Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07HARARE311
2007-04-12 10:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Harare
Cable title:
MUTAMBARA BACKS TSVANGIRAI FOR 2008
how-toVZCZCXRO2497 RR RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHSB #0311/01 1021059 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 121059Z APR 07 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY HARARE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1354 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1562 RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1430 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1566 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0235 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0829 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1192 RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1621 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 4025 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1391 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2049 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0691 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1783
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000311
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: MUTAMBARA BACKS TSVANGIRAI FOR 2008
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
-------
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 000311
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: MUTAMBARA BACKS TSVANGIRAI FOR 2008
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Arthur Mutambara, leader of the MDC's pro-Senate
faction told the Ambassador April 10 that both MDC factions
would work together in a coalition, fielding one candidate
for president, and that anti-Senate faction leader Morgan
Tsvangirai would be that candidate. Mutambara was confident
SIPDIS
the MDC could defeat Mugabe provided minimum standards were
in place to allow for a relatively free election. The
Ambassador stressed the importance of contesting the
elections and beginning preparations now. Mutambara took the
point.
2. (C) Mutambara said that behind the scenes SADC countries
were fed up with Mugabe and told him so at the SADC Summit.
He and the Ambassador agreed that South African President
Mbeki's mediation could set the stage for free elections.
Mutambara said ZANU-PF was behind the campaign of petrol
bombings and agreed with the Ambassador that Mugabe might use
it as a possible pretext to declare a state of emergency and
cancel elections. Mutambara said he would be in Washington
for a conference on April 19. The Ambassador proffered
Department help on public outreach for Mutambara afterward.
End Summary.
--------------
One MDC Presidential Candidate
--------------
3. (C) Pro-Senate MDC faction leader Arthur Mutambara told
the Ambassador April 10 that teams from both MDC factions had
met and had agreed to work as a coalition, fielding one
presidential candidate. That candidate would be his opposite
number, Morgan Tsvangirai. Mutambara added that he had used
the events of March 11 to force a degree of unity, including
on elements in his faction who were opposed. As an aside, he
mentioned that after a recent arrest (at the airport on his
way to South Africa),police had questioned him as to why he
was working with Tsvangirai. Mutambara opined that such
government concern validated the coalition.
--------------
MDC Can Win
--------------
4. (C) Mutambara said he had visited rural areas the day
before where he had encountered significant anti-Mugabe
sentiment. People there were feeling the effects of
Zimbabwe's devastated economy. The rural areas had always
been Mugabe,s bedrock of support. This loss of support
indicated that Mugabe was taking a big risk by holding an
election. It was up to the MDC to make him pay for it.
5. (C) The Ambassador responded by stressing the importance
of beginning now to prepare for the 2008 elections rather
than debating whether to participate, and building the
strongest organization possible to contest the elections. He
suggested reaching out to discontented elements within
ZANU-PF, as well as reassuring the military them and their
institution, noting that a neutralized army would make it
more difficult to manipulate voting and vote counting. The
Ambassador also discussed working with the Zimbabwe Electoral
Support Network (ZESN) to establish a parallel vote counting
HARARE 00000311 002 OF 003
system for the election.
6. (C) Mutambara took the point and agreed that the MDC had
to commit to the elections and begin organizing. He said
that resources were tight and inquired about USG support.
The Ambassador responded that although the USG could not
provide direct financing it could assist the opposition
indirectly through an umbrella coalition such as "Save
Zimbabwe." The organization, however, also needed to get
itself organized including setting up a secretariat.
--------------
SADC and Mbeki
--------------
7. (C) Mutambara said that although the SADC leaders had not
wanted to wash their "dirty laundry" in public, they were
nonetheless fed up with Mugabe. According to his sources,
the Dar es Salaam Summit last month had not been a victory
for Mugabe. Instead, the SADC leaders had dealt Mugabe an
"ugly blow." Moreover, SADC leaders were upset with
Mugabe,s efforts after the Summit to speak in their name and
claim their support for his crack down on the opposition.
The Ambassador agreed and noted that Mbeki's interview
earlier in the week with the Financial Times seemed to
indicate that Mugabe's mischaracterization of the Summit had
increased the tension between him and the other leaders in
the region.
