Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HARARE341
2007-04-24 12:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:  

LOCAL OBSERVERS HIGHLIGHT ROADMAP, PITFALLS TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ZI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5012
RR RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0341/01 1141256
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241256Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1391
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1580
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1446
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1584
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0251
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0847
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1212
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1639
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4043
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1409
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2067
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0707
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1801
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000341 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
AF FOR DAS C. THOMPSON
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. LEO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
SUBJECT: LOCAL OBSERVERS HIGHLIGHT ROADMAP, PITFALLS TO
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000341

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF/S FOR S. HILL
AF FOR DAS C. THOMPSON
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN
NSC FOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. LEO
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ZI
SUBJECT: LOCAL OBSERVERS HIGHLIGHT ROADMAP, PITFALLS TO
FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN)
Chairperson Reginald Matchaba-Hove on April 17 told poloffs
that preparatory work needed to begin now to ensure that
elections to be held next year will be free and fair. The
SADC summit in Tanzania had locked the GOZ into presidential
and parliamentary elections at the beginning of next year.
Matchaba-Hove said necessary reforms - including relaxing of
oppressive legislation now prohibiting opposition
organization and campaigning, and an open and fair
registration process - must be accomplished by August to
level the electoral playing field for a March 2008 election.
Key to achieving these reforms would be negotiations,
mediated by South Africa,s Mbeki, between the GOZ and
opposition. To create pressure, ZESN plans to intensely
lobby internally with GOZ ministers and Parliament and in
regional capitals, and will also attempt to meet with Mbeki.
End Summary.

--------------
SADC Locks In 2008 Elections
--------------


2. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove said that the March SADC Heads of
State summit in Tanzania had locked Mugabe into holding
simultaneous presidential, parliamentary, and local council
elections by the end of March 2008. The SADC leaders had
demanded this as a means to resolve Zimbabwe's internal
crisis. With the election timetable now decided,
Matchaba-Hove noted that the SADC-appointed mediator, South
African President Mbeki, had to now establish the ground
rules to ensure that the elections would be free and fair.

--------------
Pressing For a Just Poll
--------------


3. (SBU) To allow for an adequate campaign process leading
up to the election, Matchaba-Hove noted that reforms needed
to be implemented at least six months before an election )

or by the end of August 2007 for the March 2008 poll. This
would allow the opposition opportunity to support voter
registration and to effectively campaign throughout the
country, including in rural areas. Matchaba-Hove's August
deadline for meaningful reform was also timed to capitalize
on SADC's current interest, as that month will see the SADC
Chairmanship pass to Namibia, historically a Mugabe
supporter.


4. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove believed the GOZ's strategy was to
stall as long as possible on reform implementation, and then
to agree to reforms three months or so before the elections
) not enough time to permit a fair electoral process, but
enough to allow pliable observers to deem the actual vote
"free and fair". Matchaba-Hove also noted that another
aspect of the GOZ strategy was the on-going abductions and
police harassment of MDC members designed to crush opposition
structures. Therefore, it was imperative that Mbeki move
negotiations along now with the aim of creating democratic

HARARE 00000341 002 OF 003


space and allowing the opposition an opportunity to regroup
and campaign.

--------------
Setting the Stage for Free and Fair Elections
--------------


5. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove said that ZESN would push the GOZ to
fully implement the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing
Democratic Elections, principles drafted in 2004 to which the
government is a signatory. In areas where the SADC
Principles were weak, ZESN planned to lobby the Mbeki-led
negotiations to adopt the stiffer SADC Parliamentary Forum
Norms and Standards that were drafted in 2001 but rejected by
the GOZ.


6. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove told us that concurrently with its
efforts to get the GOZ to implement the SADC Principles and
SADC Parliamentary Forum Norms, ZESN would work for abolition
or reform of existing repressive legislation that is in
opposition to the Principles and Norms. (Note. Post emailed
to AF/S ZESN's analysis of existing legislation and necessary
reforms. End Note.) Such legislation included the Public
Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA),which the GOZ
continued to use to selectively ban political expression and
to censure independent media in Zimbabwe.


7. (SBU) Reform of voter registration also was necessary,
according to Matchaba-Hove, to permit easy registration,
particularly for those turning 18, and to ensure accuracy in
voting rolls. The polls now included many ghost voters while
excluding many young people who came of age since the last
presidential election in 2002. Matchaba-Hove commented that
Zimbabwean expatriates should be allowed to vote, but he was
certain the GOZ would vigorously oppose this. Finally, an
independent electoral commission vice the current
GOZ-directed Zimbabwe Electoral Commission was essential to
oversee the entire electoral process.

--------------
Institutional Obstacles
--------------


8. (SBU) Matchaba-Hove also discussed the ZANU-PF
stranglehold over rural communities, through the use of
traditional authority structures. The ruling party had
successfully co-opted many traditional chiefs and other rural
community leaders and used them to weed out opposition
supporters and to deny the MDC access to these marginalized
areas which received no independent news. Through its
structures, ZANU-PF had also manipulated food assistance to
garner support. Timely reforms, particularly of POSA and
AIPPA, would permit the opposition to build
counter-structures in the rural areas. Another potential
obstacle was the recently-announced GOZ plan to merge Harare
constituencies, traditionally opposition strongholds, with
rural constituencies held by ZANU-PF in order to dilute them.
Matchaba-Hove warned that any GOZ-delimitation of electoral
constituencies needed to be transparent and that urban and
rural communities should not be mixed.
--------------
ZESN's Next Steps
--------------

HARARE 00000341 003 OF 003




9. (SBU) With the MDC distracted by on-going GOZ-directed
violence and intimidation, Matchaba-Hove said that civil
society and ZESN in particular needed to lead the movement
for electoral reform. ZESN hoped to play a key advocacy roll
with Parliament, the Minister of Justice, and the Attorney
General to encourage the repeal of oppressive legislation, to
advocate for the establishment of an independent electoral
commission, and to advocate that delimitation of
constituencies be done in a transparent manner. ZESN also
hoped to conduct a statistical sampling of voters' rolls in
some constituencies to check for irregularities in the
voters' rolls as a prelude to general reform in this area.
Within the broader SADC region, ZESN hoped to liaise with
civil society partners to argue for adoption of the SADC
Principles. Finally, Matchaba-Hove noted that ZESN hoped to
meet with Mbeki to impress upon him the need to level the
electoral playing field as early as possible, but no latter
than six months before the elections.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) As Matchaba-Hove clearly laid out, achieving a level
electoral playing field is a daunting task in the face of
opposition from the government. The GOZ's campaign of
violence and intimidation is clearly designed to prevent
focus on electoral reform and preparation for the 2008
elections--until it is too late. Our material support is
critical to help ZESN work for reform, and to enable the
opposition to prepare for the elections. Equally important
will be sustained high-level diplomatic engagement with SADC
) and in particular, South Africa ) to keep them pushing
for genuine electoral reforms and the creation of at least
minimally acceptable conditions. All our interlocutors in
civil society and the opposition agree that regional
engagement with and pressure on the GOZ are the key to free
and fair elections next year. They will not get there if we
don't help them stay on the right path and they, in turn,
limit Mugabe's room to cheat and brutalize his way to
"victory".
DELL