his failure to stabilize the economy. Specifically, the
faction wants to link its intra-party opponents to high-level
corruption, which they could then take to the military and
the party to convince those structures to rebuke Mugabe.
While Mujuru retained broad support within the military,
Butau stated that the military's professionalism ) which he
ascribed to Mujuru's leadership ) prevented them from
intervening without compelling reason.

--------------
Asks US Support For Reformists
--------------


6. (C) Butau asked poloff that the USG quietly support the
reformist element of ZANU-PF in this battle. While it was
important to maintain the heat on Mugabe and his circle,
Butau said US policy also had to cultivate contacts with
Mugabe's intra-party opponents, and not just those outside
the party. Poloff acknowledged that ZANU-PF was not
monolithic and noted that we continually sought more contact
with reform-minded ruling party members. Asked for specific
recommendations on how the USG should proceed, Butau was
initially at a loss but finally suggested that firm promises
of international financial support would help the Mujuru
faction erode Mugabe's support and ultimately usher in a
reformist government. Poloff replied that international
financial assistance was predicated on the GOZ undertaking
reforms, not the other way around.

--------------
Comment
--------------


7. (C) Poloff's meeting with Butau, which the MP scheduled
only hours before, smacked of desperation. The Mujuru camp
has done everything it could to gain control of the ruling
party structures in Masvingo and Bulawayo, while forestalling
Mugabe's full endorsement at Central Committee, but the
status quo still favors Mugabe. The meeting, which resembled
more of a brainstorming session than a formal request for
help, demonstrates that the Mujuru camp is running out of
ideas and possible options. While Butau's comments regarding
Mujuru's commitment to reform were certainly intended to
influence, he's right that the next few months will be key.
Unless this camp gets a shot in the arm soon, we're likely
looking at several more years of Mugabe.
DELL