8. (C) Mutambara said the MDC had decided to work with SADC
and Mbeki. The two factions' secretary-generals, Tendai Biti
and Welshman Ncube, had recently met jointly with Mbeki. By
presenting a united front the MDC hoped to quell South
African doubts about the MDC. The Ambassador said the key
question going forward was whether Mbeki was serious about
creating the minimum standards for a free election or whether
he would follow his instinct of supporting the party in
power, i.e. ZANU-PF. Mutambara agreed that Mbeki could play
the key role in setting the stage for an internationally
assisted election that, even without a new constitution,
could produce a legitimate outcome.
--------------
Government Attacks on MDC
--------------
9. (C) Mutambara said the recent spate of petrol bombings
had been conducted by the government itself. That said, he
was concerned that the MDC had been infiltrated to such an
extent that ostensible MDC activists who were actually
government agents could incriminate his party. Mutambara
agreed with the Ambassador that Mugabe could use the pretext
of MDC violence to cancel the elections and declare a state
of emergency if he felt that he might lose the elections.
10. (C) The Ambassador added that the recent violence
against the opposition seemed to be an attempt on Mugabe's
part to destroy the MDC now, months before the elections,
while the world's attention was once more else where. It was
up to the MDC to keep the international spotlight on
Zimbabwe. Mutambara agreed and noted in that regard that he
would be attending the Forum of Young Global Leaders
sponsored by the World Economic Forum on April 19 in
Washington. The Ambassador agreed to help him convince
Tsvangirai or one of his deputies to accompany Mutambara and
SIPDIS
to facilitate official meetings as well as press
opportunities during the visit.
HARARE 00000311 003 OF 003
--------------
Comment
--------------
11. (C) The MDC's apparent plans to work together as a
coalition in contesting the 2008 elections is at least one
sign that they are starting to practice "grown-up" politics
in the words of one local observer. However, we have watched
them play Hamlet before on elections. It's critical that
they commit now to contest the elections and start preparing
immediately. They have a golden chance to win the election
even if it is not fully free and fair given the state of the
economy and Mugabe's unpopularity. If they fail this time,
the current leadership of the opposition is unlikely to get
another chance.
DELL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
AF/S FOR S.HILL
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR E.LOKEN
STATE PASS TO NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B.PITTMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV ZI
SUBJECT: MUTAMBARA BACKS TSVANGIRAI FOR 2008
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher Dell under Section 1.4 b/d
--------------
Summary
--------------
1. (C) Arthur Mutambara, leader of the MDC's pro-Senate
faction told the Ambassador April 10 that both MDC factions
would work together in a coalition, fielding one candidate
for president, and that anti-Senate faction leader Morgan
Tsvangirai would be that candidate. Mutambara was confident
SIPDIS
the MDC could defeat Mugabe provided minimum standards were
in place to allow for a relatively free election. The
Ambassador stressed the importance of contesting the
elections and beginning preparations now. Mutambara took the
point.
2. (C) Mutambara said that behind the scenes SADC countries
were fed up with Mugabe and told him so at the SADC Summit.
He and the Ambassador agreed that South African President
Mbeki's mediation could set the stage for free elections.
Mutambara said ZANU-PF was behind the campaign of petrol
bombings and agreed with the Ambassador that Mugabe might use
it as a possible pretext to declare a state of emergency and
cancel elections. Mutambara said he would be in Washington
for a conference on April 19. The Ambassador proffered
Department help on public outreach for Mutambara afterward.
End Summary.
--------------
One MDC Presidential Candidate
--------------
3. (C) Pro-Senate MDC faction leader Arthur Mutambara told
the Ambassador April 10 that teams from both MDC factions had
met and had agreed to work as a coalition, fielding one
presidential candidate. That candidate would be his opposite
number, Morgan Tsvangirai. Mutambara added that he had used
the events of March 11 to force a degree of unity, including
on elements in his faction who were opposed. As an aside, he
mentioned that after a recent arrest (at the airport on his
way to South Africa),police had questioned him as to why he
was working with Tsvangirai. Mutambara opined that such
government concern validated the coalition.
--------------
MDC Can Win
--------------
4. (C) Mutambara said he had visited rural areas the day
before where he had encountered significant anti-Mugabe
sentiment. People there were feeling the effects of
Zimbabwe's devastated economy. The rural areas had always
been Mugabe,s bedrock of support. This loss of support
indicated that Mugabe was taking a big risk by holding an
election. It was up to the MDC to make him pay for it.
5. (C) The Ambassador responded by stressing the importance
of beginning now to prepare for the 2008 elections rather
than debating whether to participate, and building the
strongest organization possible to contest the elections. He
suggested reaching out to discontented elements within
ZANU-PF, as well as reassuring the military them and their
institution, noting that a neutralized army would make it
more difficult to manipulate voting and vote counting. The
Ambassador also discussed working with the Zimbabwe Electoral
Support Network (ZESN) to establish a parallel vote counting
HARARE 00000311 002 OF 003
system for the election.
6. (C) Mutambara took the point and agreed that the MDC had
to commit to the elections and begin organizing. He said
that resources were tight and inquired about USG support.
The Ambassador responded that although the USG could not
provide direct financing it could assist the opposition
indirectly through an umbrella coalition such as "Save
Zimbabwe." The organization, however, also needed to get
itself organized including setting up a secretariat.
--------------
SADC and Mbeki
--------------
7. (C) Mutambara said that although the SADC leaders had not
wanted to wash their "dirty laundry" in public, they were
nonetheless fed up with Mugabe. According to his sources,
the Dar es Salaam Summit last month had not been a victory
for Mugabe. Instead, the SADC leaders had dealt Mugabe an
"ugly blow." Moreover, SADC leaders were upset with
Mugabe,s efforts after the Summit to speak in their name and
claim their support for his crack down on the opposition.
The Ambassador agreed and noted that Mbeki's interview
earlier in the week with the Financial Times seemed to
indicate that Mugabe's mischaracterization of the Summit had
increased the tension between him and the other leaders in
the region.
8. (C) Mutambara said the MDC had decided to work with SADC
and Mbeki. The two factions' secretary-generals, Tendai Biti
and Welshman Ncube, had recently met jointly with Mbeki. By
presenting a united front the MDC hoped to quell South
African doubts about the MDC. The Ambassador said the key
question going forward was whether Mbeki was serious about
creating the minimum standards for a free election or whether
he would follow his instinct of supporting the party in
power, i.e. ZANU-PF. Mutambara agreed that Mbeki could play
the key role in setting the stage for an internationally
assisted election that, even without a new constitution,
could produce a legitimate outcome.
--------------
Government Attacks on MDC
--------------
9. (C) Mutambara said the recent spate of petrol bombings
had been conducted by the government itself. That said, he
was concerned that the MDC had been infiltrated to such an
extent that ostensible MDC activists who were actually
government agents could incriminate his party. Mutambara
agreed with the Ambassador that Mugabe could use the pretext
of MDC violence to cancel the elections and declare a state
of emergency if he felt that he might lose the elections.
10. (C) The Ambassador added that the recent violence
against the opposition seemed to be an attempt on Mugabe's
part to destroy the MDC now, months before the elections,
while the world's attention was once more else where. It was
up to the MDC to keep the international spotlight on
Zimbabwe. Mutambara agreed and noted in that regard that he
would be attending the Forum of Young Global Leaders
sponsored by the World Economic Forum on April 19 in
Washington. The Ambassador agreed to help him convince
Tsvangirai or one of his deputies to accompany Mutambara and
SIPDIS
to facilitate official meetings as well as press
opportunities during the visit.
HARARE 00000311 003 OF 003
--------------
Comment
--------------
11. (C) The MDC's apparent plans to work together as a
coalition in contesting the 2008 elections is at least one
sign that they are starting to practice "grown-up" politics
in the words of one local observer. However, we have watched
them play Hamlet before on elections. It's critical that
they commit now to contest the elections and start preparing
immediately. They have a golden chance to win the election
even if it is not fully free and fair given the state of the
economy and Mugabe's unpopularity. If they fail this time,
the current leadership of the opposition is unlikely to get
another chance.
DELL